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1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Recent advances in information technology 
communications have brought about increases in bandwidth 
and processing speeds to encourage the growth of Internet 
Protocol Telephony (IPT), a method of transmitting voice 
conversations over data networks. Many organizations are 
replacing portions of their traditional phone systems to 
gain the benefits of cost savings and enhanced feature sets 
through the use of IPT.  
The Coast Guard (CG) has an interest in exploiting 
this technology, and has taken its first steps by 
implementing IPT at Headquarters Support Command in 
Washington, D.C. Unfortunately, the Coast Guard has little 
to no policy in place to guide the employment of a high 
quality, secure, and reliable IPT-based network. To address 
this issue, this thesis research will: (1) explore the 
successful implementation practices and security policies 
of commercial, government, and educational organizations, 
(2) produce recommendations for IPT security policies and 
IPT implementation practices relevant to the Coast Guard, 
and (3) analyze the IPT system at CG Headquarters with 
respect to those policy recommendations.  
B. ORGANIZATION 
Following this introduction, Chapter II will explain 
the basic characteristics and operation of the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and Internet Protocol 
Telephony (IPT). It will facilitate a comparison between 
the two types of telephone networks and prepare the reader 
to understand discussions about IPT security and 
2 
implementation. Chapter III will provide an analysis of IPT 
security issues specifically addressing IPT specific 
threats, vulnerabilities, and safeguards. It will also 
include a discussion of policies and guidance that address 
IPT security. Chapter IV will present an account of the IPT 
implementation practices that have been successfully used 
to create a secure IPT-based network. Chapter V will 
provide a background of the Coast Guard’s move to IPT at 
Headquarters Support Command. Chapter VI will apply the 
research to the Coast Guard’s implementation by examining 
their deployment process and by making recommendations for 
improvement. 
C. COAST GUARD BENEFIT 
The Coast Guard will receive the following tangible 
outputs from the research process: (1) a document providing 
security policy recommendations for IPT (Appendix A), (2) a 
manager’s guide that provides recommendations for effective 
deployment practices of IPT-based networks in the Coast 
Guard (Appendix B), and (3) feedback on the implementation 
process and security measures being used to deploy IPT at 
CG Headquarters. The Coast Guard will gain an understanding 
of the advantages, limitations, and security issues that it 




II. PUBLIC SWITCHED TELPHONE NETWORK (PSTN) AND 
INTERNET PROTOCOL TELEPHONY (IPT) OVERVIEW 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a basic 
understanding of the operation and functions of the Public 
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) and of Internet Protocol 
Telephony (IPT). This will help to make comparisons between 
the two types of telephony in regards to strengths and 
weaknesses, reliability, and feature sets. It will also 
facilitate the identification of security vulnerabilities 
so that appropriate measures may be applied to mitigate the 
risks of potential threats. 
B. PSTN OVERVIEW 
1. Background 
The Plain Old Telephone System (POTS) has come a long 
way since Alexander Graham Bell’s first connection in 1876. 
A simple system, that required two endpoints to be 
physically connected to operate, has evolved into a complex 
switching system that allows people to communicate with 
others all over the globe at an affordable cost. This 
section will provide a very brief and simple description of 
how the PSTN operates and what types of services it 
provides. It is important to understand the capabilities of 
the PSTN because people will expect similar performance 
from IPT, especially when it comes to reliability and voice 
quality.  
a. Reliability 
We often take for granted the high level of 
reliability that our telephones provide. The well-
established POTS provides redundancies that allow us to get 
a dial tone every time we pick up the phone, even during 
4 
power outages. Most people would not be able to clearly 
recall the last time they had a dropped call nor remember 
when they could not get a connection. This level of 
reliability is often referred to as “five nines,” that is, 
the telephone network is operational 99.999% of the time. 
This translates to about 5.256 minutes of downtime per year 
(Walker 3). Most believe that the telephone companies 
provide this advertised level of service, though some 
believe that aging equipment and the inability to follow 
maintenance standards (called Bell System Practices) have 
created an environment where reliability is beginning to 
falter (Estes Interview, 16 Dec 04). Regardless of the 
PSTN’s actual reliability, we know from experience that it 
is much more dependable than our data networks, which we 
lose access to on a regular basis (on average about 5 days 
and 11.4 hours out of the year based on an estimated 
network reliability of 98.5% (Walker 68-9)). If we plan to 
move voice over the data network via IPT, we must be 
prepared to find a way to advance towards the level of 
reliability that users have come to expect from the PSTN. 
b. Quality 
Like reliability, the voice quality of the POTS 
has been refined over the years to provide clear messages 
across the network. Voice quality is purported to be so 
good that you can hear a pin drop. The quality can 
deteriorate through the use of cellular phones, wireless 
phones, and satellite communications, but rarely does so 
over the physical network.  
The most widely accepted method of evaluating 
voice quality is a subjective assessment called the mean 
opinion score or MOS. MOS is calculated by having several 
5 
human listeners rate the quality of a call on a scale of 1 
to 5 and taking the average. Determining voice quality in 
this manner can be very expensive; as a result, several 
algorithms have been created to estimate voice quality and 
map their scores to the MOS model. The Mean Opinion Score 
Scale is shown in Table 1. A MOS of 4 or higher is 
considered toll quality, while values less than 3.6 usually 
result in user dissatisfaction (Walker 79-81). 
 






Table 1. Mean Opinion Score Scale (From Walker 80) 
 
The MOS of a network (whether it be, for 
instance, the PSTN, IPT, or a Cellular network) is 
dependent on call volume, the type of compression used, and 
other network design factors. Generally, telephones on the 
PSTN provide toll quality service, while cell phones and IP 
Phones frequently fall short. To successfully imitate the 
PSTN, IPT must attempt to reach a consistent level of 
quality; however, consumers have been willing to accept 
lower quality in cellular phones to realize mobility and 
may consider similar trade-offs from IPT. 
c. Features 
The PSTN provides a variety of services that we 
have become familiar with through residential use. Some of 
these include: Local, long distance, and international 
6 
service; Call waiting; Call forwarding; Three-way calling; 
Caller ID; Call blocking; Automatic callback; Call return 
(*69; Calling cards; Voice mail; Toll free numbers (e.g., 
800) (Davidson 16-7). At home, we usually only use simple 
features to allow convenient voice communication and enable 
data connections to the internet. On the other hand, 
organizations find great business value in utilizing these 
features in a variety of ways. For instance, a company may 
use an 800 number and phone tree (enabled by call 
forwarding) to connect the customer to the right person, 
and use Caller ID as a piece of information to determine 
the customer’s identity. Businesses also leverage the power 
of the PSTN through conferencing and advanced voice mail 
services. IPT-based networks must provide, at a minimum, 
the same services and features (or suitable replacements) 
that a business already relies on from its POTS. 
IPT must also provision for two other services 
that provide for the safety and security of individuals and 
governments, Emergency 911 (E911) and the Government 
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS). E911 is a 
service available to any user that provides the location of 
a phone to emergency dispatch services. The GETS is 
provided only to authorized individuals from certain 
government agencies and private companies that handle 
critical infrastructure recovery operations. GETS these 
personnel a higher probability of getting a dial tone 
during emergencies (e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes, 
terrorist attacks, etc.) when the PSTN becomes overburdened 
with calls (Carlberg 2-4). These services have been well-
established on the PSTN and must be replicated in IPT. 
7 
d. Regulation and Cost Structure 
The PSTN is regulated to a degree (less so than 
in the years prior to deregulation in 1980) to ensure a 
stable infrastructure, mostly in the form of taxes, fees, 
and prescribed processes mandated by federal and local 
governments. Despite these regulatory costs (which are 
currently very limited with IPT), telephone carriers have 
been able to provide relatively cheap long distance 
services. Billing on the PSTN is relatively simple because 
carriers control large segments of the network and 
collectively own the entire network. Users are typically 
charged an access fee and additional charges for each unit 
(e.g., minute) of use. In contrast, billing for IPT-based 
networks is more complex because it is more difficult to 
track phone calls through multiple networks. Telephone 
carriers must work to create an effective billing system 
for IPT that addresses a complicated data network. 
e. Common Threats 
The PSTN is a reasonably secure network due to 
years of experience and a strong physical infrastructure. 
The POTS holds most of its information in equipment that is 
physically protected, where access is limited to the 
general public. Though conversation confidentiality is not 
guaranteed (however, this risk is generally accepted by the 
public and mitigated by certain agencies through the use of 
encryption), private information is well guarded and the 
industry’s largest concern has been the threat of 
Phreaking. A Phreaker is similar to a black hat hacker who 
attempts to get free phone calls through illegal methods. 
IPT will be subject to the same risks present in the PSTN, 
but must also be prepared to address the threats introduced 
8 
by utilizing a network that could easily be accessed by 
almost anyone. 
2. PSTN Operation 
The POTS is made up of a variety of redundant and 
physically protected elements that create a very reliable 
(5 nines) and relatively secure (compared to voice over 
data network) telephone network. A list of the basic 
components of the network follows to help demonstrate how a 
voice conversation is carried across the PSTN. 
a. Components 
(1) Telephone and Circuit: The typical home 
handset is a simple device that sends and receives an 
analog signal (voice) to/from the local switch. Business 
telephones are often digital devices that connect to the 
company’s Private Branch Exchange (PBX). The basic circuit 
from the telephone to the local switch is called a twisted 
pair. It is composed of two wires, twisted to reduce 
interference, and a sleeve used to transmit signals and 
voice at 48 volts. These components are commonly referred 
to as tip (negative wire), ring (positive wire), and ground 
(sleeve) (Newton 858, 837). 
(2) Private Branch Exchange (PBX): The PBX 
is used by organizations to enable many features of the 
PSTN that are not necessarily available for residential 
service. It is similar to the local office switch that most 
residential users are connected to, but is located within 
and usually owned by the organization. It allows businesses 
to provide services for many users with fewer resources by 
sharing lines (but not phone numbers). They are often able 
to achieve further savings and functionality by connecting 
PBXs at different offices. The functionality of the PBX may 
be outsourced to the local service provider at a lower cost 
9 
to the company, known as Centrex, but usually comes at a 
loss of control of over some telephony components and 
features (Walker 9). 
(3) Switches: The first two telephones had 
to be physically connected to function, and modern 
telephones require the same connectivity. Rather then 
physically connect every telephone to every other 
telephone, networks of switches were developed. These 
switches consolidate several lines together and create the 
physical connections required to link two phones. The first 
switch that a phone is connected to is usually the local 
switch or local office and is sometimes referred to as a 
Class 5 switch. At this point, the analog signal is 
converted to a digital signal and sent to the next switch 
on the network. These switches at the core of the network 
are called tandem switches and move large call volumes 
through the network (Walker 7-8).  
 
Figure 1. Circuit-Switched Network (After Ragsdale 2) 
 
These switches form a dedicated circuit from 
one phone to another through the duration of a call as 
illustrated in the example in Figure 1. The call is 
initiated from a digital phone and connected to the PSTN 
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through the PBX. The voice signal moves from local switch 1 
(LS1), through tandem switches 2 (TS2) and 3(TS3), to local 
switch 4 (LS4). The signal is converted to analog at LS4 
and is received by the other caller on an analog telephone. 
The entire phone conversation takes place on this 
connection in both directions until the call is complete. 
Not all telephone connections are established this way, as 
many telephone carriers now have some sort of packet-
switching located in the backbone of their networks; 
however, this type of connection is usually established for 
a local call. 
(4) Trunk lines: Switches on the PSTN are 
connected by trunk lines. The capacity of a trunk line is 
measured by the number of channels it can hold. A basic 
channel, called digital signal level 0 (DS0), that supports 
one phone line requires 64 kbps of bandwidth to achieve 
adequate digital voice quality. A T1 (trunk level 1) line 
supplies 1.544 mbps to support 24 DS0 channels (and 8 kbps 
of overhead per channel) (Newton 800). 
(5) Signaling System 7 (SS7): The components 
discussed to this point provide the basic physical 
connection from one endpoint to another. SS7 provides the 
means to set up, manage, and tear down a call so that 
information can flow freely between two telephones. SS7 is 
referred to as out-of-band signaling because it does not 
use the same path as the voice signal. In fact, SS7 
utilizes switches that operate like the packet-switched 
internet. The SS7 is made up primarily of three components: 
The Service Switching Point (SSP), the Signal Transfer 
Point (STP), and the Service Control Point (SCP). The SSPs 
are usually located near the endpoint local switches of the 
PSTN. The SSPs usually generate and receive the signaling 
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messages to set up and manage voice circuits. The STPs are 
similar to switches, moving signaling messages through the 
SS7 network, and communicate with tandem switches and the 
destination local switch to setup a call. The SCPs provide 
the interface to databases that provide information for 
toll free number lookups and other call management 
features. These components are linked together in a network 
to provide an efficient method of setting up calls without 
tying up bandwidth on the voice network (Ragsdale 111-118). 
Figure 2 shows how these integrate into the system.  
 
Figure 2. PSTN Diagram (After Walker 9, 11) 
 
b. Making a Call 
Figure 2 provides an illustration of how these 
basic components of the PSTN work together to make a call 
between two telephones (from an enterprise office to a 
residential phone in this example). First, the user picks 
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up the phone and hears a dial tone. The dial tone is 
generated by the PBX or local office to indicate that there 
is a connection and power to the local switch. When the 
user dials a number it begins the call setup process. The 
SSP at the local switch generates messages that are managed 
by the STPs to communicate with tandem switches and the 
other local switch on the voice network. The STPs will, by 
way of the SSPs, reserve a path for the voice conversation 
and alert the other local switch that a call is incoming. 
If necessary, the STPs will use the SCPs to look up the 
location of a number (e.g., 800 number lookup) or to 
retrieve other management information. Next, the local 
switch will signal the analog telephone to ring. When a 
user answers the telephone at the other end, a similar 
signaling process will occur to notify the telephone at the 
office to begin the conversation. Once the call is set up, 
voice is transported across the PSTN as described in 
section B.2.a(3) of this chapter. When either user hangs up 
to complete the call another signaling transaction, similar 
to the setup process, occurs on the SS7 Network to release 
PSTN resources. 
C. IPT OPERATION 
1. Definition 
A variety of terminology has been coined to describe 
the process of replicating the function of the PSTN by 
moving voice on data networks, including: Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP or VOIP), Internet telephony, 
internet telephony, Voice on the Net (VON), next-generation 
telephony, computer telephony, packet telephony, intranet 
telephony, extranet telephony, etc (McKnight 3). As a broad 
description of all methods of moving voice over a packet-
switched network, the author uses the term Internet 
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Protocol Telephony (IPT) to “refer to the components and 
technology needed to place telephone calls over an[y] IP-
based network” (Walker 2). A description of the basic 
components and functionality of IPT follows. 
2. (Voice) Data Transport 
Although there are a variety of methods (discussed 
below) to set up and manage a call over data networks, all 
IPT phone calls share similar elements to transport voice 
data over packet-switched networks. These include: 
telephones, codecs, packet-switched networks and protocols. 
a. Telephones 
IPT telephones can take many forms. They may consist 
of simple analog phones connected to adapters that utilize 
bandwidth provided by an internet service provider (ISP). 
They may exist in the form of softphones, where a PC with a 
microphone and software are used to create a virtual phone. 
The most common IPT telephone, called an IP Phone, consists 
of a handset and a processor that provides varying degrees 
of IPT functionality depending on the model. The important 
point to note is that the intelligence of the network no 
longer resides deep within the network (as it does in the 
PSTN), but is often contained closer to or within the 
endpoints (Arkin, Security, 32). 
b. Codecs 
A codec derives its name from the process of 
coding and decoding. Codecs are used to convert an analog 
signal to a digital signal (code) and convert digital to 
analog (decode). This process may also include compression 
and other functions to optimize the signal bandwidth. The 
selection of a codec must be approached carefully to ensure 
good quality calls on IPT-based networks. A codec that does 
little compression will handle packets more quickly, but 
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will require more bandwidth. If there isn’t enough 
bandwidth, quality will suffer. On the other hand, codecs 
that do more compression take longer to handle packets and 
may potential lose information, creating potential drops in 
quality. When selecting a codec for a particular network, 
these concerns must be carefully balanced (Miller 254-256).  
c. Packet-Switched Network 
The packet-switched network of the Internet 
differs significantly from the circuit-switched network of 
the PSTN. Where the PSTN dedicates one line to an entire 
telephone conversation, IPT splits the conversation into 
small pieces (called packets) and transmits them, via 
Internet Protocol (IP), over a variety of paths depending 
on varying network traffic conditions. These packets also 
share network resources, such as the bandwidth allotted to 
a network, unlike the PSTN which dedicates the line to the 
call’s use. This type of network provides a connectionless 
or “best-effort” approach to packet delivery, that is, 
packets are not guaranteed to reach their final 
destination. Figure 3 illustrates the movement of voice 
packets over a packet-switched network and provides a 
comparison with the circuit-switched network in Figure 1. 
Notice that the dark packets take different routes and 
share resources with other (white) packets on the network. 
 
Figure 3. Packet-Switched Network (After Ragsdale 2) 
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The switch and trunk components of a packet-
switched network are similar to those of the PSTN. Devices 
that provide for connections between nodes in the network 
are called switches, and devices that connect networks are 
called routers. The links (or trunks) between switches and 
routers are similar to those of the PSTN and propagate data 
packets via a variety of media (e.g., copper wire, fiber 
optic cable, wireless, satellite, etc.). 
d. Transport Protocols 
The Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), a 
connection orientated protocol, was developed to achieve 
better reliability from the best effort packet-switched 
network. Both ends of a communication ensure reliable 
information exchange by acknowledging receipt of packets. 
Lost or damaged packets can be re-sent and reassembled 
through this process to attain complete information. This 
process, however, requires too much overhead and is too 
slow for real-time applications like voice conversations. 
However, TCP is often used to carry higher-layer protocols 
that setup and tear down IPT calls. 
The User Datagram Protocol (UDP), a 
connectionless orientated protocol like IP, is a simpler 
protocol than TCP and is used where reliable transmission 
of every packet is not critical. UDP has much less overhead 
and does nothing to acknowledge or resend packets. This 
protocol is useful when transmitting real-time data, such 
as multimedia video and audio, because even if it was 
determined that a packet was not received, it would be too 
late to resend the packet since the stream of audio or 
video would have passed the  point that it could be 
reinserted. Though packets may be lost, it is usually 
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acceptable since a single lost packet would not 
significantly affect the transmission of the information, 
and its use is usually limited to a robust network where 
loss would be minimal. IPT utilizes UDP to transport voice 
conversations because, even though it does not guarantee 
delivery of every voice packet, it provides better quality 
than the inherent delay created by TCP.  
Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP) is a higher-
layer protocol that is encapsulated in UDP and is 
specifically used to support streaming real-time multimedia 
applications like IPT. RTP carries the bulk of the voice 
conversation between two IPT endpoints once a connection is 
established. It provides support for “content 
identification, timing reconstruction, loss detection and 
security” (Newton 717). It is supported by the Resource 
Reservation Protocol (RSVP) to enable Quality of Service 
(i.e., prioritization of voice packets). 
The components discusses above provide a basic 
overview of the elements that facilitate the movement of 
the actual voice conversation in IPT. After the call is 
established, a user speaks into the phone, the analog voice 
signal is converted to a digital signal that may be 
compressed, and the signal is split into packets and 
carried over the packet-switched network via Internet 
protocols. 
3. Signaling Protocols 
A variety of protocols exist that set up and manage 
telephone calls in the IPT-based network. These protocols 
have been created by different standards bodies and by 
commercial organizations that developed their own propriety 
protocols (e.g., Cisco’s Skinny Client Control Protocol). 
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Varying protocols have created an environment where 
interoperability among IPT-based networks is difficult, but 
many believe that one standard will soon emerge. A brief 
description of two of the most commonly used IPT signaling 
protocols, Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and H.323, 
will be provided to understand call setup. 
a. H.323 
The H.323 standard, developed by the 
International Telecommunication Union (ITU-T), encompasses 
a set of standards designed to enable real-time multimedia 
(voice, video, and data) communications over a packet-
switched network. This is one of the first protocols 
developed for IPT and is currently the most widely 
supported. The high level of detail of the standard 
provides for excellent interoperability but has high 
overhead and is slow to change (Passmore, SIP, 9). 
(1) Components: H.323 has four primary 
components: Terminal, Gateway, Gatekeeper, and Multipoint 
Control Unit (MCU). The terminals represent the endpoints, 
telephones in the case of IPT. Gateways are optional and 
provide connections to other networks, protocols, or 
formats (e.g., PSTN). Gatekeepers are also optional, but if 
present must be used to provide address translation and 
manage calls to control bandwidth. The MCU is used to 
conference three or more Terminals or Gateways (Newton 
383). Figure 4 displays how these components fit together 
and connect to other networks in the H.323 architecture. 
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Figure 4. H.323 Architecture (After Miller 217) 
  
(2) Command and Control Protocols:  H.323 is 
considered an umbrella standard over several protocols, but 
only three of the primary protocols used by H.323 will be 
discussed here: H.245, Q.931, and RAS (Registration, 
Admissions, and Status). H.245, a call control channel, is 
used to send control messages to negotiate a terminal’s 
capabilities. Q.931 sets up connections between terminals. 
RAS is used to setup connections and manage communications 
between any component and gatekeepers. RAS is not utilized 
if a gatekeeper is not present (Newton 383).  
(3) Placing a Call: An example of a basic 
phone call, between two terminals that share the same 
gatekeeper, such as two phones on the same Local Area 
Network (LAN), is illustrated in Figure 5. Prior to the 
call, both terminals must register with the gatekeeper by 
exchanging RAS messages with the gatekeeper. When placing a 
call, terminal 1 will request bandwidth and terminal 2’s 
address from the gatekeeper. After the gatekeeper 
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acknowledges the request, terminal 1 will contact terminal 
2 directly to negotiate session parameters. If terminal 2 
accepts the call, it will also request bandwidth from the 
gatekeeper. After receiving an acknowledgement, terminal 2 
will notify terminal 1 and voice conversation may begin. 
Concluding the call is conducted in a similar manner in 
order to release bandwidth. 












Call Signaling Messages (Q.931 and H.245)
RTP
 
Figure 5. H.323 Call Signaling (After Miller 225) 
 
b. SIP 
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) was 
standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) 
in 1999 as Request for Comment (RFC) 2543. The protocol was 
designed with simplicity in mind, focusing on session 
initiation and termination, while relying on other Internet 
Protocols (such as TCP, UDP, RTP, and Session Description 
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Protocol) to complete the process. SIP is much like HTTP, 
using text-based messages to setup call connections. This 
“lightweight” protocol is expected to dominate the industry 
because it facilitates quick, scalable IPT solutions and 
creates the potential for a variety of features that the 
PSTN or H.323 are too slow to provide. 
(1) Components: SIP-based networks consist 
of two main components, User Agents and Servers. User 
Agents (UA) are endpoints (e.g., IP telephones) that 
contain a Client (UAC) and a Server (UAS). The UAC 
initiates requests and the UAS responds to requests. There 
are several SIP servers that provide certain services on 
the IPT-based network. Proxy servers make requests in 
behalf of other clients, Redirect servers provide address 
translation, Register servers register clients on the 
network, and Location servers provide the call recipient’s 
possible location to other servers. SIP components are 
identified with Uniform Resource Locators (URL) to simplify 
addressing. See Figure 6 for how these components reside 
within a network. 
(2) Placing a Call: Figure 6 shows an 
example of how the components of a SIP network are used to 
initiate a call {note: Prior to the call, the UAs will have 
already registered with a Registration server}. (Step 1) 
When the telephone (UA) is picked up, and the number 
dialed, an Invite request is sent to its Proxy server. 
(Step 2) The Proxy will query the Redirect server (could 
have queried a Location server as well) for an address of 
the called party. (Step 3) The Redirect server responds 
with an address to the call recipient’s network. (Step 4) 
The Proxy server sends an invite to the second Proxy server 
through the IP Network. (Steps 5-6) The second Proxy server 
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will query a location service that is not necessarily SIP 
and receive the address of the called party’s Proxy server. 
(Steps 7-8) The second Proxy server will send an Invite 
request to the third Proxy server that will then notify the 
call recipient that the caller desires to setup a 
connection. (Steps 9-12) When the called party picks up the 
phone, the UA will then acknowledge the Invite request back 
to the caller via the Proxy servers. Once a call is 
established, voice will flow via RTP as described above. 
The call will be terminated in a similar fashion, but will 
not require the services of the Redirect or Location 
Servers.  
 
Figure 6. SIP Network Architecture (From Miller 232)  
 
4. Voice Quality 
The process of moving voice over the data network as 
described above presents some challenges for maintaining 
high levels of voice quality. An explanation of some of 
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these issues will be related to help understand what kind 
of factors cause voice quality to improve or to 
deteriorate. 
a. Latency/Delay 
Latency or delay is the amount of time it takes 
for voice to travel from the speaker’s mouth to the 
receiver’s ear. Delay can be categorized in three ways: as 
propagation delay, handling delay, and serialization delay. 
Propagation delay is the amount of time it takes for the 
data to traverse the medium (e.g., speed of light through 
optical fiber) it is carried on. Serialization delay is the 
time it takes to place a bit onto an interface (bit rate), 
but is usually ignored, as it is relatively small with 
modern equipment. Handling delay is created by the 
equipment that processes data packets as it traverses a 
network. It commonly occurs in codecs where analog/digital 
signals are converted and data is compressed. Firewalls, 
switches, and routers create some delay while reading 
packet or header information and deciding how to process 
the packet. When networks are congested, the packets also 
see an increase in latency while waiting in queues. To 
provide an acceptable level of quality, the IPT-based 
network must not have delay in excess of 150 ms, and must 
reduce delay even further to meet the quality provided by 
the POTS (which is mostly affected by propagation delay, 
and minor handling delay (Davidson 167-169). 
b. Jitter 
Jitter refers to variations in the arrival time 
and order of packets. Jitter can potentially cause packets 
to be assembled out of sequence or to be dropped. To allow 
for non-uniform arrival times, jitter buffers are 
configured to wait a set amount of time before assembling 
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packets. This adds additional delay and must be balanced 
with the potential of losing packets that don’t arrive 
within the buffer timeframe (Kuhn 20-21). 
c. Lost Packets 
Lost packets are those packets that are dropped 
in the network, whether it is from improper routing, 
corrupted data, overflowing queues, or late arrivals. IPT 
can accept a certain amount of packet loss (approximately 
1-3%) without negative affects because the packets are so 
small (10-50 bytes); however, packet loss is often a bursty 
behavior, where many packets are lost at once (Kuhn 21-22). 
The solution to this problem usually involves good 
management of network resources, which will be discussed in 
implementation practices in Chapter IV. Another option 
considered to remedy this problem is to send redundant 
information, causing an increase in bandwidth.  
d. Echo 
Echo is created when the receiver’s telephony 
equipment amplifies and returns parts of the original 
signal back to the sender. It negatively impacts the 
conversation when the delay is greater than 25 ms. It can 
be reduced by properly configuring echo cancellers that are 
equipped with most IPT devices (Davidson 175). 
e. Quality of Service (QoS) 
QoS refers to services that give priority to 
certain packets, such as time-sensitive IPT packets over 
web browser traffic, to improve the affects of packet loss, 
jitter and handling delay. A variety of protocols are in 
use or being planned to help prioritize real-time data 
flows. They give priority to packets from time sensitive 
applications like IPT, subsequently slowing the processing 
of other information flows where time is less critical 
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(like email). Several companies provide tools to help 
monitor and manage QoS to balance the needs of applications 
and bandwidth constraints. The use of QoS mechanisms is 
considered a must to successfully attain good call quality 
on data networks. 
f. Bandwidth 
Increased bandwidth is often seen as the solution 
to many of the delays created in a packet-switched network, 
but data networks quickly consume increases in bandwidth. 
Increases in bandwidth will help to prevent packet loss, 
jitter, and decrease delay, but the best network 
performance is achieved by managing bandwidth rather than 
constantly increasing it. 
g.  Voice Activity Detection (VAD) 
VAD is used to detect pauses in speech to reduce 
the amount of bandwidth required to send voice 
conversations. The process saves significant amounts of 
bandwidth but can sometimes cut off the beginning of a 
phrase and will not work in noisy environments. 
h. Security  
Implementing security measures will often 
introduce delay in the system. Firewalls and encryption, 
for instance, will increase handling delay in an IPT-based 
network. Security will be discussed in depth later, but it 
will become apparent that security often comes at a cost of 
voice quality. 
D. BRIDGING PSTN AND IPT 
The telephony processes thus far have only addressed 
the PSTN and IPT in isolation. It is necessary to 
understand the interface between these two systems (and 
other systems like ISDN and Frame Relay Networks) to be 
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able to identify potential vulnerabilities in their 
interaction in later sections. 
1. Components 
The European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI), which has cooperated with the ITU and IETF, has 
developed a model for communication between gateways of 
dissimilar networks. This model (see Figure 7) separates 
gateway functionality into three elements: a Signaling 
Gateway (SG), a Media Gateway (MG), and a Media Gateway 
Controller (MGC). Sometimes these components exist in one 
piece of hardware, but frequently they are controlled by 
several different organizations. The SG controls signaling 
functions between the IP network (e.g., SIP) and circuit-
switched networks (e.g., SS7). The MG controls the media 
transfer between the IP network (e.g., RTP) and circuit-
switched networks (e.g., pulse code modulated voice). The 
MGC coordinates call processing functions between the SG 
and MG by using either the MGCP or the MEGACO/H.248 
protocols (Miller 237). 
 





a.  Media Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP) 
MGCP was developed by the IETF in RFC 2705 and 
was one of the first standards used to provide interfaces 
between the PSTN and IP network. MGCP refers to MGCs as 
Call Agents and has different gateways that provide 
interfaces between IP networks and a variety of other 
networks. For instance, “trunking gateways” manage many 
digital circuits to connect the PSTN to an IPT-based 
network, “business gateways” connect PBXs to IPT-based 
networks, and “residential gateways” provide an analog 
connection to the IP network via cable modems and other 
devices. The MGCP uses Call Agents to define connections 
among two endpoints and manages those connections with MGCP 
commands that are transmitted via UDP (Miller 238-239). 
b. Media Gateway Control (MEGACO)/H.248 
This protocol was developed jointly by IETF and 
ITU to improve upon MGCP, although the two protocols are 
not interoperable. MEGACO’s architecture is similar to 
MGCP, but handles control somewhat differently and provides 
more features for better security and scalability. For the 
purpose of this document, MEGACO follows the same basic 
model as MGCP. 
c. SIP and H.323 
SIP and H.323 provide some basic functionality to 
interface IPT-based networks to the PSTN (via H.323 or SIP 
gateways) but are not widely used for this purpose. 
3. Placing a Call 
Figure 8 can be used to demonstrate how a call can be 
made from an IP telephone to an analog line on the PSTN. 
When the caller picks up the phone on the IPT-based 
network, it initiates the H.323 or SIP signaling process 
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described above. The H.323 or SIP gateway on the edge of 
the network communicates with the Call Agent to set up the 
call. The Call Agent communicates with the SS7 network via 
the Signaling Gateway in the MEGACO architecture. The SS7 
network will contact the called party and initiate a 
connection if they answer the phone and pass an 
acknowledgement back to the IPT-based network via the Call 
Agent. The Call Agent will send a message to the Media 
Gateway to prepare for the transport of voice through the 
network. After the signaling process is complete, data will 
flow via the RTP: from the IP telephone, to an H.323 or SIP 
gateway, to the Media Gateway, to the PSTN network, and to 
the analog telephone. A call is terminated in a similar 
fashion to the setup and is initiated by hanging up. 
 
Figure 8. MGCP/MEGACO/H.248 Architecture (After Kuhn 48) 
 
4. IPT Architectures 
There are several IPT-based network designs that 
provide varying levels of IPT capability and network 
control to an organization. The following four are 
considered: 
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• Broadband services: These are services that are 
typically used by residential customers to save on long 
distance phone calls. They rely on a users existing 
broadband connection to provide service over the Internet. 
Services vary. For instance, among other services Vonage 
supplies its users with Analog Telephony Adapters that 
allow them to connect their traditional phones to their 
home routers. Other services, like Skype, are peer-to-peer 
services that require common (free) software between two 
users. 
• IP-PBX: This is similar to the PBX described for 
the PSTN, except that it supports an IPT-based network 
within the organization. It is connected to the PSTN 
through a dedicated trunk. 
• IP-enabled PBX: This is a hybrid solution, where 
a circuit-switched PBX is provided with interfaces for IPT 
equipment. It allows an incremental introduction of IPT 
without losing the features of the current PBX. 
• IP Centrex: A local service provider supplies the 
core IPT services for those organizations that wish to save 
costs on equipment and space. The disadvantage to this 
approach is that fewer features are available and 
businesses have less control of the network, making it more 
difficult to make changes or protect information. 
E. WHY IPT? 
IPT has been around for a while, but did not 
originally see much use due to bandwidth constraints that 
prevented good voice quality. Thanks to rapid increases in 
processing speeds and bandwidth, IPT has become a feasible 
alternative or complement to the PSTN. Despite IPT’s 
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inability to consistently provide the same level of voice 
quality and availability as the PSTN, it has grown to 
provide other forms of value, through lower costs, 
convergence, and enhanced feature sets, that the PSTN 
cannot. As voice quality and network reliability improve, 
many organizations are beginning to see fewer tradeoffs to 
IPT implementation. 
1. Lower Costs  
Many believe that IPT provides a means to make 
virtually free long distance and international calls, 
especially within an enterprise network. These savings are 
enabled by increasingly cheap bandwidth and by a lack of 
regulation (i.e., taxes) on media transport over internets. 
The bandwidth even becomes cheaper when comparing the 
required 64kbps throughput dedicated to a call on the POTS 
to the 14 kbps used for an IPT call (Varshney 90). However, 
most of these savings are not as large as publicized due to 
the relatively low cost of long distance, the cost of 
replacing PSTN components, and the cost of upgrading 
network components to support IPT.  
Toll-call savings are of minor interest to 
government agencies that already enjoy economies 
offered by government wide telecommunications 
contracts. Lower costs alone don’t justify 
significant investments in IP telephony and 
related network upgrades (Joch,IP telephony). 
Most would agree that the motivation to shift to IP is no 
longer driven by direct cost savings, but by other 
benefits. 
2. Convergence 
A significant benefit of shifting to IPT is the 
potential to consolidating the voice and data networks into 
one network, which is known as convergence. Organizations 
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can find great value in building one physical 
infrastructure. After the initial setup costs, maintenance 
and upkeep will become cheaper as less equipment will need 
to be maintained. Training and staffing costs will also 
fall because businesses no longer have to maintain two 
separate networks. Initial barriers to network convergence 
are caused by the high cost of replacing old systems and 
security risks. These roadblocks are slowly diminishing as 
PSTN systems age and require replacement and as security 
professionals more closely address the vulnerabilities of a 
converged system. 
3. Enhanced Feature Sets 
One of the greatest motivators to pursuing IPT 
implementation is the number, ease, and scalability of 
features that IPT systems are expected to provide. They 
have already proven their value by imitating most of the 
features that we have come to expect from the PSTN. The 
capabilities of the IPT protocols are easy to use and 
implemented quickly, far surpassing the sluggish change 
processes required with the PSTN. This has been 
demonstrated, for instance, with how quickly Moves, Adds, 
and Changes (MAC) can be performed. On the PSTN it could 
take as long as a few weeks to have a person’s phone moved 
to a new location and reconfigured, often at substantial 
cost. The slow response was often a result of sloppy wiring 
closets and the need for administrative assistance. On the 
IPT-based network a telephone can be moved within moments 
without the need of administrative control, because 
configuration capabilities lie within the IP phone and 
because no physical changes are required. Another powerful 
tool that businesses are utilizing is Unified Messaging 
Systems (UMS), where email and voice are converging to a 
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single mailbox allowing users to access their messages and 
communicate with colleagues in different ways. These are 
several examples of new capabilities that organizations are 
using to improve productivity, add value to business 
processes, and serve customers. It is expected that SIP 
will continue to enable rapid growth and implementation of 
new features. 
F. IPT CHALLENGES 
A shift to IPT produces significant benefits, but 
introduces risks that must be addressed and mitigated. By 
combining voice with data, we introduce the same security 
vulnerabilities to our voice systems that already exist on 
the data network, weaknesses that were nonexistent or 
sufficiently minimized in the PSTN. New interfaces between 
the PSTN and IPT are also likely to expose our networks to 
new threats. Understanding the operation of IPT and the 
functionality it attempts to emulate from the PSTN will 
help us to recognize points of vulnerability in the IPT 
system. The potential security risks introduced in this new 
environment will be discussed in-depth in the next chapter.  
Along with security issues, we find that voice quality 
and system availability may decline when shifting to IPT. 
An organization must carefully balance its management of 
IPT resources, as we are likely to find that an increase in 
quality is often associated with a decrease in security or 
an increase in costs. Other challenges include regulatory 
issues such as wiretapping under the Communications for Law 
Enforcement Act of 1994 (CALEA) on the one hand, and 
protecting private or proprietary information on the other. 
As organizations make the decision to implement IPT, they 
must carefully weigh the associated gains and tradeoffs. In 
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the long run though, we are likely to see companies 


























III. IPT SECURITY 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter provides descriptions of the most common 
security risks to IPT and the tools used to mitigate them. 
It includes a discussion of the costs (not necessarily in 
dollars) associated with either implementing security 
measures or ignoring the risks, in light of the common 
technique to measure the effectiveness of a network’s 
security in terms of Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability, and Authentication. Finally, a review of the 
U.S. Coast Guards current information technology policies 
is presented, and potential IPT security policy gaps are 
identified. 
The material in this chapter uses concepts (threats, 
vulnerabilities, and consequences) of a risk model 
presented by William Murray, to help gain an understanding 
of how to balance security risks with effective safeguards. 
Threats are attacks on the system and are usually measured 
as a rate of occurrence. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in 
the system that either exist (value of 1) or do not exist 
(value of 0). Consequences are the costs (e.g., time, 
money, reputation, etc.) that an organization incurs when 
an attack is successful. Multiplying these factors together 
can give a company a quantifiable (or subjective) estimate 
of risks and balance them with the costs of security 
mechanisms (Murray Notes). 
  
Figure 9. Risk Model 
Risk = Threat(rate) X Vulnerability(1,0) X Consequence($,Time,other) 
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A simple example of how this model could be used 
follows, but the process of examining risk may vary in 
scope and detail depending on the needs of the 
organization. A company endeavors to determine the risk of 
spam (junk mail). The business is vulnerable (V=1) because 
it receives all mail from any recipient. Employees 
encounter spam every business day of the month 
(T=20/month). On average, employees spend about five 
minutes per day sorting through junk mail(C=5 min/day). The 
risk that the company currently accepts each month totals 
about 100 (20*1*5) minutes of lost productivity per 
employee. Assuming that each employee is paid $.25 per 
minute ($15/hr), the company loses $25 of productivity for 
each employee per month. To reduce this cost, the company 
considers purchasing and maintaining a spam filter that 
costs about $5 per month per employee to maintain. The 
company will still receive spam everyday, but reduces it to 
the point where it only requires 1 minute per day to sort 
through, reducing lost productivity to 20 minutes or $5. 
The spam filter actually creates an additional 
vulnerability by blocking legitimate mail. The company 
estimates that it will require approximately 30 minutes 
($7.50) of additional work per month for each employee to 
make up for missed correspondence. The total risk accepted 
by the organization after installing the spam filter would 
be equal to the cost of the safeguard ($5) plus the cost of 
the remaining security weaknesses ($12.50) for a total of 
$17.50. This analysis allows the company to determine that 
the spam filter will add more value to the company by 
reducing risk. 
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It is clear from the example that the model does not 
always provide a perfect answer because several assumptions 
must be made to determine risk. However, real value comes 
through the ability to analyze security weaknesses and 
safeguards, to compare various solutions, and to establish 
where the businesses priorities lie. This chapter helps to 
identify: vulnerabilities that are common to IPT-based 
networks, common or frequently occurring threats and their 
consequences, infrequent threats (e.g., natural disasters) 
with large consequences, and the safeguards used to 
mitigate the subsequent risks. Each organization must 
determine for itself how to balance each of these elements 
to provide the most value to the company. 
B. SECURITY THREATS  
Security threats are those actors that interact with 
networks to degrade system security. Human threats and 
natural occurrences are introduced. IPT-based network 
managers must be aware of these threats to properly 
implement physical and logical barriers via safeguards. 
Human threats to the network come in a variety of 
forms. Those people who work to circumvent security 
measures are often referred to as hackers. “White-hat” 
hackers claim to improve security by identifying holes and 
alerting those who can fix them. This can still be a threat 
if the bad guys hear of the fix before you do. “Black-hat” 
hackers (a.k.a. crackers) have criminal intent, whether it 
is for financial gain, notoriety, political gain, 
information warfare or other goals. From this point forward 
the author refers to all attackers, with malicious or 
criminal intent, as hackers. “Phreakers” are telephony 
hackers who specifically focus on receiving free phone 
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calls. The hackers described have varying levels of 
experience, from the teenager that downloads scripts off 
the Internet to the seasoned IT professional.  
The human threat to computer systems is difficult 
because of three main advantages that computer criminals 
have: automation, action at a distance, and technique 
propagation. Automation is used to complete monotonous 
redundant tasks at high speeds (sometimes slowed to avoid 
detection). This ability allows the attacker to perform 
exploits that would normally be infeasible for an 
individual. Hackers are also able to perform attacks from a 
distance, leaving little to no physical evidence, and often 
crossing jurisdictional boundaries to avoid prosecution. 
Finally, numerous computer criminals are able to utilize 
the genius of individuals through technique propagation. 
That is, once one person has discovered a hole in security, 
the knowledge quickly spreads and can be used by anyone 
with minimal understanding (Walker 238-239). 
The most dangerous of human threats exist from 
insiders, those personnel who work for the organization 
that is attacked. According to a survey of large companies 
and government agencies in 2000, over 80% believed that 
insiders where a likely source of attack which was higher 
than any other suggested source of attack (Power 160). 
These people usually have special knowledge or physical 
access that enables an attack that would have otherwise 
been unsuccessful from an outsider’s perspective. Insider 
threats can also be unintentional in the case of human 
error and complacency. Simple errors or failure to adhere 
to security policy (e.g., Failing to change default 
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passwords or leaving passwords lying around.) can often 
lead to breaches. 
Threats to security are not all created through human 
interaction, but can often be caused through natural 
events. Fire, flooding, power outages, earthquakes, 
hurricanes, and other natural disasters can cause the 
network element failure and information loss. Extremes in 
humidity, heat and cold are also sources of failure. All of 
these potential threats must be assessed and planned for 
when created IPT security policy. 
C. IPT VULNERABILITIES 
This section identifies common weaknesses in the IPT-
based network that potentially enable system exploits. 
Where appropriate, the vulnerabilities will be compared 
with the level of protection provided by the PSTN. 
1. Network Convergence 
Not only does network convergence provide many of the 
benefits previously discussed, but it also supplies the 
source of many security weaknesses. When joining the data 
and voice networks, the telephony elements may become 
affected by the known (and unknown) vulnerabilities of the 
data network, and vice versa. This convergence also brings 
the signaling and data transport components of telephony 
together onto a common system. The generally isolated PSTN, 
with its separation of signaling and voice transport 
networks, is generally thought to provide a more secure 
environment. Convergence also introduces other risks to 
telephony, discussed below, due to its interaction with the 




2. IPT Protocols 
IPT relies on internet protocols (e.g., TCP/IP, UDP, 
RTP, etc.) to perform signaling and transport data. The 
security risks inherent in these supporting protocols 
transfer into the IPT domain. Furthermore, many have 
observed that internet protocols are often designed with 
functionality first and security mechanisms later; 
including IPT protocols like SIP. This is in stark contrast 
to the well-established and closely regulated protocols of 
the PSTN.  
Fortunately, SIP, H.323, and MEGACO/H.248 continue to 
be updated to include better security mechanisms. Two 
issues, however, that have not fully been addressed with 
these protocols are the use of Firewalls and Network 
Address Translation (NAT). These are very common security 
measures (to be discussed in more detail later) that 
complicate the use of IPT protocols. Those who implement 
IPT sometimes find that increased IPT functionality comes 
at a cost to the level of security provided by Firewalls 
and NAT. 
3. Network Control & Placement of Intelligence 
While the boundaries of the PSTN are easily 
identifiable and controlled, the limits of an IPT domain 
are often obscure. No single authority controls the IP 
medium; therefore, a voice conversation may flow through a 
variety of networks that are not necessarily controlled or 
trusted by the IPT user. Depending on the IPT 
implementation, this could potentially expose voice packets 
to unwanted contact. The Internet is more easily accessible 
than the PSTN and allows access to information that isn’t 
as easily reachable on the PSTN. 
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Relative to data networks, limited access to the PSTN 
has been possible because the information or intelligence 
of the network tends to reside in equipment that can be 
locked up and physically protected by telephone companies 
and organizations. This prevents access by the general 
public and makes it more difficult for malicious parties to 
attack the network. Even if we assume that the core 
components of the IPT-based network have the same physical 
protection as the PSTN, the IPT-based network will be 
vulnerable to the intelligence that resides at the end-
points (i.e., IP phones, softphones, etc.). SIP, for 
instance, can provide IP phones with the ability to 
interact with other components (e.g., e-mail and voice 
application servers) of the IPT-based network which may 
allow greater manipulation of system devices. On the POTS 
network, most (but not all) telephones are considered “dumb 
terminals” that typically only allow communication with the 
local switch. It is no longer sufficient to protect 
switches and servers, but telephones themselves must be 
guarded (Arkin, E.T., 13-14). 
4. IPT Components 
Any piece of equipment in the IPT-based network can 
become the target of an attack. As illustrated above, some 
of these devices require different kinds of protection than 
equivalent portions of the PSTN. IPT Servers, gateways, 
network interfaces, and end-points require special 
attention to ensure appropriate security mechanisms are in 
place. It is also important to ensure that other protected 
data network components, like firewalls, switches and 
routers, have security mechanisms that do not inhibit the 




As discussed earlier, the PSTN provides a high level 
of reliability or availability. The “five nines” of 
reliability provided by the POTS means that most of the 
time you are going to get a good quality call without any 
connection problems, even in cases where power is down. 
Data networks do not promise the same level of 
availability. Network congestion and outages are common on 
data networks and are tolerated to a certain degree; 
however, an IPT-based network must have better reliability 
in order to serve the needs of the organization. An attack 
directed at shutting down or slowing the data network will 
disrupt telephone service, a threat that is not present on 
the PSTN. Even natural occurrences that cause power outages 
are likely to interrupt IPT service where the POTS provides 
power to the line for telephone calls. IPT-based networks 
must be prepared to implement the redundancy required to 
achieve levels of reliability that meet the needs of the 
user, which is not necessarily the same as is currently 
supported by the PSTN.  
6. PSTN Exposure 
The interfaces between IPT-based networks and the PSTN 
(or other circuit-switched networks) create a potential 
point of vulnerability for both networks. It is common for 
organizations to utilize both the PSTN and IPT-based 
networks for their business processes. They must be careful 
to ensure that the security that they have come to expect 
from the PSTN is not compromised through its connections to 
a packet-switched network, and ensure that data network 
personnel recognize the potential threat of unfamiliar 
attacks on the PSTN that bleed over to the data network. 
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D. IPT ATTACKS & CONSEQUENCES 
Now that potential areas of IPT weakness have been 
enumerated, we can discuss some of the more common methods 
of exploiting them and the impact that successful attacks 
have on the network. A partial list of specific attacks 
that threaten IPT is provided in Table 2 to facilitate the 
discussion. There are an abundance of tools that hackers 
use to attack data networks, and many of them become 
potential threats to the IPT-based network. However, the 
focus of this discussion will center on common IPT attacks 
present in the data network and attacks that are distinct 
to the IPT environment. 
1. IPT Phone Service Disruption 
An attacker has a variety of methods to reduce the 
availability of an IPT-based network. Degraded availability 
in this case can refer to poor voice quality, the inability 
to connect with or receive calls from a desired party, or 
complete loss of telephony service. Depending on the needs 
of an organization, an attack on the availability of 
telephone services can cause minor irritations and 
inconveniences, create significant losses in potential 
revenue and competitive advantage, or increase life 
threatening risks. 
A common method of attack on a data network to disrupt 
service is called Denial of Service (DoS). An attacker can 
use a variety of techniques to overwhelm network equipment, 
such as servers, with so much unnecessary data that the 
devices are unable to serve legitimate users. This can 
cause minor delays, and a subsequent drop in voice quality, 
or destabilize equipment to the point where it shuts down 
or fails to process any information. 
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Table 2. Specific Methods of Attack on Network Systems 
Attack Description Consequences 
Virus 
Malicious code usually spread by the 
user when executing a program. (e.g. 
opening a file) 
Damage can vary from harmless and annoying 
(e.g. changes desktop background) to complete 
system compromise (e.g. system shuts down, 
lost/damaged files, back door installed). Viruses 
among IP Phones are not common, yet. 
Worm Malicious code that quickly spreads on its own. Similar to Virus consequences. 
Trojan horse Malicious code implanted in seemingly innocent, but untrustworthy, programs. Similar to Worm and Virus consequences. 
Buffer overflow 
Caused by poor coding practices. When 
a program allows inputs (e.g., 500 
chars) that exceed the allotted memory 
(e.g., 8 chars), it can overwrite blocks of 
memory and have unintended 
consequences. 
“The most common form of security vulnerability 
in the past decade” (Newton 130). Usually used 
to gain access to a piece of equipment or cause 
a system crash. The Morris worm, a buffer 
overflow exploit, caused over 6,000 servers to 
crash in 1989, bringing down about 10% of the 
internet (Newton 130). 
Back Door 
A method of accessing password 
protected systems without the 
password. May be installed during 
design or after successful attack (e.g., 
virus, worm, buffer overflow). 
Provides hacker with access to computer system 
after attack. May not be identified even after 
correcting the vulnerability that enabled the initial 
successful attack. 
Sniffing 
Like a wiretap, for eavesdropping. A 
sniffing device will examine IP packets 
as they pass. It can be performed over a 
variety of mediums (e.g. copper wire, 
air, fiber optic cable) and equipment.  
Loss of confidentiality. An attacker can 
potentially overhear private/confidential calls. 
Even if conversation is not decipherable, 
attackers can sometimes gain useful information 
by analyzing the flow of packets (i.e., where the 
packet came from, and where it is going.) 
Spoofing 
Impersonation. When an attacker 
pretends to be someone else, whether 
they fake their email address, IP 
address, or any other address. 
Allows access to devices that believe the 
illegitimate address is authentic, or masks the 




A situation where a hacker is able to 
intercept and sometimes modify packets 
between two endpoints. 
Confidentiality and integrity of messages are at 





ARP is used to map IP addresses to 
hardware addresses. “ARP Cache 
Poisoning” is an attack where ARP 
tables with mapping information are 
changed. 
Packets may be redirected to intercept a call or 





A simple protocol used to transfer files. 
Some IP Phones automatically configure 
themselves from TFTP servers. 
An attacker may attempt to get an IP Phone to 
reboot, and then spoof the TFTP server, gaining 
remote access to the IP Phone via a 
configuration file uploaded from that server. 
Social 
Engineering 
Someone who impersonates another 
person, usually over the phone, to gain 
special knowledge to gain access to 
network equipment. 
Many people are fooled, providing valuable 
knowledge to aid attackers in gaining access to 




An attacker will crash a system to get it 
to reboot. When these systems restart, 
they often return to their default settings 
and configurations, usually with weaker 
security mechanisms. 
An attacker will follow up with another attack to 
gain access to the system or device. The 
spoofing attacks on DHCP and TFTP describe 
above are examples. 
Default/Weak 
Password 
Many network devices are delivered with 
well-known default passwords. Users fail 
to change them or replace them with 
passwords that are easy to guess. 
Devices with unchanged default passwords or 
passwords that are easy to guess with software 
(e.g., dictionary words), are extremely vulnerable 
to access by unauthorized individuals. 
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A DoS attack can be performed simply by sending 
hundreds of packets per second to a network switch until it 
is no longer able to handle the volume. More commonly, 
however, malicious parties use many computers (called 
Zombies) in parallel to send a flood of data in a 
Distributed DoS (DDoS) attack. The hacker gains control of 
these Zombies through the use of malicious code implanted 
on the computer by viruses, worms, Trojan horses, buffer 
overflow attacks or other means (see Table 2). The Slammer 
Worm is a well-known example of a DDoS attack that quickly 
disabled an emergency 911 system in Bellevue, Washington. 
The call center had to track calls manually until the issue 
was resolved, illustrating the potential damage that a DDoS 
can have on essential network functions (Newton 926). 
An attacker may not need to knock out network 
equipment to prevent telephone service, but may gain 
control of system devices to work against you without your 
knowledge. They make changes to configurations, often 
affecting changes in traffic flow. For instance, a person 
who gains unauthorized access to your IP phone could have 
all calls automatically forwarded to a different number and 
you wouldn’t know the difference. Table 2 provides examples 
of a variety of methods to accomplish this type of call 
hijacking. 
Finally, the most annoying form of denial of service 
is caused by spamming. Just as email inboxes fill with 
unsolicited and unwanted messages, IP phones can be hit 
with numerous calls that are difficult to trace (unlike 
PSTN calls). Some consider this a form of denial of service 
for two reasons: legitimate calls are missed when filtered 
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out by anti-spam mechanisms and lines become tied up until 
the spam phone call is recognized for what it is. 
2. Compromise of Confidentiality  
Confidentiality describes the ability to keep private, 
confidential, or propriety information secret. Failure to 
maintain confidentiality can lead to such penalties as 
identity fraud, the loss of competitive advantage related 
to leaked corporate secrets, and National Security risks 
when sensitive information is compromised. IPT 
vulnerabilities provide opportunities for hackers to 
eavesdrop on conversations, to track signaling, to monitor 
billing records, and to see private information. They can 
easily extract information from unencrypted packets that 
pass through sniffing (see Table 2) devices under their 
control. Your packets may pass through an attackers sniffer 
(1) as a necessary consequence of placing calls through 
untrusted networks, (2) as a result of using hubs that 
broadcast packets to all devices they are connected to, (3) 
because an attacker physically attached the device to your 
network, (4) because the attacker gained access to one of 
your network devices, or (5) because the attacker 
configured a network device to redirect (or send copies of) 
the packets (e.g., via ARP Cache Poisoning described in 
Table 2).  
When hackers are unable to determine the content of 
the messages on the network, they may still learn valuable 
information by sniffing the network through traffic flow 
analysis. If attackers can determine where a packet is 
going to and where it came from by reading header 
information, they may be able to make some determinations 
based on predictable network behavior. For instance, 
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several packets going to the same address from many 
different addresses may indicate the location of a server 
and give the hacker a point to focus an attack. 
Hackers are not the only enemies to confidentiality. 
Complacent employees, usually with no malicious intent, 
frequently fail to keep calls private. Whether it be 
speaking loudly amongst a group of cubicles, failing to 
close a door or window, or chatting on a wireless or cell 
phone, people often create vulnerabilities that no amount 
of network security mechanisms will overcome. 
3. Toll Fraud 
Phreakers have been trying to get free phone calls 
from the PSTN for years and continue to pursue the same 
goal on IPT-based networks. Common methods of acquiring 
toll free calls consist of: intercepting and rerouting 
signaling, gaining access to network devices that record 
call billing, and gaining access to another individuals IP 
phone. These methods are similar to those used to attack 
the PSTN, but are much simpler to conduct due to easier 
access to data networks. Although phreakers can potentially 
drive up telephone bills, employee abuse of telephone use 
is likely to come at a higher cost. 
4. Compromise of Integrity/Authentication 
Integrity describes the ability to recognize if a 
packet has been altered (whether by mistake or 
intentionally). Good integrity gives us confidence that the 
message received is trustworthy and in its original form. 
Authentication is similar and provides the means to 
reliably identify who a message is from. One step further 
is non-repudiation, a mechanism that prevents a user from 
denying that he or she sent a message. When in place, these 
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tools provide a confidence that the user on the other end 
is known and providing accurate information. 
Hackers may attempt to subvert these mechanisms in 
order to spread false information, to gain access to 
network resources under someone else’s name, or to avoid 
security mechanisms for other attacks. If an attacker can 
successfully spoof (see Table 2) another address, it will 
likely give them access to network resources that were 
previously unavailable. For instance, if hackers can 
convince an IP Phone that it is receiving a legitimate 
configuration file from its server, they can reconfigure 
the IP Phone to suit their needs. Caller ID is an example 
of a telephony feature that has been successfully spoofed 
on IPT-based networks. Hackers have found a way to display 
any number they want, and can even bypass Caller ID 
blocking to discover the phone number of anonymous numbers 
(Poulsen). 
5. IPT Components 
The components of the IPT-based network are the focus 
of attacks, usually to disrupt service or to gain 
unauthorized access. Hackers will use a combination of the 
attacks listed in Table 2, and others, in order to meet 
their goals. The main elements of the IPT-based network 
that they will attack are the endpoints, switches, servers, 
and gateways. 
The endpoints of the IPT-based network are typically 
the phones and computers where voice conversations begin. 
Where telephone handsets of the PSTN are usually ignored as 
avenues of attack, IP phones are targeted extensively as a 
viable point of unauthorized access. The intelligence 
contained in the phones allows much more control of the 
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network. Hackers gain access to IP Phone configurations by 
forcing IP phone reboots, spoofing TFTP servers, and by 
other methods mentioned in Table 2. Softphones are even 
more vulnerable because they are software programs that 
create virtual telephones on a computer. They become 
susceptible to any of the worms, viruses, or operating 
system/application software bugs that the computer may 
encounter. The hacker has access to a considerable number 
of tools to gain access to IPT-based network endpoints. 
The switches and routers on the network are targeted 
to disrupt or redirect the flow of traffic on an IPT-
network. A hacker will attempt to use many of the attacks 
already discussed to eavesdrop or intercept phone calls at 
switches on the network. 
The servers in an IPT-based network hold most of the 
information of value (e.g., billing, address translation, 
configurations, etc.) and are thus a prime target. Hackers 
use many of the same attacks discussed to gain control of 
the servers or disrupt the network by bringing them down. 
“Compromising an IPT-based server usually leads to the 
total compromise of the IPT telephony network the telephony 
server is a part of” (Keneipp 15). 
Gateways provide an interface between IPT-based 
networks and other telephony networks, like the PSTN or 
ISDN. The complexity of interfacing dissimilar networks 
provides great opportunity for hackers to identify bugs or 
to use known vulnerabilities of either network. They can 
subsequently exploit those bugs with the potential of 
gaining control over components of both networks, a 
vulnerability that was less common to the PSTN prior to the 
emergence of telephony over packet-switched networks. 
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E. MANAGING SECURITY RISKS 
The long list of IPT threats and vulnerabilities might 
suggest that IPT is not ready to fill the role of the PSTN. 
However, there are many mechanisms that are currently in 
use or being developed to alleviate the risks presented. 
Although some tradeoffs of the qualities and protections of 
the PSTN are required, the risks of using IPT can be 
mitigated to the point where the benefits of IPT will far 
outweigh the services of the PSTN. The next section will 
describe the type of security approaches required to ensure 
the success of IPT. 
1. Policy 
Organizations must continually create, review, and 
update IPT-based network security policy. IPT continues to 
grow and change rapidly, creating the need to frequently 
reassess and adapt a security strategy that balances the 
goals of the business with the current IPT environment. 
Policy must include measures that ensure compliance to the 
procedures set forth and adequate training and education 
for network administrators. One of the greatest 
vulnerabilities to a company’s security posture is created 
by those personnel who fail to properly implement security 
mechanisms as prescribed. 
2. Physical Security 
Physical access to all IPT equipment should be closely 
monitored and limited to authorized personnel only. 
Critical components of the IPT-based network should be kept 
in a locked room or datacenter. This equipment would 
include servers, gateways, IP PBXs, databases, routers, and 
network management systems. Potential methods of access 
control include: electronic ID cards, keys, badges, 
combination locks, keypad systems, biometric devices, and 
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human guards. Be sure to log each visit, whether 
electronically (e.g., with electronic access card) or 
handwritten log. Visitors should always be escorted. 
Consider the use of motion detectors and closed circuit 
television. Securing the space in this manner reduces 
avenues of unauthorized physical access and minimizes 
accidents by reducing unnecessary traffic. 
Equipment in the secured space can further be 
protected by using installed locks and keeping special 
knowledge out of view (e.g., passwords and configuration 
settings). Less critical equipment that is not located in 
the datacenter, like cabling and switches, should be kept 
behind locked doors and run behind walls and ceilings. All 
unused ports of any equipment should be disabled.  
 Finally, preserve network equipment by controlling 
the environment and planning for natural occurrences. 
Equipment should be stored in rooms with good ventilation 
to prevent overheating and air conditioning to reduce 
moisture in the air. Prepare for power outages by 
installing uninterruptible power supplies or backup 
generators. Develop disaster recovery plans, pay for 
insurance, and build in redundancy to minimize losses from 
physical damages caused by acts of nature. 
3.  Logical Separation 
Once the network is physically protected, it is 
necessary to design a network topology that will provide 
the best security. It is possible to create another 
physical network specifically for IPT to significantly 
reduce the risks of vulnerabilities and performance 
reductions introduced by the data network. Although it 
provides excellent security, it is not a desirable 
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implementation because it is costly to install, maintain, 
and manage the extra cabling and equipment. Additionally, 
it would eliminate the benefits gained by converged data 
and voice networks. To both minimize vulnerability and 
increase efficiency, the IPT-based network should be 
logically segregated from the data network. This can be 
accomplished by putting IPT components on a separate VLAN 
(see Table 3), by using switches in preference to hubs, and 
by using a private IP address space (see Table 3).  
Table 3. IPT Security Mechanisms 
 
The logical separation of the two networks promotes 
better IPT performance, because IPT components can ignore 






A VLAN is a logical (virtual) grouping of network devices regardless of their physical location on 
the network. A VLAN allows more efficient traffic routing and segmentation of similar system 
applications to minimize security risks. For instance, VLANs may be used to segment network 




IP address ranges specifically dedicated for internal use in an organization’s network. These 
addresses are not valid (i.e. you can’t route traffic) external to the network. The ranges are: 





A firewall is a system implemented in a combination of hardware and software that enforces a 
boundary between two or more networks. Packets entering or leaving the network are examined, 
then let through or blocked according to specific criteria. These criteria are determined according 
to security policy intended to limit potential avenues of attack. Firewalls filter with different 
granularity, examining basic address information up to application level information. Simple 
firewalls are typically faster and less expensive because they inspect less information; while, 
firewalls that examine deeper into packets become more expensive, especially if faster 
processing is required. A firewall is analogous to a security gate at a secured facility. All traffic in 
and out of the facility must pass through the gate and will be inspected according to established 
policy. Anything entering (e.g., person without identification) or leaving (e.g., government 





There are two types of packet filtering firewalls, stateless and stateful. A stateless firewall has no 
memory of traffic it has processed. A stateful firewall remembers previous traffic and can adjust 
filtering decision dynamically to allow certain connections. For instance, when a user sends a 
packet to an address outside of the network, the firewall will remember the external address and 






An IDS is a program that monitors network traffic or system processes and analyzes them for 
malicious attacks. Sometimes the IDS will send an alarm, while other times it may block the data 
flow. An IDS must be tuned to find the right balance between false positives (blocking legitimate 
traffic) and false negatives (allowing malicious traffic to pass.) There are two types of IDSs, 
Network IDSs (NIDS) and Host-based IDSs. NIDS monitor packets on the network, usually at the 
perimeter. HIDS are installed on individual machines and work to detect attacks originating within 
that specific computer. 
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give priority to specific IPT traffic. The reduced 
interaction between voice and data improves security by 
minimizing, but not eliminating, exposure to attacks (e.g., 
worms, viruses, DoS) on the data network. It should be 
noted that softphones actually lie on the data network and 
should be segmented to avoid exposure to these attacks as 
well. The segregation of the two networks also achieves 
better resistance to eavesdropping attacks. To achieve the 
full benefits of segregating the voice and data networks, 
switches (more expensive) must be used rather than hubs 
(i.e., no VLAN at hubs).  
The IPT-based network may be isolated further by using 
a private address space, facilitated by NAT. It can serve 
two purposes: first, to disguise the location of IPT 
components from external devices, and second, to share the 
use of external IP addresses among several devices. 
Unfortunately, these benefits are offset by the complexity 
of using NAT with IPT. NAT traversal mechanisms must be 
considered and in place to take advantage of the private 
addresses and to assure reliable IPT telephone sessions.  
4. Manage Network Traffic 
Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)(see Table 
3), and NAT traversal mechanisms are measures used at 
network boundaries to provide protection from external 
threats. Careful planning is required to ensure these 
devices are deployed in the right places with functionality 
appropriate to the needs of the network. Network managers 
must understand what they are willing to pay to achieve 
both performance and security. 
Firewalls are essential network security tools that 
are used to block undesirable traffic, both entering and 
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leaving the network. However, they form bottlenecks that 
add delay to the system, significantly impacting the 
quality of IPT communications. This is enhanced by the fact 
that IPT firewalls must be stateful (see Table 3) to 
recognize IPT packets that would otherwise be blocked. 
These delays are mitigated by segmenting networks and by 
using firewalls designed for use with IPT-based networks 
(i.e., they are stateful and recognize SIP and H.323 
protocols), but come at a significant cost to achieve 
efficiency. 
Network IDSs (NIDS) are generally placed in the same 
portion of the network as firewalls where they can observe 
traffic that flows in and out of the data network. A NIDS 
examines packets (without adding significant delay) to 
detect malicious attack traffic and warn system 
administrators. Some have the ability to block the traffic, 
but are generally used to observe. NIDS must be carefully 
tuned to avoid either blocking legitimate traffic or 
allowing malicious packets. 
NAT is not so much a security mechanism, as it is a 
method to map private addresses to externally routable IP 
addresses. The use of NAT must be carefully planned for and 
considered with IPT-based networks, however, because it is 
difficult to establish and maintain IPT connections without 
the proper systems in place. Table 4 provides a general 
description of NAT and the current methods used to 
negotiate it. No single method of NAT traversal is ideal 
for all network environments, especially since the problem 
is relatively new and solutions are slowly evolving. Each 
mechanism has its advantages and limitations and must be 
evaluated in the context of the specific IPT-based network. 
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Recently, the use of STUN, TURN, and ICE protocols appear 





NAT can be implemented in a variety of ways to map private addresses in an internal 
network to a set of valid external IP addresses at the network perimeter. It has the 
advantage of sharing a limited number of valid external IP addresses among many internal 
devices and of virtually hiding the internal devices from external users. The disadvantage of 
NAT is that translation can become very complex, particularly for incoming traffic, and 
causes complications with the use of firewalls and VPNs. This means that very expensive 





This is a stateful firewall that can be used specifically for IPT-based networks. It is able to 
understand packet information pertaining to SIP or H.323 call control, and make appropriate 
filtering decisions to accommodate most IPT voice traffic through NAT. Unfortunately, an 
ALG can introduce latency, jitter, and network congestion into the system during times of 
high call volume and is often expensive maintain. They are also known to interfere with 




A Firewall Control Proxy (FCP) is an example of a middlebox device that is intended to 
improve the performance of firewalls (like ALGs) that filter IPT traffic. The FCP inspects IPT 
traffic and tells the firewall what traffic to allow, significantly improving throughput. The 
weakness of a FCP is that it becomes another point of attack that must be protected. If an 
attacker gains control of an FCP, the firewall will be compromised as well because it 
completely “trusts” the FCP. 
 
Simple Traversal 
of UDP through 
NAT (STUN) 
 
STUN is a protocol that allows IPT applications and devices to identify NATs and firewalls in 
a communication path between two endpoints. This helps to facilitate call setup and reliable 
channels of communication that pass through NAT devices. STUN is not effective for all 





TURN is a protocol intended to overcome the limitations of STUN. TURN is more complex 





ICE is a methodology used with the same goals as STUN and TURN, that is, to allow 
reliable channels of communication through all forms of NAT devices. ICE uses existing 
protocols to determine which method of NAT traversal (i.e., STUN or TURN) will provide the 
best connection for an IPT call session between two endpoints. 
Table 4. NAT Traversal Mechanisms 
 
5. Harden IPT Equipment 
IPT-based network equipment must be secured to prevent 
hackers from gaining control of critical network devices. 
Call servers, mail servers, and other IPT-based network 
servers hold sensitive data and perform critical functions 
that require special defenses. Servers should be hardened 
by doing the following: 
• Install the operating system on a clean hard 
drive. 
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• Apply all the latest patches. Patches contain 
fixes to newly discovered vulnerabilities. Subscribe to a 
service that will provide continuous updates on new 
patches. 
• Run a vulnerability assessment tool. These tools 
allow network managers (or hackers) to scan network 
equipment for known security holes. After discovering the 
vulnerabilities, either take the steps necessary to correct 
them or accept the risk that they represent.  
• Install a firewall on the server computer. Start 
with a restrictive policy (don’t allow any traffic) and 
then open only those ports required to serve its function. 
• Consider installing a host-based IDS. 
• Install antivirus software and ensure it is up to 
date. Antivirus software is designed to scan files for 
viruses, worms, and Trojan horses. Most are signature-
based, looking for lines of code distinct to particular 
viruses. Signature files are updated frequently to protect 
from the newest, known viruses. Utilize automatic update 
functionality that will automatically check for updates and 
download them. 
• Create an image after following the steps above 
and use it to create other IPT servers. 
• Change default configurations to match security 
policy. This can be done using software. Adjust the boot 
sequence to prevent hackers from gaining access by forcing 
a system crash and reboot. Be sure default passwords are 
changed. 
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• Turn off or disable all unnecessary services and 
applications that are not in use. This may include disk 
drives and physical ports. Each service is a potential 
avenue of attack for a hacker. 
• Avoid the use of shared drives. 
Hardening these servers causes little delay and helps 
to protect against the bulk of external attacks on these 
IPT components. Combined with good physical protection and 
logical separation from the data network, these systems can 
help establish relatively secure IPT sessions. 
Other IPT equipment must be hardened in a similar 
fashion. IP phones, for instance, have several 
vulnerabilities in a default state. Passwords must be 
updated and authentication required, all unnecessary 
services must be disabled, and reboot sequences must be 
updated to prevent unauthorized access to the equipment. 
Automatic registration is often used to install many IP 
Phones at once, but should be disabled immediately to 
prevent an attacker from restarting the phone and gaining 
access by spoofing the registration server. Treat public IP 
Phones differently by limiting available features and 
services. 
Softphones also require special hardening since they 
reside in a portion of the data network on computers. They 
must have the latest patches and antivirus software to be 
protected against worms, viruses, Trojan horses, and buffer 
overflow attacks. Unnecessary services must be restored. 
Because they are more closely tied to the data network, 
softphones are more likely to be affected by attacks and 
suffer from reduced voice quality. All other network 
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components should receive the same kind of attention to 
secure the network from known attacks. 
6. Encrypt and Authenticate IPT Traffic 
Encryption is required to establish confidentiality 
(i.e., prevent eavesdropping) both within the network and 
through external networks. A Virtual Private Network (VPN) 
incorporates end-to-end encryption to “tunnel” through 
untrusted networks. This allows IPT traffic to flow 
securely from an organization’s intranet and through 
internets, that aren’t trusted, to the other end. It also 
allows employees to connect to the company’s intranet from 
an external source and provides a certain level of 
authentication. Table 5 provides a few of the common 
mechanisms used to keep voice conversations private, 
including the favored protocol IPsec.  
Table 5. Encryption and Authentication Mechanisms 
 
The major disadvantage of encryption is that the 







“A VPN is a ‘virtual’ network that is kept private by ‘tunneling’ private data through the underlying 
infrastructure of the public Internet” (Mairs 208). Tunneling basically allows the connection of two 
networks that are separated by an untrusted medium. It ensures the security of data flow by using 
end-to-end encryption and encapsulation. First a data packet is encrypted at the endpoint, that is, 
the data is scrambled into an unreadable format that may only be unscrambled by a trustworthy 
user at the other end. Then the encrypted data is enclosed (called encapsulation) in the packet of 
another protocol and sent across the appropriate network. When it reaches the other end, the 
protocol headers are removed and the data is deciphered. This method of data protection 







“IPsec is the preferred from of VPN tunneling across the Internet” (Kuhn 63). IPsec has two basic 
protocols: Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH). ESP primarily 
focuses on ensuring data confidentiality and some authentication, while AH provides authentication 
and integrity. Since ESP creates more delay to ensure privacy, AH can be used only where 
authentication is necessary. IPsec also has two delivery modes: Transport and Tunnel. The modes 
are similar, but tunnel mode encrypts more packet information to minimize traffic flow analysis and 






“SRTP provides a framework for encryption and message authentication of RTP and RTCP 
streams. SRTP can achieve high throughput and low packet expansion” (Kuhn 69). SRTP provides 
a method to protect the confidentiality of voice conversations without adding significant overhead 
and delays to RTP packets. 
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substantial delay. This significantly impacts the voice 
quality of a real-time application like IPT. Organizations 
have been able to effectively apply encryption to IPT 
conversations, but it requires a careful initial assessment 
of network capabilities and subsequent investment in 
upgraded equipment. After that, consistent performance can 
be achieved by continued evaluation (and tweaking) of 
network performance using network management tools. 
7. Redundancy 
In order to approach the reliability of the PSTN, an 
IPT-based network must take a similar approach to 
redundancy. A focus on several areas of redundant systems 
will improve the chance of quick recovery when disaster 
strikes. First, the data must be protected by making 
regular backups of critical systems. They should be created 
in reliable memory systems and stored in a secured, offsite 
location. Second, the network is protected using a layered 
strategy or “Defense in Depth.”  This describes the use of 
several security mechanisms that complement each other and 
overlap, rather than a reliance on a single defense. Third, 
the operation of critical equipment is assured by providing 
redundant systems that are ready to go online when the 
current systems fail. All equipment is protected from power 
fluctuations and power loss with surge protectors and 
Uninterruptable Power Sources to allow controlled 
shutdowns. Critical systems are backed up with generator 
power. Fourth, the IPT-based network is supported by out-
of-band communications, usually the PSTN. PSTN will still 
be around for awhile. Organizations should feel comfortable 
with a telephony architecture that utilizes the benefits of 
both the PSTN and IPT to meet its needs. Finally, Disaster 
Recovery Planning (and practice) must be a regular part of 
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every organization’s network policy. Even if disaster never 
strikes, effective use of this type of planning will help 
businesses learn to identify potential risks and losses and 
the costs associated with them. The ability to effectively 
balance the cost of risk mitigation strategies with the 
cost of actual losses will provide those companies with a 
competitive advantage. 
8. Weighing the Costs 
The security measures described offer methods to 
protect against the vulnerabilities of computing systems 
and packet-switched networks. They provide solutions to 
mitigate security risks to IPT-based networks, but usually 
at an economic cost or at a cost to call quality. Although 
security and voice quality often conflict, they can both 
rise if you are willing to pay for it. Since each 
organization’s security and business needs differ, they 
must be determined to understand their requirements and 
decide if they have the means to get there. Recently, it 
appears that more and more businesses have come to the 
conclusion that they can afford to secure an IPT-based 
network and enjoy the benefits it provides. 
F. SECURITY POLICY AND GUIDANCE REVIEW 
Now that the management of IPT security risks has been 
discussed, it is appropriate to examine how to enforce 
effective security practices with good security policy and 
guidance. The next section will briefly define what good 
security policy is and describe how to create it. Then, a 
variety of current information technology policy and 
guidance will be reviewed. Policy from the Coast Guard and 
other government agencies will be examined to understand 
how each policy is relevant to IPT and how it might be used 
to create Coast Guard specific policy. The combination of 
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information gathered from these policies, other research, 
and a study of a Coast Guard’s implementation of IPT were 
pulled together to make recommendations for IPT Security 
Policy in the Coast Guard. These recommendations are 
presented in Appendix A. 
1. Creating Effective Policy 
Policy consists of an organization’s guiding 
principles and mandates that express management’s goals and 
objectives about a general issue. It should be brief, 
concise, clear, stable, and written in the active voice. A 
good security policy will (1) address the level of risk 
that management is willing to accept, (2) specify who is 
responsible for what actions and how they will be held 
accountable, (3) identify how results are to be measured 
and reported, (4) and be expressed in terms that are 
appropriate to the specific system being discussed in the 
context of its role in the organization (Murray Notes). 
Good security policy is created by adhering to these 
guidelines and by considering Courtney’s Laws (i.e., three 
laws created by Robert H. Courtney, Jr.): 
(1) Nothing useful can be said about the security 
of a mechanism except in the context of a 
specific application and environment. 
(2) Never spend more mitigating a risk than 
tolerating it will cost you. 
(3) There are management solutions to technical 
problems, but no technical solutions to 
management problems (Murray Notes). 
The objectives of a security policy are enforced 
through the use of standards, guidelines and procedures. 
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Standards are more specific than policy, providing 
measurable rules and regulations that support the policy 
and are required. Guidelines are usually suggested (i.e., 
optional) techniques to understand how to meet standards 
and policies. Procedures are even more specific and 
describe how to meet standards well, by providing step-by-
step methods. As you move from one end of the spectrum at 
policy, where intent is broadly defined and relatively 
unchanging, to the other end at procedures (via standards 
and guidelines), objectives become more specific and more 
volatile to meet the needs of the current technology 
(Murray Notes).  
In this document, policy generally refers to documents 
that describe an organization’s overall approach to dealing 
with information technology security and the types of 
standards that are mandated, while guidance typically 
refers to documents that describe methods (i.e., guidelines 
and procedures) to implement policy and standards. However, 
policy may sometimes include options and guidance may 
include requirements. 
2. Coast Guard Policy Review 
The documents described in this section mandate the 
use of information technology in the Coast Guard. They have 
been studied to determine how they are relevant to IPT and 
what type of standards and guidance they have not 
addressed. The information gleaned from this analysis is 
presented below and has been used to develop specific IPT 
Security Policy and Guidance in Appendices A and B. 
a. COMDTINST 5230.56: Policy on Coast Guard use 
of Internet/Worldwide Web 
The purpose of this policy is to regulate 
“Internet site management, page content, page development, 
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and usage” (1). It applies to all Coast Guard units that 
use the WWW to share or access information, whether it is 
on the Coast Guard Data Network (CGDN) or other networks. 
It provides direction and guidance, to commanding officers 
and information technology staff, on what type of 
information may be shared on the WWW and how it must be 
protected. The security issues briefly addressed cover the 
protection of web site information and equipment. It does 
not directly address IPT, but can be referenced to 
appropriately manage the configuration of IPT equipment via 
web browsers. 
b. COMDTINST 5375.1A: Limited Personal Use of 
Government Office Equipment 
This instruction defines the policy for the 
personal use of government office equipment, which includes 
information technology equipment, by all Coast guard 
personnel. It sets restrictions on the appropriate times 
and duration that office equipment may be used for non-work 
activities. It also specifically prohibits certain 
activities and sets forth disciplinary measures for failure 
to meet standards.  
Although, the policy does not specifically 
mention IPT (nor does it address security), the use of IP 
Phones and other IPT equipment easily falls under the 
standards set for telephones and other information 
technology equipment. The most relevant standards include 
limits on personal telephone calls, prohibitions on 
downloading personal software and connecting personal 
hardware, and restrictions on the content (e.g., illegal, 
offensive, personal business, confidential, etc.) of 
information. IPT specific policy and guidance can refer to 
this policy for appropriate use of IPT-based systems. 
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c. COMDTINST M5530.1C: Physical Security and 
Force Protection Program 
This program sets forth policy, standards, 
guidance, and procedures to assure the physical security of 
a variety of Coast Guard resources, including: facilities, 
computers and networks, firearms, ammunition, explosives, 
personal electronic devices (PED), telephones and switches, 
funds, vehicles, property, and medical substances. It 
describes the use of many measures to use to provide for 
the physical protection of these resources from basic 
physical barriers to human security forces. It also 
addresses antiterrorism policy and the response to bomb 
threats and other incidents.  
The Coast Guard Physical Security and Force 
Protection Program is an important tool to determine how to 
physically protect IPT equipment. It provides specific 
guidance on how network equipment should be protected based 
on one of three categories: Classified Information Systems 
(CIS), Sensitive/Critical Information System (SCIS), Non-
Critical Information System (NIS). Depending on the 
particular IPT application, different levels of physical 
security must be applied as prescribed in the program. The 
program also describes how to protect PEDs, telephones and 
telephone switches, primarily to ensure private exchange of 
information. The same physical security measures must be 
applied to IPT-based equipment that fall within these 
categories (e.g., wireless telephones, IPT Phones, servers) 
to ensure confidentiality. IPT specific guidance can refer 




d. COMDTINST M5500.13B: Information Assurance 
Manual 
The Coast Guard Information Assurance (IA) Manual 
sets forth the responsibilities of carrying out the IA 
Program which… 
provides a baseline of IT security policies, 
standards, and guidance. The IA program outlines 
policies that relate to management, operational, 
and technical controls that provide the 
foundation to information confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, authenticity, and 
nonrepudiation within the CG’s information 
infrastructure and operating environment (1-1).  
The manual does exactly what it says in a manner consistent 
with the characteristics of good policy described above. It 
provides a strong foundation for data network security 
practices to be used by Coast Guard information technology 
professionals.  
This document briefly mentions the use of IPT, 
touching on redundancy, identification and authentication, 
audit logging, integrity controls, and physical security. 
However, this program does not adequately address security 
issues unique to IPT-based networks. IPT-based security 
policy can refer to this program for many aspects of sound 
network security principles, but must rely on other sources 
for IPT-specific concerns. 
3. Other Government Agency IPT Policy and Guidance 
Review 
The documents described in this section provide 
guidelines that are not required by the Coast Guard, but 
may provide insight into IPT security relevant to the Coast 
Guard environment. They have been studied to determine how 
they address current IPT-based network implementations and 
security issues. The information gathered from this 
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analysis is presented below and has been used to develop 
specific IPT Security Policy and Guidance in Appendices A 
and B. 
a. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) 
Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP) Security 
Technical Implementation Guide 
The DISA VOIP Security Technical Implementation 
Guide provides specific guidance on the use of IPT to units 
in the Department of Defense (DoD) that choose to employ 
IPT. It is intended to be “a tool to assist in securing…DoD 
networks and systems supporting” IPT technology (7). The 
document provides a brief overview of IPT and addresses 
many IPT security issues, most of which have been discussed 
in this chapter. Security risks are resolved or mitigated 
through the use of both mandatory standards and suggested 
guidelines. The Coast Guard is not required to follow this 
guidance, but may use the information provided as a strong 
outline for Coast Guard specific IPT security policy. 
b. Special Publication 800-58: Security 
Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems: 
Recommendations of the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) 
NIST has prepared this document as a guideline 
for federal agencies to use and adapt to meet their 
specific IPT security and business requirements. It is 
designed to provide guidance to establish secure IPT 
networks, with a focus on overcoming complications (e.g., 
reduced voice quality, NAT traversal) introduced by 
security requirements of IPT (10, 13). The document 
includes discussions on IPT basics, performance and 
quality, protocols, firewalls, address translation, call 
setup, encryption, IPsec, and others. NIST summarizes its 
findings with nine recommendations to implement a secure 
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IPT network. The information in this document provides 
current information on IPT-related security issues and can 
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IV. IPT IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES 
A. PURPOSE 
Despite the continuous change occurring in the area of 
IPT, the technology has been in use long enough to develop 
practices that yield successful IPT deployments. However, 
there is not a “one size fits all” approach that is 
appropriate for all organizations. IPT implementers must 
carefully analyze their current network architecture and 
pursue IPT solutions that can best be adapted to their 
agency. This chapter contains a list of the attributes of 
successful deployments and the methodologies used by 
thriving businesses that have exploited IPT systems to gain 
a competitive advantage. 
B. IPT NETWORK CHARACTERISTICS 
Burton Group has cataloged several areas of focus that 
must be considered to realize viable communications using 
packet-switched networks (IP Telephony 6-13 and Voice over 
IP Architecture Workshop 4-6). Proactively addressing each 
of these technical and operational issues is a common 
success factor among organizations that have already 
attained the benefits of IPT. 
• Cost: The costs of IPT already discussed present 
a solid argument for a transition away from the POTS; 
however, an IPT-based network may not be the best solution 
in all cases. It is unwise to invest in technology just for 
technology’s sake. Each organization must carefully 
consider its options and make an unbiased business case for 
a particular telephony implementation. 
• Security: As discussed in depth, each company 
must plan for security up front and determine the level of 
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risk it is willing to accept. They must be willing to pay 
for a level of security that is comparable to that which 
the PSTN currently provides. 
• Sound Quality: Sound quality and security are 
often at odds with each other in an IPT-based network. It 
is very difficult (i.e., expensive) to realize high levels 
of both quality and security equal to that provided by the 
PSTN. A business must understand its regular (and worst 
case) telephone usage to determine the resources consumed 
by good quality phone calls. It must them provide the 
required mechanisms (e.g., bandwidth, prioritization 
(sometimes referred to as quality of service), IPT specific 
network equipment, etc) to meet the need. 
• Resiliency: The availability of a telephony 
system is critical to any organization’s success. An IPT-
based network must provide a variety of backups to meet 
this requirement, including redundant: power, memory, 
systems, applications, network components, and 
communications (e.g., PSTN line). 
• Power and Reach:  Many phones are located in 
places where there is no need for computers, so there is 
not any power or network wiring in place. Sometimes these 
points are extended using wireless devices. Companies must 
be prepared to provide for these cases, and understand the 
potential reductions in voice quality to create solutions. 
• Network Management: IPT-based networks are not 
managed in the same manner as the data network. Data 
network personnel and telephony personnel will have to work 
together and learn new skills to properly manage the IPT 
network. The network will require constant attention to 
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assure quality and availability. The support of the network 
should be facilitated by network management tools that are 
specifically attuned to the needs of IPT. 
• Platform Independence/Support of Legacy Services: 
A successful IPT implementation will facilitate 
interoperability among telephony components and be flexible 
to adapt to changes in the technology. Few telephony 
networks are solely devoted to IPT technology, but rather 
integrate a variety of networks to provide a competitive 
telephony solution. It requires careful planning to connect 
the IPT network to other networks, like the PSTN or an 
ISDN, and to connect a variety of equipment from multiple 
vendors. Successful businesses avoid propriety equipment 
and protocols, and strive for standards that bring a 
diverse set of elements together to form a reliable 
telephone system. 
• Scalability: Just like typical PSTN PBX 
solutions, an IPT-based network must be flexible enough to 
grow and change with the organization. 
• Features: The primary business advantage that is 
beginning to emerge from IPT is the diverse set of features 
that it promises to provide. To maximize the benefit of an 
IPT implementation, organizations must create IPT solutions 
that enable feature sets that optimize current business 
practices and understand how those features differ from 
current PSTN offerings. 
• User Mobility: One of the advantages of IPT is 
the mobility that it provides to employees. This mobility 
can be manifest in a user’s ability to quickly change 
desks, change phones, or even work out of the office at 
70 
home or on the road. This is an example of the type of 
features enabled by IPT that must be fully understood, 
because they require additional security and quality of 
service measures to appropriately implement. 
• Emergency Services: Emergency 911 location 
services are a standard part of the PSTN that many people 
take for granted. These services require special measures 
(especially because of the increased mobility mentioned 
above) to ensure the same level of reliability that the 
PSTN already provides. Each organization must ensure 
appropriate systems are in place. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES 
The following section enumerates and explains a 
variety of practices that organizations are using to 
successfully implement IPT and address the issues discussed 
in the previous section. The methods described below are 
not necessarily conducted in the order listed. Some may be 
performed simultaneously, while other groups of processes 
may require multiple iterations to design the right IPT 
solution. The practices discussed should be adapted to meet 
the needs of a company within the context of its 
environment. A manager’s guide has been developed to 
facilitate Coast Guard IPT implementation and is included 
in Appendix B. 
1. Form an Implementation Team 
Since IPT brings together the data network and the 
telephone network, personnel with training and experience 
from both backgrounds are required to understand the new 
system. An organization must form a team that taps the 
resources of employees with varying specialties (e.g., 
telephony specialist, network manager, security 
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professional, finance, legal, etc.) so that all issues may 
be addressed. The team members must receive the training 
and develop the experience necessary to interface ideas and 
processes. The collaborative process must not only include 
the exchange and fusion of information, but must also share 
sources of power (e.g., budget, resources, management 
support, etc.). Each member should expect to have a 
different understanding of the data and telephony networks, 
and how they support business objectives, when the 
implementation is complete. 
The IPT implementation team may be supported by 
personnel, called system integrators, who are brought in 
from outside of the company to help design an IPT solution. 
Outsourcing pieces of the implementation has the advantage 
of providing in depth knowledge and experience about IPT. 
This know-how usually comes more quickly and at a lower 
cost than if the company was to train its own IPT experts. 
According to a survey conducted by Integrated Research, 
approximately 34% of companies use or plan to use system 
integrators for their IPT deployments (Integrated Research 
6).  
When selecting system integrators, an organization 
should review and weigh the integrators’ level of quality, 
expertise, capability, integrity and cost. The organization 
must also establish service-level agreements. The contract 
made with the system integrator should include training and 
support so that the system is properly maintained when the 
system integrator leaves (Walker 130-134). 
2. Understand Current Telephony Requirements 
Before replacing components of the POTS with IP 
Telephony, an organization must first understand its 
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current telephone usage. Fortunately, the PSTN has a well 
established system of capturing characteristics of 
telephone calls made over the network. Call Detail Records 
(you’ve seen these in your monthly itemized long-distance 
bill) are an example of records that track calls. The IPT 
deployment team should locate call records and determine 
the telephony requirements of the organization. Statistics 
of interest include: number of calls, number of users with 
distinct phone numbers, duration of calls, number of 
concurrent calls, source and destination of calls (within 
site, within business, external, international versus 
domestic), and call volumes. Call volume profiles are 
especially important for determining network capacity. Call 
volume peaks and averages should be discovered with an 
understanding of when peaks occur, for how long, and if 
they cause (a percentage of) blocked calls. Understanding 
these requirements will facilitate the development of an 
IPT-based network design that accommodates the 
organization’s needs (Walker 64-66).  
While reviewing call records, it is a good time to 
review telephony costs and carrier contracts. Identifying 
these costs helps to justify the IPT implementation, but 
may also point out potential areas of increased costs. For 
instance, most businesses incrementally deploy IPT and 
continue to rely on existing PSTN services. An organization 
that deploys IPT may reduce the number of calls on the 
PSTN, but actually cause an increase in telephony costs. 
This can happen when the reduced PSTN call volume falls 
below a threshold where “bulk” rates are applied. Even 
though there are fewer calls, those calls become more 
expensive and may actually drive up costs. 
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Finally, the IPT project team must work to understand 
user requirements and expectations. It is commonly accepted 
that the PSTN provides “five nines” of availability and 
toll quality calls. Users have come to expect that level of 
performance along with the other features they already use. 
Current capabilities must be cataloged and prioritized so 
that they can be enabled in the IPT-based network. Examples 
of some of these requirements include: voice mail, 
conferencing, customer relationship management tools 
(a.k.a. phone trees), simple phone interfaces, simple 
dialing plans (how many extra numbers does the user need to 
dial to get an outside line balanced with how few to dial 
internal extensions), features mentioned in Chapter I, and 
others. User expectations must be managed if those 
capabilities are going to be reduced in trade of other 
improvements or lower costs. 
3. Understand the Data Network Infrastructure 
To converge voice and data, we must understand both 
the PSTN and the data network prior to deployment. Many 
believe that IPT can just be thrown on top of the data 
network like any other application, but soon discover that 
IPT has special requirements that necessitate adjustments 
to the network and require more stringent monitoring. 
The technology that is currently available from 
mainstream vendors is ready for enterprise 
deployment but many problems still occur, 
primarily from insufficient network preparation 
(Integrated Research 5). 
Adequate network preparation begins by identifying the 
current characteristics of the data network so that 
adjustments can be made to support IPT. This type of 
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evaluation must be performed at three levels as appropriate 
to the implementation: (1) over the local area network, (2) 
over the enterprise wide area network, and (3) over the 
Internet (although the ability to make changes will be 
limited). Most IPT professionals agree that some sort of 
data network audit or assessment for any implementation is 
vital to successfully deploy IPT. John Walker and Jeffrey 
Hicks explain such a process in “Taking Charge of Your VoIP 
Project.” Their methodology is described below. 
• Configuration Assessment: The purpose of this 
assessment is to examine network equipment to determine 
what must be upgraded to handle IPT. First, all network 
equipment must be identified and inventoried. The equipment 
characteristics that should be checked include: the 
operating system version, the amount of memory, the 
existence and types of Quality of Service mechanisms, 
presence of VLANs (data, voice, and wireless should be 
separate), presence of hubs (should be removed), interface 
speeds, and how power is supplied to the phone. Then each 
piece of equipment must be compared to a set of criteria to 
determine if it will support IPT traffic, functionality, 
capacity, reliability and call-quality (93-95).  
For example, a configuration assessment might reveal 
that a network router has an interface speed of 100 
megabits per second (Mbps). Based on peak call volumes, the 
speed will not be able to handle all calls without degraded 
call quality or dropped calls. The router must be upgraded 
(e.g., 1000 Mbps) to support the new IPT-based network. 
• Utilization Assessment: The purpose of this 
assessment is to identify to what degree network devices 
and links are being utilized. Average values, peak values, 
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and times of high utilization are important metrics to 
observe. Utilization rates that approach 100% suggest 
problem areas for IPT implementation, which must be managed 
or corrected via equipment upgrades. The following 
dimensions should be measured to ensure the support of IPT 
traffic, functionality, capacity, reliability and call-
quality: CPU utilization (device’s workload), memory 
utilization (e.g., size of jitter buffer), backplane 
utilization (amount of traffic moving through switches), 
dropped packets (occur at bottlenecks), buffer errors 
(usually indicates inadequate memory), interface errors 
(usually indicate problems with physical transport medium), 
and bandwidth utilization (the percentage of bandwidth 
being used). Bandwidth utilization is a good indicator of 
network capacity and should always be closely monitored, 
particularly on wide area network links where delays are 
more likely. (95-97). 
• Call-Quality Assessment: The purpose of this 
assessment is to determine how well the network would 
support good call quality by simulating IPT traffic and 
measuring the flow of information for delay, jitter and 
packet loss. These measurements are used to estimate a mean 
opinion score to determine call quality. 
The following characteristics of IPT equipment and 
packets will affect the flow of information: The type of 
codec used (the compression algorithms and data rates it 
uses, and the packet size it produces), voice packet sizes 
(smaller packets move more quickly but have more overhead), 
the use of Voice Activity Detection, the size of jitter 
buffers, and Quality of Service mechanisms. 
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The simulation allows experimentation among changes in 
network characteristics and is usually conducted on 
selected portions of the network that mostly represent the 
entire IPT network. From this assessment, predictions can 
be made about the feasibility of good call quality in an 
IPT implementation. It is also useful for identifying 
potential risks and weak points in the network prior to 
deployment, allowing for equipment upgrades or network 
configurations that will enhance call quality (97-99). 
• Bandwidth Modeling: The purpose of this 
assessment is to make predictions about the actual 
performance of the current network with the load of IPT 
traffic. This process is very similar to the call quality 
assessment described above, but is more complex and 
requires many mathematical calculations to complete; 
therefore, it is usually conducted on critical network 
links first and expanded as resources permit. Bandwidth 
modeling allows the IPT design team to determine how well 
the capacity of the network handles the additional traffic 
introduced by IPT, based on changes in call volumes, 
codecs, bandwidth, packet sizes, Quality of Service 
mechanisms, and voice suppression mechanisms. (99-100) 
4. Update the Data Network 
After successfully auditing the data network, most 
organizations discover that many changes are required to 
adequately support IPT. According to Mack Leathurby of 
Avaya “…about five percent of our customers don’t have to 
do something to upgrade their existing network” (Joch). 
Network changes usually focus on call quality improvements 
or replacing equipment to meet other requirements like 
security or redundancy. 
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Increased call quality can be achieved by cleaning up 
network traffic, increasing bandwidth, upgrading equipment, 
changing the network design, and implementing or tuning 
Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms. 
• Network Traffic: Approximately 20%-50% of network 
traffic is considered unnecessary, supporting unneeded 
services that are operating by default, usually without 
anyone’s knowledge (Walker 104). Use a network protocol 
analyzer (e.g., Ethereal, EtherPeek) to identify these. 
Turning them off will increase bandwidth, and reduce the 
load on processors and memory. 
• Bandwidth: There are several methods available 
that help to conserve bandwidth, some of which include: RTP 
header compression (cRTP), VAD, RTP multiplexing, and Call 
admission control. cRTP compresses RTP headers to reduce 
bandwidth consumption, but comes at the expense of 
increased handling delay. VAD reduces bandwidth consumption 
by sending smaller packets during silence, but can reduce 
voice quality. RTP multiplexing sends several voice 
conversations in the same packet to cut out bandwidth that 
is consumed by headers, but can add to delay and cause 
greater impact when packets are lost. Call admission 
control is used to limit the number of concurrent IPT calls 
on the network, routing extra calls to the PSTN. The 
benefits and disadvantages of each of these methods must be 
balanced to meet the requirements of the network 
configuration. If these mechanisms aren’t sufficient to 
free up adequate bandwidth it may be appropriate to pay for 
more; however, it is important to understand the network in 
order to increase the bandwidth in the bottlenecks where it 
is needed the most. 
78 
• Equipment: Common equipment upgrades to improve 
voice quality include: Replacing hubs with switches, 
upgrading to more modern switches and routers that process 
information more quickly, increasing router memory, and 
preferring hardware-based firewalls to software-based 
equipment. These equipment upgrades help increase the 
processing speed of the network, enabling better call 
quality. 
• Network Design: Re-engineering the network can 
help to improve call quality in many ways. Examine traffic 
flow to determine what kinds of routes are used and how 
many hops are required to get from one endpoint to another. 
Direct, shorter routes and fewer hops will help to reduce 
propagation and handling delays. Locate bottlenecks and 
points of congestion and work to eliminate them, route 
around them, or give precedence to IPT traffic. Finally, 
push processing work out to the endpoints to facilitate the 
movement of packets through the core of the network. This, 
however, requires more processing power at the edges of the 
network.  
• QoS Mechanisms: As previously discussed, QoS 
mechanisms give priority to time-sensitive applications 
like IPT. They help to maintain good call quality during 
occasional periods of congestion. 
Other components of the network must be updated to 
meet the needs of requirements other than call quality, 
like security and redundancy. These improvements are 
usually completed through the replacement or update of 
existing equipment. When updating network equipment (or 
when making call quality improvements), it is important to 
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make changes in a methodical way. First, the project team 
must determine which changes are the most cost effective 
and most important. Then, they should make incremental 
changes beginning with the highest priorities. After making 
a change, small tests and assessments should be conducting 
to ensure that the adjustment had the desired effect. Those 
that try to make too many modifications at once find that 
it is too difficult to identify new problems created by the 
change. The incremental approach also makes it easier to 
adjust priorities and determine when network improvements 
have reached an acceptable level (Walker 103-109). 
5. Develop the Business Case & Acquire 
Justifying the installation of an IPT-based network 
occurs prior to and throughout the implementation process. 
The planning and preparation phases discussed to this point 
help to strengthen a case to deploy IPT (or not to deploy 
it) by determining the organization’s requirements and by 
assessing the condition of its data network. These 
considerations must be weighed with an analysis of the 
costs required to go forward with a large scale 
implementation. This section begins by covering some common 
forms of IPT deployment that are known to provide good 
returns on investment.  It follows with recommendations on 
the type of equipment, service, and support that the IPT 
project team should demand to ensure long term success. A 
project team that is able to demonstrate measurable 
benefits and the viability of IPT early and continuously 
will get internal commitment and budgetary support that 
will sustain the duration of the implementation. 
IPT-based networks are rarely deployed by completely 
replacing old PSTN equipment with new IPT gear. The 
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benefits of IPT are usually realized through incremental 
upgrades that take advantage of the features of both IPT 
and the PSTN. Walker and Hicks make several 
recommendations, which follow, for the type of upgrades 
that promise large returns from minor investments for most 
organizations. 
• New Sites: Organizations that are expanding to 
new sites can find great benefit from building new 
telephony service from the ground up without having to 
worry about upgrading an old network. With proper planning, 
the new office can provide dependable IPT service with room 
for future growth. 
• Data Network Upgrades: If the data network 
already needs an improvement, the business can benefit by 
including IPT requirements in the planning requirements. 
• Excess Capacity: Bandwidth and processing power 
have become very inexpensive. If an organization has 
recently upgraded its data network, it may consider IPT. 
• Expiring Service Contracts: The possibility of 
shifting some telephony expenses to the data network may be 
convenient when leases expire, but also adds leverage to 
bargaining power when renegotiating. 
• Voice Network Upgrades: If the current voice 
network is not meeting business requirements it is a good 
opportunity to incrementally add and test new IPT services 
that will eventually lead to larger deployments. 
• Remote Users: IPT can provide telephone support 
to telecommuters with high speed connections. 
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• Company Merger: When companies merge, they often 
bring together different telephony networks and 
technologies. Combining the two companies provides a unique 
opportunity to converge the networks as well (56-57). 
No matter what the particular IPT implementation, 
there are certain characteristics that project teams must 
search for when acquiring IPT technology and services. 
Aside from meeting the network requirements discovered 
during planning and assessment, equipment must also be 
interoperable, non-proprietary, and easy to maintain. 
Services standards must be proven and enforced with 
measurable service level agreements (SLAs). Finally, an 
outsourced portion of the IPT deployment must be supported 
by strong relationships among providers. Enforcing these 
standards will assure long term viability of the IPT-based 
network. 
• Equipment: To avoid additional costs and network 
difficulties, all IPT equipment should be non-proprietary 
and interoperable. The use of proprietary equipment often 
prevents equipment from different vendors from 
communicating correctly and can lock an organization into a 
position where they must continue to rely on one vendor for 
service. This lack of flexibility puts the business at the 
mercy of the vendor, creating the potential for inflated 
costs or system failure should the vendor company collapse 
or fail to keep up with business needs. An organization 
should support vendors that produce interoperable, open 
architecture systems. This facilitates the development of 
equipment that easily communicates between different types 
of networks, protocols, and vendor equipment. Until common 
standards are achieved, businesses should prefer equipment 
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that provides the most interoperability (e.g., IPT 
equipment that supports both SIP and H.323). 
• Services: A SLA is an agreement between the user 
and a vendor that defines what services will be provided, 
at what cost, how they will be measured, and how 
deficiencies will be addressed (Newton 739). An 
organization must work with service vendors to create 
measurable SLAs that are easy to enforce (because they 
include specific actions when guarantees aren’t fulfilled) 
(Robert Frances Group).  
• Outsourcing: All of the practices discussed in 
this chapter could potentially be outsourced to another 
company. Outsourcing is the practice of hiring another 
company to handle an internal business function, usually 
because the organization believes that someone else can do 
it better at less cost. A company might outsource the 
entire IPT deployment, or just portions of it like the data 
network assessment or network upgrades. They might decide 
to bring in a system integrator as previously discussed. 
Almost anything can be outsourced.  
An agency that outsources any of the IPT 
implementation or IPT services must work to create a 
relationship with the provider that will lead to long term 
success of the IPT deployment. This can be done by avoiding 
the following six mistakes: (1) Not clearly defining the 
desired results and how they’ll be measured, (2) Not 
talking to a provider’s current and former clients, (3) 
Failing to consider the long-term relationship dynamics, 
(4) Signing a standardized, multiyear contract, (5) Not 
planning up front for how the relationships might end, and 
(6) Treating the provider as an outsider (Walker 138). 
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6. Create an Implementation Plan 
As previously mentioned, an effective method of 
implementing IPT is to make incremental adjustments. An IPT 
implementation plan is designed with this in mind and 
identifies distinct breaks in the process where 
effectiveness can be measured. A proven way to start the 
process is to conduct a pilot deployment. This gives the 
IPT project team the opportunity to gain experience with 
the technology before diving in to a full deployment. The 
pilot program helps the project team to truly understand 
how the IPT-based network will function in the organization 
and enables them to create an implementation plan that 
addresses the highest priorities first. 
• Pilot Deployment (Test Bed): A pilot program is a 
small implementation of IPT intended to be a learning 
opportunity that prepares for a larger implementation; 
however, it also helps to define a business case for IPT 
and to select the best equipment and services for a full 
deployment. The best place to perform the pilot is in a 
situation where there may be a high return on investment 
(see section C.5 of this chapter), where the potential for 
disruption is minimal, and where user cooperation and 
feedback is high. To get the most out of the test bed, the 
project team should learn as much as they can about the 
behavior of the system by experimenting with different 
equipment, configurations, traffic volumes, protocols, QoS 
mechanisms, and security mechanisms. They should understand 
how equipment from different vendors interoperates. They 
should understand how to recognize, isolate, and repair 
network problems.  The experimentation should be supported 
with training and with strong working relationships with 
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potential vendors. Finally, the project team should be 
comfortable with the maintenance and long term management 
of the system to ensure success when vendor support fades. 
The more thorough the pilot program, the more prepared the 
project team will be for a large scale deployment of IPT 
(Walker 109-113). 
7. Deployment 
Once a pilot program has been conducted and an 
implementation plan is developed, the project team will be 
prepared to move into full deployment. The project team 
should begin to make adjustments to the network 
incrementally and be prepared for adjustments. Changes in 
the plan will effectively be recognized by building 
feedback loops into the process and by monitoring 
measurements that demonstrate system effectiveness 
(Yedwab). An example of a test plan that might be used to 
check each phase of the implementations is provided in 
Table 6. A systematic and continuous assessment of the 
implementation creates a smooth transition to a valuable 
IPT-based network.  
IPT Deployment Test Plan 
• Operation and Function: Does all the end-user equipment work properly and provide all promised features? 
• Ease of Use: Is the system easy for all users to use? Is the system easy for the IT staff to maintain? 
• Network Application Performance: Is there good call quality? 
• Transaction-oriented Application Performance:  Are critical applications on the network still operating normally 
after the change? This requires the project team to take measurements prior to the change. 
• Settings: Do equipment and applications still perform as expected after changing IPT configurations? 
• Stress: Does the network provide good call quality to the predicted level of call volume? Does it transfer calls to the 
PSTN when the limit is reached? 
• Extraneous Traffic: Is the system doing anything you don’t expect or understand? A network protocol analyzer may 
help to determine this. 
• Reporting Problems: Does the IPT management system operate correctly? Create faults in the system and see if the 
management system responds accordingly (Walker 116-118). 
Table 6. Sample IPT Deployment Test Plan 
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8. Network Management & Maintenance 
Once the IPT-based network has been deployed, it 
requires constant attention to maintain high levels of 
reliability, call quality, and system security. An 
effective IPT management system will meet the future needs 
of a growing network while addressing four areas of 
concern: Operations, Availability, Call Quality, and 
Accounting. Security is an important piece of each area and 
must be consistently addressed to assure the well-being of 
the network (Walker 180).  
a. Managing Operations 
This section addresses some of the issues 
required to effectively manage daily operations and changes 
in the IPT network. It helps to understand how to identify 
and address the important problems proactively to prevent 
significant system failures. Three areas of focus will be 
discussed: configuration management, event management, and 
fault management. 
• Configuration Management: A configuration is “the 
hardware and software arrangements that define a computer 
or telecommunications system and thus determine what the 
system will do and how well it will do it“ (Newton 203). To 
manage the IPT system configuration, the IT staff must: 
understand the current configuration, test and monitor all 
changes to the system configuration, closely track all 
changes, and limit and control who is authorized to make 
changes. 
An awareness of the current system configuration is 
achieved through the use of readable and understandable 
files, reports, and diagrams. The network management team 
must understand what physical components make up the 
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network, they should know equipment specifics, and 
recognize how the components are linked together. This can 
be accomplished through the use of network topology 
diagrams and up-to-date inventories. Topology diagrams 
provide a good high-level understanding of how the network 
is connected. Inventories provide more specific information 
(e.g., name, location, addresses, function of the device, 
vendor, model, serial number, operating system version, 
available memory, processing speed, etc.) to better 
understand each components function in the network. There 
are also software tools available to help identify and 
track this information. Configuration files should be 
protected to ensure the current configuration is accurate. 
This is accomplished by limited access to authorized 
individuals, by backing up configuration files frequently, 
installing security mechanisms, and by closely monitoring 
access to the files in order to recognize potential damage 
(Walker 186-192). 
• Event Management: Operating systems have the 
ability to track and log a variety of system events (e.g., 
opening, reading, modifying, and closing documents; when an 
application starts and stops; system errors). When system 
performance suffers, failures occur, or when the network 
has been attacked it is usually possible to recognize signs 
of the cause through system logs. There are so many logs to 
monitor that it would be infeasible to track them all, so 
an organization must prioritize what type of events are the 
most important to monitor. Then they must determine what 
kind of system response is required to address suspicious 
activity, which might include alerting the IT staff or 
executing corrective action without immediate human 
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intervention. It is wise to manage all of this information 
with software applications that help to track system 
events, consolidate logs, and help to recognize irregular 
activity (Walker 194-197). 
• Fault Management: The IPT system management team 
must be able to locate and correct system problems quickly 
as a part of day-to-day operations to prevent significant 
downtime. The complexity of the network often makes it 
difficult to isolate problems. A team can do several things 
to locate problems more quickly. They should look in places 
where the most recent changes were made, in places where 
previous failures occurred, and in places where monitoring 
indicates a trend of increasing trouble. They may also 
identify the problem by tracking the logical path between 
two endpoints where the problem occurs. All problems, 
whether solved or still unidentified, should be tracked 
with an explanation of symptoms, expected time and cost to 
repair, solutions, and a priority. This will help the 
management team to address the most important problems 
first and create a repository of information that will 
enable faster resolution in later cases. Finally, the 
management team should have a plan to handle significant 
events, like a network failure or severe attack on security 
(e.g., DDoS), so that the problem can be addressed 
efficiently (i.e., decreasing the likelihood of long hours 
that can cause more failures due to human fatigue and 
limitations) before significantly impacting the business 
(Walker 197-200). 
b. Maintaining High Availability 
An organization that desires a high level of 
availability must be committed to reducing network 
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downtime.  This can be accomplished through prevention, 
detection, and reaction. The best approach is to prevent 
failures by actively responding to small indications of 
problems before they get out of control. When prevention is 
not successful, the IT team must be able to quickly isolate 
the problem so that it can be repaired. Once detected, the 
team must act quickly to provide a short term solution and 
follow up with a permanent fix and prevention of similar 
failures. 
Though not all inclusive, there are two areas 
where an IT staff should focus for IPT-based networks. 
First, they must closely monitor IPT servers. Although 
servers can vary significantly depending on the functions 
they perform, they provide the most critical portions of 
the network. To enable good availability, these servers 
must be hardened as previously described and monitored 
continuously with a focus on the hardware, applications, 
and traffic. The second area of focus should be on managing 
applications. System software is complex and often acts 
unexpectedly, especially when interacting with other 
applications. Applications can often consume resources 
quickly or waste processing capability on unnecessary 
operations. Setting limits and closely monitoring these 
systems assists in achieving better levels of availability 
(Walker 200-204). 
c. Maintaining Consistent Call Quality 
On initial deployment, the IPT-based network 
should provide satisfactory call quality. However, as the 
network grows and changes, call quality is likely to become 
an issue. To manage call quality, the IPT management team 
must first be able to measure and track current call 
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quality. Recall that toll quality is measured at an MOS of 
4.0 or greater, while quality becomes unacceptable at 
levels lower than 3.6. Software is available to 
continuously monitor network traffic and determine an 
estimate of the MOS. Monitoring should occur throughout the 
network and trigger some kind of response, whether it be to 
alert staff or divert calls, when quality falls below 
established standards. 
To prevent reductions in voice quality, IT staff 
should monitor network performance, enforce SLAs, tune QoS 
mechanisms, and plan for future growth. The network metrics 
for IPT that should be examined most closely are delay, 
jitter, and lost packets. Responding to fluctuations in 
these measurements help to maintain call quality. These 
measurements are typically used to establish service level 
agreements with service providers. Track them and hold 
vendors accountable to encourage consistent quality. QoS 
mechanisms must be managed to ensure that they are 
configured correctly and work correctly. The mechanisms can 
be complex, but can be managed with policy-based network 
management. A policy server monitors how traffic is handled 
and automatically generates and distributes configuration 
instructions that help components to apply QoS settings in 
accordance with policy. Finally, the network management 
team should prepare for future growth by tracking how the 
network responds when new users are added. Understanding 
these trends assists in determining how to incrementally 
install or upgrade components in response to increasing 
call demands. By focusing on network performance and future 
growth, an organization can consistently maintain call 
quality on the IPT-based network (Walker 205-212). 
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d. Accounting 
Call detail records (CDRs) are used to keep track 
of the details of completed calls, containing information 
like the call source, destination, time, duration, delay, 
and jitter. The data can be used to monitor and 
troubleshoot the network, but are frequently utilized to 
determine who pays for the IPT service. This information 
must be tracked and monitored to ensure accurate billing 
and to help identify potential problems in the network. The 
information that is kept should also be protected, since it 
usually contains personal private information that is 
required by law. Prudent management of accounting records 
saves organizations money and assures compliance with 
privacy law. 
Failure to successful monitor and upkeep the network 
can create substantial losses due to the costs of replacing 
damaged equipment, time lost by the IT staff, lowered 
employee productivity, and the loss of sales or customer 
trust. This is demonstrated by a Find/SVP survey in 2000 
that estimated that Fortune 100 companies lost an average 
of $3 million (US) from network outages, not including the 
costs of lost productivity or missed calls (Walker 184). 
Good network management will come at an increased cost of 
human and physical resources, but is necessary to balance 
the risks of network failures that hamper business 
processes.  
9. Manage Change  
The final capabilities that are used in successful 
deployments are: the ability to manage the expectations of 
the people who will use the new system and the ability to 
adjust business practices to utilize new technology. 
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Company employees can be a great hindrance to any 
significant change in an organization, whether it is 
because they are comfortable with the old way of doing 
business or believe they will lose power or any other 
reason. The introduction of IPT will not only change the 
equipment in the business, but is likely to have an effect 
on how business is done in order to take full advantage of 
the opportunity. Agencies must harness the drive of those 
who are excited to implement the change and manage those 
employees who are likely to resist. Organizations that can 
do this throughout the implementation process are more 
likely to realize greater benefits from the IPT-based 
network.  
There are many methodologies that have been created to 
manage this type of change in the organization, and most 
any of them could be applied to an IPT implementation. A 
framework for business transformation, which may be applied 
to IPT implementations, is explained by Joseph Kotter in 
the article, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts 
Fail.” It consists of eight steps that are discussed below. 
1) Establishing a Sense of Urgency: The urgency that 
must be conveyed for an IPT implementation is the 
opportunity to realize great benefits from a converged 
network.  That urgency may soon be created by the need to 
stay competitive with other organizations that have already 
taken advantages of IPT-based networks. The level of 
urgency is established by the effectiveness of the business 
case made to stakeholders of an IPT system. 
2) Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition: The IPT 
implementation project team will lead the development, but 
can only do it effectively with the support (in the form of 
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money and power) of upper management. They can also drive 
positive change with the support of enthusiastic employees 
that have an interest in the end product. 
3) Creating a Vision: The vision is supported by a 
strong business case and a well-planned implementation 
plan, which includes plans for development beyond the 
initial deployment and changes in business processes. 
4) Communicating a Vision: All stakeholders, down to 
individual users, must have an understanding of the changes 
that will take place to convert to IPT technology and 
resultant business practices. This is accomplished through 
training and continuous communication that includes 
feedback between both implementers and users. 
5) Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: This can 
be accomplished by getting full support from individuals 
who have the authority and budget to make changes. 
Enthusiast stakeholders will lose faith if not given the 
power to implement the IPT system the right way.  
6) Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins: Small 
deployments and pilot projects, which take advantage of 
great returns from small changes, will help to achieve buy-
in from stakeholders. It is also an early indication of 
problems or resistance if a project team is unable to get 
user acceptance or realize business improvements on small 
changes. Successes, however, should be recognized to 
encourage further growth, acceptance, and positive business 
change. 
7) Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still 
More Change: The incremental approach to implementing IPT-
based networks described above provides an excellent method 
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to encourage change. The process produces gradual change in 
stages and confirms success through effective measures of 
performance. Not only must the technical aspects of the 
change be measured as described, but the project team must 
also monitor the effect those changes have on business 
processes. Incremental successes build upon each other to 
create more positive change and acceptance in the future. 
8) Institutionalizing New Approaches: Finally, the 
implementation will be a success when stakeholders adjust 
to and accept new business processes created by the change 
in technology. Organizations should be wary of those who 
continue to reminisce about the way things used to be, and 
reward those who embrace the opportunity to improve 
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V. COAST GUARD HEADQUARTERS CASE STUDY 
A. PURPOSE 
Coast Guard Headquarters (CGHQ) Support Command (HSC) 
in Washington, D.C. administers telephony services for CG 
offices located at CGHQ and some others in the D.C. area. 
This chapter provides a background of HSC’s migration 
towards IPT in order to present an analysis of their 
security and implementation practices in Chapter VI. It 
includes a discussion of: the driving factors that led to 
the decision to begin implementation, the preparation 
conducted prior to deployment, the pilot project, the 
process of incrementally implementing IPT, and plans for 
the future. An understanding of the current implementation 
process at HSC facilitates the analysis of practices and 
assists in preparing for future deployments in the CG. 
B. BACKGROUND 
1. Headquarters Support Command 
HSC provides support services to HQ personnel and 
families via four divisions and other staff. This includes 
the Administration Services Division, which handles 
military personnel issues, facilities support and 
maintenance, procurement, property management and 
accounting, and work Life. The Command and Safety Division 
provides for the physical safety of personnel and 
equipment. The Clinical Services Division responds to 
personnel health care needs. Other staffs handle important 
support services like equal opportunity programs and 
religious services.  Finally, the Information Services (IS) 
Division supports information technology needs by focusing 
on systems, customer support, budget and planning, and 
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communications operations. The IS Division is responsible 
for meeting the telephony needs of HSC and CGHQ, and 
currently does so through the use of the PSTN and other 
networks. They support various telecommunications functions 
by providing a Help Desk to respond to information service 
problems identified by HQ personnel. 
2. HQ Telephony Requirements 
The missions of each division briefly mentioned above 
and the various responsibilities of CGHQ offices combine to 
necessitate diverse telephony solutions that ensure 
operational effectiveness. Some of the services, equipment  
and features that are currently provided include: single 
line phones, multiple line phones, speaker phones, 
headsets, call hold, call transferring, call forwarding, 
intercom, redial, conferencing, Video Teleconferencing, 
remote access, secured telephone equipment and lines, 800 
service, data lines (e.g., fax and modem), Octel VMX Voice 
Mail, broadcast messages, single digit menus (a.k.a. phone 
trees), pagers, cell phones, calling cards, GETS, simple 
dialing plans, and help desk services. In all, HSC services 
the needs of approximately 3600 telephone users (and 4000 
numbers) to achieve mission performance at CGHQ.  
3. Department of Transportation (DoT) Telephony 
Services 
The majority of HQ’s current telephony needs are 
provided by the PSTN via a local switch (PBX) owned and 
administered by the DoT. Among other government 
organizations in the D.C. area, the Coast Guard leases 
telephone lines and services from the DoT. This arrangement 
is similar to Centrex services previously discussed, where 
the DoT houses the equipment and provides services to other 
entities for a cost. Although this relieves the CG of the 
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burden of storing and maintaining the equipment, it has the 
disadvantage of reducing administrative control that delays 
configuration changes (e.g., Moves, Adds, and Changes 
(MACs)) and may increase the costs of services in the long 
run. 
C. CONSIDERING IPT 
HSC was influenced by several factors when first 
contemplating the use of IPT.  The primary factor prompting 
a change in telephony services is the fact that the 
Department of Transportation will be relocating to a new 
building in fiscal year 2007 with the intention of shutting 
down the local telephony switch that CGHQ currently 
operates on. Other factors include: the CG’s transition 
from the DoT to the Department of Homeland Security, policy 
that supports moving away from legacy systems (i.e., aging 
PSTN equipment), the expansion of CGHQ into another 
building (Referred to as the Jemal or Half Street 
building), the potential (now confirmed) move of CGHQ 
within the next ten years, and mediocre telephony services 
provided by the DoT. 
After learning of the DoT’s future move, HSC was 
presented with three basic options; first, to shift to 
similar telephony services provided by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA), or to stand up its own services with 
either a traditional solution or an IPT solution. The FAA 
solution was too expensive and relied too much on legacy 
equipment to be a viable solution, while the other two 
options appeared to be better long term solutions. The 
traditional solution would provide familiar and proven 
telephony services; however, HSC decided to move forward 
with an IPT solution because of the telecommunication 
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industry’s shift towards packet-switched technology and 
because IPT offered the features that most-suited the 
organization’s needs and promised to produce the best 
value. 
The implementation of IPT addresses several of the 
concerns prompted by the DoT. It provides a new telephony 
solution independent of the DoT or other federal agencies, 
it is a progression away from legacy telephony equipment 
used by the CG, it is expected to provide portability and 
scalability that meets the needs of HQ expansion and 
relocation, and it offers enhanced feature sets that are 
expected to improve operational processes. Along with the 
services that the traditional PSTN system provides, the new 
IPT solution is anticipated to provide: 
• Unified Messaging System: This is a service that 
supports the integration of email and voice messaging, 
allowing users to access voice messages (converted to text) 
via email or email messages (converted to voice) via the 
telephone. 
• Improved Help Desk Services: IPT Call Management 
features facilitate the entering and monitoring of help 
tickets and trouble calls. 
• Skill-based routing: This is a form of customer 
relations management and is commonly referred to as a phone 
tree. For HSC, the particular goal is to consolidate or 
centralize a variety of services at the Help Desk’s number 
at extension “HELP” (4357). For instance, a user might dial 
“one” to report data network problems (e.g., account 
access), “two” for telephone problems (e.g., echo), “three” 
99 
for facilities management (e.g., broken water fountain), 
and so on. 
• Call Tracking and Monitoring: Tracking features 
of an IPT solution provides many advantages. First, network 
managers can more closely monitor telephone traffic to 
better understand requirements and make adjustments 
accordingly. It improves the measurement of performance 
metrics to hold service providers to established service 
level agreements. Finally, it improves the visibility of 
call records, allowing better tracking of call usage and 
billing, via TelSoft Solution’s MegaCall Call Accounting 
system. This is an improvement upon the previous 
relationship with the DoT where billing for use and 
services were often vague. Not only does improved billing 
information and tracking increase the potential for 
savings, but also provides a mechanism to offer services to 
other government agencies to reduce overall costs. 
• Moves, Adds, and Changes: MACs are very slow and 
expensive, sometimes requiring weeks to complete. This is 
often created by the need to make physical changes to the 
PSTN to move an office for instance. The problem is further 
aggravated by sloppy wiring, necessary administrator 
involvement, and slow physical request routing processes. 
In contrast, a majority of MACs on an IPT network can be 
completed at the telephone terminal by the user in a matter 
of minutes or remotely by an administrator. An Improved MAC 
process provides significant savings in time and costs. 
• Convergence: There are great potential benefits 
by bringing the data and voice networks together, 
particularly in the new Half Street building where there is 
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little interaction with the PSTN. It consolidates network 
equipment, management, and maintenance, effectively 
streamlining two different groups (data and telephony) to 
one more efficient team. Basically, HSC will be able to run 
its data and voice communications with the same personnel 
as before, but with increased control over functions that 
were previously controlled by DoT. 
Despite the promise of several improvements through 
the use of IPT, HSC is not completely replacing the PSTN 
and will continue to utilize some its features in the near 
term. The reliability and proven stability of the PSTN will 
be utilized while both HSC and the telecommunications 
industry progresses to more complete IPT solutions. 
Specifically, HSC is incrementally replacing traditional 
telephony services with IPT services at the HQ building and 
is using the PSTN as a redundant form of communications in 
the new Half Street building. This process provides a known 
and reliable fallback as CGHQ transitions, it assures 
emergency communications during disasters, and it provides 
for emergency location services like E911.  
D. INITIAL PLANNING 
After deciding to deploy IPT to meet HQ requirements, 
HSC began the planning process by selecting a project 
implementation team and by identifying the most appropriate 
equipment and services. After selecting a preliminary 
solution, HSC continues to test and evaluate elements of 
the IPT system to produce the best outcome. 
• Project Team: The IPT project team consists of 
many existing members of the Information Services Division 
at HSC, including data network personnel, budget and 
finance functions, and security experts, with active upper 
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management involvement and support. The key to completing 
the team however, was the decision to contract 
telecommunications specialists with years of telephony 
experience and familiarity with packet-switched networks, 
and to outsource the system integrator function. HSC hired 
Connected Work Place Solutions (CWPS), a company that 
specializes in implementing 3Com IPT solutions, to 
facilitate a smooth transition into a new technology for 
the Coast Guard. This group of personnel provides a rounded 
out team of professionals equipped with the knowledge and 
expertise to deploy a secure and reliable telephone network 
at CGHQ.  
• Research & Vendor Selection: HSC conducted 
extensive research to determine the best product for CGHQ’s 
needs. This included market surveys, vendor site visits, 
and analysis of vendor documentation of equipment and past 
projects. Companies like Cisco Systems, Avaya, Nortel, 
3Com, Sylantro, Broadsoft, and Qovia were represented. HSC 
also paid close attention to other agencies that had 
already implemented IPT, particularly the U.S. Fish and 
Wildlife Service because the scale and requirements of 
their solution was very similar to CGHQ needs. 
HSC chose a solution provided by 3Com and supported by 
CWPS and Qovia. 3Com was selected because their products 
were most appropriate to the scale of the Coast Guard’s 
implementation; whereas, companies like Cisco provided (and 
required) a lot of very expensive equipment more 
appropriate for large enterprise solutions. 3Com’s 
equipment also proved to be more user-friendly. For 
instance, 3Com IP Telephones have “hard buttons” that allow 
the selection of an option at any time, where other vendors 
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often support equipment with “soft buttons” that only 
appear on the terminal after making other selections. 
Equipment from other vendors (e.g., Cisco routers) is being 
used to build the IPT-based network, but the core IPT 
components and endpoints have been produced by 3Com and 
implemented by CWPS. Qovia’s NetScout, an IPT network 
management tool, has also been selected for evaluation on 
the new packet-switched network. As HSC incrementally 
implements its IPT solution, it continually reevaluates the 
equipment and services provided by these vendors, as well 
as new products, to assure the best options are employed. 
• Preparing a Pilot program & the initial rollout: 
After selecting an initial solution, HSC made preparations 
for a Pilot program in order to become familiar with the 
IPT technology and to test the IPT products provided by the 
selected vendors. HSC recognized the opportunity to improve 
its Help Desk functions, and chose to conduct a trial run 
by migrating approximately 40 Help Desk support personnel 
and services to IPT. They would follow this up with an 
initial rollout of IPT by moving approximately 300 
personnel to the new Half Street building with new 
telephony services. After a successful trial program and 
rollout, HSC had plans to gradually migrate the remaining 
3250 personnel at about 400-600 personnel every three 
months. 
E. HELP DESK TEST BED 
To test and familiarize itself with IPT, HSC installed 
3Com’s NBX call server, supporting telephone equipment, and 
call management software at the call center (Help Desk). 
The technology supports smaller IPT implementations 
primarily based on a 3Com protocol that is similar to the 
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H.323 protocol. It is used over the HQ LAN using the 
existing Help Desk extension. 
Prior to implementation, the Help Desk was attended by 
two receptionists who processed phone calls, emails, and 
walk-in requests. They would answer simple questions, but 
spent most of their time entering remedy tickets into the 
system. The tickets would be prioritized by analysts in the 
back room who then worked to resolve them. The main 
problems with this method of resolving issues included the 
inability to capture all the information and the inability 
to respond in a timely manner. Information was often lost 
in this process because the two receptionists would become 
overburdened and forget to enter remedy tickets, personnel 
would choose not to leave a message when the two phone 
lines where tied up by the attendants, or an event (e.g., 
server down) would generate many calls that would not be 
added as remedy tickets because they related to the same 
problem and were too numerous to track. 
One of the anticipated benefits of upgrading the call 
center with an IPT-based network was to be able to better 
track calls to more effectively meet the needs of those who 
call the Help Desk. The IPT system proved to improve the 
efficiency of the Help Desk. First, the call management 
software tracks all calls, whether they are live calls, 
voice messages, or even impatient hang ups. This 
information facilitates faster entry of remedy tickets and 
helps to track actual call volume to the Help Desk.  
The business process of receiving calls also improved. 
There are still two receptionists at the front desk who 
handle most of the calls and walk-in requests, but now 
analysts in the back room are able to monitor activity of 
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the two attendants up front. When both of them are busy, 
analysts in the back room pick up the line and accept 
requests. As a result, more HSC customers are talking to 
live personnel, improving relations between support 
personnel and system users. Despite an increase in number 
of remedy tickets due to improved tracking, the Help Desk 
is now able to respond to requests in a timelier manner 
because of its ability to closely monitor and track 
incoming calls.  
The Pilot demonstrated the benefits of other improved 
processes, like MACs. It increased mobility by allowing 
Help Desk personnel to move between phones by entering a 
personal access code, effectively logging into the phone. 
The pilot program successfully provided the opportunity to 
experiment and test the IPT equipment. It was particularly 
helpful to have some of those analysts, who would respond 
to IPT problem calls later, become comfortable with the use 
of the phones up front. IPT users and implementers quickly 
adapted to the use of the new phone systems and made minor 
adjustments (e.g., echo was a common problem) to tune the 
network to optimum performance.  
F. INCREMENTAL DEPLOYMENT & TESTING 
Upon completion of a successful pilot program, HSC 
continued to move forward by making plans to move the Coast 
Guard Acquisitions Directorate and the Coast Guard 
Deepwater Directorate to the new building where a new IPT-
based network would be installed. The Acquisitions 
Directorate is responsible for the acquisition of large 
Coast Guard assets, like Aircraft, Cutters, small boats, 
and facilities. The Deepwater Directorate is responsible 
for conducting the Integrated Deepwater System Program:  
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an integrated performance-based approach for 
upgrading existing assets while transitioning to 
newer, more capable platforms with improved 
systems,…recapitalizing the Coast Guard's aging 
deepwater assets and support systems by 
modernizing or replacing with state-of-the-market 
interoperable systems (IDS). 
The two of these directorates combined contain over 300 
telephony users with a wide variety of telephony needs. 
Before starting the shift to internet protocol telephony, 
HSC prepared both directorates with briefings of planned 
changes, user training, and through the production and 
distribution of brochures and user manuals. 
The transition of these CG organizations would require 
the shift of all offices and equipment to the new building. 
This transition would benefit the IPT implementation on one 
hand, by creating one large change for personnel to deal 
with at one time (over the weekend), rather than making 
several encumbering adjustments over a period of time. 
However, it increased the possibility of unanticipated 
events that could be more difficult to handle due to the 
increased workload during the transfer. In fact, the change 
over required a new dial plan with new phone numbers for 
each user. Due to a few minor human errors, the phone list 
was completely incorrect and many individuals where moved 
to the wrong physical location, significantly impacting the 
original dialing plan. Fortunately, the capability and 
features of the new IPT solution demonstrated the ability 
to quickly makes changes and restore the system to order in 
one evening.  
The relocation was also complicated by the unknowns of 
transferring to a new facility. Potential issues that were 
resolved or became insignificant were: a tight building 
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construction schedule, the collapse of fiber optic ducts, 
and renegotiation of telephony service contracts. 
Fortunately, construction completed on time, the fiber 
lines were led overhead and backed up with line of sight 
transmission via optical laser (eventually a third fiber 
connection was established through power ducts), and the 
shift to IPT encouraged competitive pricing among service 
providers in the area. 
The two Coast Guard Directorates smoothly transitioned 
to the Half Street building without major incident and 
without loss of telephony services. At peak hours of use 
they approach approximately five percent bandwidth 
utilization, although that is likely to change near the end 
of the fiscal year for these Directorates. The current IPT 
solution provides most of the features, functionality and 
bandwidth required by the current users with room for 
growth for future implementation of IPT at CGHQ. HSC is 
currently evaluating the initial rollout of these 
Directorates and plans to shift the remainder of HQ 
personnel to the IPT solution, followed by an incremental 
increase in call features that weren’t available with the 
first deployment. Their future plans will be discussed 
after a description of the current IPT network is 
presented. 
G. IPT NETWORK DESCRIPTION 
The network depicted is not an exact representation of 
CGHQ’s actual IPT network, but provides enough description 
to encourage an understanding of the basic operation of the 
network and still maintain an appropriate level of 
security. 
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Both the CGHQ building and the Half Street building 
have similar network characteristics throughout with a few 
variations of equipment. Similarities include the physical 
protection of the network, where both buildings incorporate 
security mechanisms that protect critical pieces of the 
network. Equipment resiliency is supported by backup 
systems like RAID (redundant array of independent disks) 
drives, universal power sources, generators, and system 
backups. Both buildings also provide logical protection of 
information by separating voice and data on separate 
virtual local area networks. The voice data itself never 
leaves the LAN via the internet; rather, the IP phone sets 
up external calls through the PSTN by way of the Call 
Processor and Gateway as illustrated in Figure 8 (Section 
II.3). Finally, the IPT-based network is supported by the 
PSTN, providing E911 services, analog capability (e.g., fax 
and modem), and an automatic transfer to the PSTN should 
the IPT network fail. 
1. CGHQ Building 
The primary IPT equipment located in the CGHQ building 
is listed below with a description of basic function and 
security functions. 
• 3Com Linux Appliances: All of the 3Com IPT server 
equipment described below (including the Half Street 
building) are produced and maintained by 3Com. They are 
treated like appliances, where 3Com hardens machines and 
replaces equipment as necessary. This reduces the effort of 
constant system patches and upgrades, and is believed to be 
more secure than other systems (i.e., Microsoft based 
machines). These machines are devoted to the IPT 
applications described and have any other unnecessary 
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services disabled. They have the ability to produce 
messages and alerts during system failures. Each machine is 
also backed up with a universal power supply. 
• 3Com NBX Call Control Server: This server is the 
gateway between the PSTN and the HQ LAN for the HSC Call 
Center (Help Desk), and is intended to serve small IPT 
implementations. It provides 1500 ports, has mirrored hard 
drive, is backed up by the VCX (see below) server during 
failure, and provides filtering (firewall) capability.  
• 3Com VCX Call Control Server: This server is the 
gateway between the PSTN and the HQ LAN for all other users 
and provides for a larger scale implementation. It provides 
10,000 ports, RAID for processing redundancy, is mirrored 
by another VCX server in the Half Street building in case 
of system failure, and provides filtering (firewall) 
capability.  
• 3Com Unified Messaging System Server: The UMS 
server provides voice mail services for HQ users, with the 
capability of accessing and converting the format of both 
voice mail and email. This server is mirrored by another 
UMS server in the Half Street building and has RAID for 
processing redundancy. 
• Telemanagement Server: This server provides the 
billing and accounting service for the IPT at HQ. It uses 
TelSoft software call MegaCall to perform these functions. 
For redundancy it has RAID drives and routine backups. 
• Security Server: This server is the only machine 
described that is not entirely used for IPT services. It 
resides on the data network and manages security policies 
all data network and IPT machines. It alerts support 
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personnel and provides “advice” (e.g., pictures, maps, 
schematic, and priority of alarms) to personnel on duty who 
are unfamiliar with the alarms. 
• IPT Telephones: Telephone terminals are all 3Com 
handsets that provides varying functionality based on the 
model. They do not provide fax, modem, or other analog 
capabilities. No wireless handsets or Softphones are 
currently being used or allowed on the network. 
• PSTN: The PSTN provides for fax, modem, and other 
analog services. It also provides for E911 location 
services. It serves as fall back when IPT services fail. 
2. Jemal (Half Street) Building 
• The Half Street building also has a 3Com VCX Call 
Control Server and a 3Com UMS Server that mirror the 
servers at the HQ building. They provide primary service to 
IPT users, while being mirrored and effectively backed up 
by the servers at the HQ building. 
• The IPT Telephones and PSTN features described 
for the HQ building are provided for at the Half Street 
building. 
• The Half Street building does not have backup 
generator power for IPT equipment in the building. All 
equipment has backup power that provides time for safe 
system shut downs but will not allow extended processing 
capability.  
3. Network Links 
The two HQ buildings are physically linked through 
several points of access. These links are provided by fiber 
cable that is either run through power ducting, fiber cable 
that is run through telephony ducting and routed above 
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ground along telephone poles to bypass collapsed ducting, 
or passed through the atmosphere by line of sight optical 
lasers positioned on top of each building.  
4. Diagram 
The following diagram (Figure 10) shows the basic 
logical (and some physical) setup of the IPT network. The 
call control servers provide a gateway between the IPT 
network and the PSTN, while also allowing analog services 
through the PSTN. The rest of the IPT equipment is 
basically on an Ethernet backbone, subnetted on one VLAN to 
segregate it from the data network.  The data network 
resides on the CGDN, the Coast Guard’s Intranet, which is 
connected to the Public Internet through connections that 
are managed and protected (via firewall and other security 
mechanisms) by the Coast Guard Telecommunications Command 
(TISCOM). Connection to the HQ IPT VLAN for remote 
configuration management of IPT equipment is performed via 
a Remote Access Server (RAS) that resides at TISCOM. 
 
Figure 10. CG Headquarters IPT Network Diagram 
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H. FUTURE DEVELOPMENT 
HSC will work to transfer the rest of CGHQ to an IPT 
telephony solution beginning in July of 2005. They plan to 
shift approximately 400 to 600 people every three months 
until the remaining 3250 users are utilizing IPT services. 
The process will include continual monitoring of system 
resources and capabilities, via Qovia’s NetScout and 
through the stand-up of a Network Operations Center (NOC), 
to assure call quality and maintain security. There are 
also plans to create “fly away” kits that allow remote IPT 
service to support continuity of operations (COOP) planning 
when natural or man-made disasters occur. When complete, 
this IPT solution of the CGHQ local area network will be 
the first step towards larger Coast Guard enterprise 
implementation of internet protocol telephony. 
Following full integration of CGHQ, HSC is likely to 
provide IPT service to the National Response Center (NRC). 
The NRC is the sole federal point of contact for reporting 
oil and chemical spills. Careful planning is required to 
meet the NRC’s requirement of 24 hour telephony service 
without interruption. Transition to IPT must be watertight, 
but will provide great benefit once established by 
supporting the NRC’s Incident Response Information System 
(IRIS). IPT integration with IRIS will allow quick dialing, 
quick production of reports, voice recording, call 
labeling, and generation of call statistics. These 
capabilities greatly improve NRC’s ability to respond to 
environmental catastrophes. HSC also plans to equip the 
Coast Guard Command Center and other commands with the same 
kind of operational capabilities provided by an IPT 
solution. 
112 
Once the Coast Guard has established IPT networks 
among units on HQ’s local area network, the next logical 
step would be the deployment of IPT across the Coast 
Guard’s Data Network (Intranet) followed by the eventual 
transport of voice data across the Internet. The long term 
goal is to provide the benefits of IPT to all aspects of 
the Coast Guard’s resources, from the smallest and most 
remote CG Station to the largest CG command, to assets 
afloat and ashore, both nationwide and worldwide. Through 
its initial development of IPT, HSC has positioned the 










VI. CASE ANALYSIS 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze HSC’s 
deployment of IPT with respect to the security policy and 
implementation practices discussed in this document. First, 
the use of security mechanisms will be evaluated based on: 
Physical Security, Logical Separation, Network Traffic 
Management, IPT Equipment, Encryption and Authentication, 
and Redundancy. For each attribute, strengths and 
weaknesses will be identified as appropriate and 
recommendations made to encourage better security. 
Implementations practices will be explored in the same 
manner, with a focus on: Forming an Implementation Team, 
Understanding Telephony Requirements, Understanding the 
Data Network Infrastructure, Updating the Data Network, 
Developing a Business Case and Acquiring, Creating an 
Implementation Plan, Deploying IPT, Network Management and 
Maintenance, and Managing Change. 
B. SECURITY 
1. Physical Security 
The physical security mechanisms employed at CGHQ 
provide the expected level of security for all elements of 
the IPT network. Some of the equipment and methods used to 
protect critical components of the network include: 
automated monitoring systems, closed circuit television, 
motion sensing cameras, system disconnect alarms, power 
loss alarms, flooding alarms, HVAC, chemical biological 
protection, door position switches, door strikes, motion 
sensors, proximity card readers, and security guards. To 
the greatest extent possible, cabling and data transport 
114 
media are protected by physical barriers to prevent 
unauthorized physical access to the network.  
• Recommendations: The physical security measures 
set up at CGHQ will effectively deter most physical attacks 
on the voice network. To maintain strong protection, HSC 
must ensure those mechanisms are not weakened through human 
complacency (e.g., failure to log and escort visitors, 
bypassing authentication systems by holding the door open 
for other personnel, ignoring alarms, etc.). HSC should 
develop and enforce policy that supports the proper use of 
these physical protections and barriers.  
2. Logical Separation 
To err on the side of security and prevent potential 
attacks on the voice network from data network 
vulnerabilities, HSC initially installed physically 
separate data and voice transport media in the Half Street 
building. That is, different cabling is provided for data 
and voice. This reduced some of the cost savings of a 
converged network, but provided better security. HSC 
recognized that adequate security could be provided by 
logically segregating the network and use common physical 
components. As new development occurs in the new building, 
all data and voice equipment will support only one physical 
network, but divide voice and data traffic through the use 
of separate subnets (VLANs). 
There are currently no softphones or wireless IP 
Phones on the IPT network. This reduces the number of 
potential threats on the network through interaction of 
different networks (i.e., voice, data, wireless). The UMS 
server, security server, and network switches are the only 
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places where the voice and data networks interface. These 
points are not supported with Intrusion Detection Systems. 
• Recommendations: Separation between the data and 
voice networks has been established on the CGHQ network, 
providing adequate security to the IPT-based network. To 
maintain security and call quality, HSC must actively 
monitor the network to ensure that unused ports are closed 
(especially data network ports on IPT equipment), that data 
and voice packets remain on separate VLANs, and that 
unauthorized equipment that compromises network 
segregation(e.g., personal softphone agent software) is not 
added to the network.  
3. Network Traffic Management 
The IPT VLAN resides within the HQ data network LAN, 
which is a part of the CGDN. The CGDN accesses the public 
Internet through firewalls that are controlled by TISCOM. 
It is assumed that the CGDN is relatively secure from 
external influence and that all traffic residing on the 
CGDN is trusted; therefore, there are few filtering or IDS 
mechanisms within Headquarter’s IPT solution. 
Since the IPT network connects directly to the PSTN 
via the VCX and NBX gateways, there is no need to use 
Network Address Translation between the HQ IPT LAN and any 
other networks. This reduces the complexity of securing IPT 
conversations that traverse different networks. 
IPT Equipment and Servers may be configured remotely 
by a small number of administrative personnel. They gain 
access to the IPT network by connecting to a Remote Access 
Server (RAS) from their home (or remote) computer. This 
provides a secure connection to the CGDN. 
116 
• Recommendations: The CGHQ IPT solution will 
require more preparation before it can complete calls over 
the Internet or other untrusted networks. Since it is 
assumed that all information on the CGDN is trusted, HSC 
has put few mechanisms in place to separate the voice 
network from other influences. The use of separate VLANs is 
adequate for the current implementation over the HQ LAN; 
however, HSC must use firewalls, IDSs, and other network 
monitoring equipment to assure good call quality and 
security for calls that will traverse other networks. The 
Coast Guard should balance the costs of implementing these 
security mechanisms prior to moving voice over the public 
Internet. 
4. IPT Equipment 
As described in the previous chapter, the IPT servers 
have been hardened by the manufacturer and are replaced as 
an entire “appliance” when upgrades are necessary. They are 
generally designed and used for one application. HSC can 
strengthen the security of these machines by utilizing 
built in firewall, intrusion detection, and alerting 
systems and by disabling unnecessary services.  
Other IPT equipment, like switches, routers, and IP 
phones, have been hardened by disabling unused ports and 
services, and by maintaining up to date patches and 
antivirus software. They require access through 
authentication mechanisms to make configuration changes.  
• Recommendations: CGHQ has a good start by using 
strong equipment. They must continue to monitor the 
equipment and ensure built-in security mechanisms are 
utilized to maximize security, reliability, and call 
quality.  
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4. Encryption and Authentication 
Voice encryption is not currently being utilized on 
the IPT network because voice conversations do not leave 
the LAN on a packet-switched network. It is assumed that 
the risk of overhearing an unclassified conversation and 
the subsequent consequences are acceptable (a greater risk 
is the employee that is too loud).  
Authentication mechanisms are in place on all IPT 
Phones and equipment to assure trusted personnel access the 
equipment. For instance, each user has an account and a 
personal code that they must use to logon to a IP 
Telephone. 
 IPT Equipment and Servers may be configured remotely 
by a small number of administrative personnel. They gain 
access to the IPT network by connecting to a Remote Access 
Server (RAS) from their home (or remote) computer. This 
provides a secure connection to the CGDN. 
• Recommendations: As the Coast Guard expands it 
IPT capability, it must prepare to provide more encryption 
and authentication mechanisms. The current solution would 
not adequately protect call conversations over the Internet 
and achieve the desired call quality. 
5. Redundancy 
The IPT-based network at CGHQ ensures reliability by 
employing several points of redundancy. With the exception 
of consistent generator power in the Half Street building, 
all critical equipment is backed up with emergency power to 
allow continuous operation during losses of power. At a 
minimum, all vital components are backed up with power 
sources that allow sufficient time for safe shut downs. 
Power failure tests are conducted regularly. To assure 
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system processes stay online, critical IPT equipment files 
are backed up or stored in redundant memory locations. 
Vital servers are mirrored or backed up by other servers to 
ensure operations during system failure. When the IPT 
network fails, the voice network automatically faults over 
to the PSTN to provide telephony services. Finally, 
disaster recovery planning is conducted regularly in order 
to provide continuity of operations. 
• Recommendations: Generator power at the Half 
Street building has not been established. To ensure better 
reliability of the voice network, HSC should work to 
quickly bring long term backup power to the building. 
Otherwise, the current support mechanisms provide the means 
to maintain a reliable network. 
C. IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES 
1. Forming an Implementation Team 
HSC developed a strong project team consisting of 
individuals with a variety of background and experience. 
The areas of specialty brought by members of the team 
included: past Coast Guard or CG headquarters experience, 
telecommunications, internet protocol telephony, 
traditional telephony, data network management, data 
network security, computer security, physical security, 
budget and finance, facilities engineering, and others. The 
decision to outsource the role of system integration to a 
company experienced with 3Com equipment and IPT greatly 
strengthened the ability of the implementation crew. A 
focus on the selection of experienced project team leaders 
led to a very smooth and effective implementation of IPT. 
• Recommendations: To maintain a high level of IPT 
security and call quality, HSC must continue to educate and 
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train its network management personnel and maintain strong 
relationships with its telecommunications carriers, 
contracted support personnel, and system integrators. The 
experience and diligence of these personnel will keep the 
system running in the long term. 
2. Understanding Telephony Requirements 
Some members of the project team already had years of 
experience with traditional telephone use at CGHQ and were 
immediately able to transfer that knowledge towards the 
preparation of requirements for an IPT-based network 
solution. They immediately recognized the potential 
benefits that IPT could provide to MACs, telephony feature 
sets, and telecommunications contracts with service 
providers. 
• Recommendations: Telephony requirements are 
likely to change as organizations within the Coast Guard 
realize the benefits of new features that IPT provides. As 
the technology advances and as personnel become more 
familiar with it, business processes and use of telephony 
are likely to change. Network managers should continually 
monitor network traffic and work with stake holders to 
understand requirements and adjust accordingly. 
3. Understanding the Data Network Infrastructure and 
Updating the Data Network 
The benefit of deploying IPT at a new facility is that 
it saves the effort of analyzing and upgrading the old data 
network. Installation of the test bed and other IPT 
services at the old HQ building, however, required an 
examination of the network. HSC’s study and preparation of 
the network and its available bandwidth allowed a smooth 
transition to a new centralized Help Desk. Increased 
bandwidth and the use of QoS mechanisms helped to improve 
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the flow of voice over the data network. Telephone 
services, features, and call quality introduced by the new 
IPT system proved to meet the needs of its users. 
• Recommendations: As CGHQ transitions more users 
from the PSTN to the new IPT-based network, it must 
continually monitor the data network and its interaction 
with the voice network to assure the security of the IPT 
network. They should be prepared to make adjustments to the 
data network to handle negative interactions or increased 
traffic volume caused by the introduction of IPT. They must 
be especially diligent when they move to the point where 
they are moving voice conversations over the Internet. 
4. Developing a Business Case and Acquiring 
HSC had several good reasons to switch to IPT. First, 
a need, which might be considered an opportunity in this 
case, presented itself when the DoT announced that it would 
be moving and shutting down its switch. Second, the DoT’s 
move coincided with CG pressure to move away from old 
processes (e.g., relationships with DoT) and legacy 
systems. Third, the expansion of CGHQ to another building 
and a future CGHQ move encouraged the consideration of a 
new and portable technology. Finally, the combination of 
these demands and opportunities brought the realization 
that new technology could bring cost savings and improved 
productivity through features like unified messaging, 
inexpensive MACs, and convergence. 
The project team conducted thorough reviews of many 
IPT vendors and the equipment and services provided. They 
also researched other implementations to understand the 
kind of capabilities, limitations, features, and 
requirements inherent in an IPT solution developed for 
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organizations with similar missions and size. Careful 
consideration of these factors helped HSC to choose a 
product by 3Com that appeared to fit well, was 
interoperable (via SIP standard), and provided scalability 
to prepare for IPT growth in the Coast Guard.  The 
implementation of this product was supported by the 
selection of a system integrator that was charged with 
ensuring a smooth installation and sustainined 
maintainability by providing training and documentation. An 
IPT-based network management tool, Qovia’s NetScout, was 
also acquired to monitor and manage the IPT network for 
long term viability. Finally, service contracts with 
telecommunications service providers were negotiated to 
guarantee the bandwidth required to support the IPT network 
in the near future. 
• Recommendations: Although the use of IPT is 
growing, some organizations are still slow to change due to 
the reliability and quality already provided by the PSTN. 
CGHQ must demonstrate successes to encourage the spread of 
IPT throughout the Coast Guard. As IPT grows in the CG, 
telecommunications managers must choose equipment and 
services that are interoperable and scalable. The systems 
must be able to grow with the technology and interact with 
other IPT systems to assure communications between CG units 
and other government agencies. 
5. Creating an Implementation Plan 
The pilot program conducted at HSC’s Help Desk was 
invaluable in preparing the IPT implementation team for the 
rollout of IPT at CGHQ. Many of the personnel working at 
the Help Desk were the same people who would be installing 
and supporting the IPT solution for CGHQ. The test bed 
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allowed these employees to understand how to address voice 
network problems and tune the IPT system to bring maximum 
performance. They were also better able to understand user 
questions and concerns, through their own experiences with 
the equipment. Additionally, the pilot program measured and 
confirmed the capability of the data network, vendor 
equipment, and workforce aptitude. 
• Recommendations: CGHQ should continue to 
experiment and learn as it continues to transition to a 
full IPT solution. The same careful planning and 
experimentation must take place before the CG begins 
implementation across the CGDN and again before utilizing 
IPT across the Internet. 
6. Deploying IPT 
The key success of HSC’s deployment to date is its 
incremental approach to implementation. Each stage of the 
process has been carefully laid out, performed, and then 
tested. A gradual approach to full deployment allows the 
project team to properly plan, to respond to and resolve 
unanticipated events, and to confirm satisfactory 
operation. Attempting to implement the entire system at 
once can: overwhelm the implementation team, make it more 
difficult to isolate problems, frustrate users, increase 
security risks, hamper the data network, and increase the 
risk of failure. A controlled approach allows the project 
team to adapt to changing requirements and the rapidly 
changing IPT technology with reduced risks. 
It is important to reiterate that incremental 
adjustments to the IPT system must be followed by rigorous 
testing. If implementers fail to test changes, then the 
strength of the incremental approach quickly weakens. 
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Assuming that changes or updates will flow smoothly can 
lead to failure. For instance, the potential threat of this 
type of problem was illustrated during implementation on HQ 
backup generators. It was believed and assumed that many 
pieces of critical IPT equipment were connected to and 
backed up with generator power. A power failure test 
revealed that they were not, in fact, backed-up adequately 
and they shut down. Fortunately, it demonstrated the 
ability of the mirrored server setup when the backup 
servers came online, but put undue stress on the IPT 
equipment. Continuous monitoring and testing practices must 
be maintained to prevent these types of problems. 
• Recommendations: The method of deployment must be 
monitored and balanced to achieve greater value and to 
reduce risk. As the IPT project team becomes more 
proficient, it may be appropriate to expand services more 
quickly. On the other hand, if telephony requirements or 
IPT technology change significantly, then the team may 
consider smaller increments. 
7. Network Management and Maintenance 
HSC uses software (e.g., Qovia tools and NetScout)to 
monitor network traffic, bandwidth, and equipment. These 
tools help to make adjustments to the network to assure 
call quality and reliability. HSC continues to research 
better traffic management products in order to maintain the 
network more efficiently. 
The Coast Guard currently uses the Remedy ticket 
system to handle problems and conduct configuration 
management on the voice network. They are in the process of 
researching a more robust application (that utilizes 
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advanced detection, monitoring, and alarm capabilities) to 
manage network failures and updates. 
• Recommendations: HSC will be more capable of 
maintaining a strong IPT-based network in the long run when 
it implements stronger traffic management and configuration 
management systems.  
8. Managing Change 
The decision to shift towards IPT was driven by a 
great opportunity to improve telephony features when the 
legacy telephone systems were going to be replaced. HSC 
capitalized on the opportunity by putting together a strong 
team to lead the development. The team had the authority, 
funding, motivation, and experience to drive successful 
change in the organization. Bringing new personnel from 
outside of the organization brought fresh ideas and 
enthusiasm. Training and user involvement encouraged buy-in 
from all levels. And the successes of the pilot program and 
the initial rollout have bolstered efforts and will help to 
push IPT through full deployment at CGHQ. 
• Recommendations: The acceptance of IPT and its 
improved capabilities appear to have taken hold at CGHQ. To 
gain further success throughout the Coast Guard, those who 
wish to push voice and data convergence forward must 
consider how to manage the adjustment. The reliability, 
security, familiarity and call quality of the PSTN often 
hinder consideration of IPT technology. Addressing those 
issues and demonstrating consistent successes and 
improvements in IPT will help to encourage convergence. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. REVIEW 
This thesis has explained the basic operation and 
components of the PSTN and an IPT-based network in order to 
facilitate the discussion of IPT security and deployment. 
Potential threats and vulnerabilities specific to IPT were 
enumerated, as well as the consequences of successful 
attacks on IPT phone calls. Then safeguards and other 
security mechanisms were listed to prevent attacks on the 
network, with an understanding that implementation of those 
security tools often comes at a trade-off, whether it be 
cost, voice quality, or some other desired trait. After 
addressing security, desired characteristics of an IPT-
network were explained, followed by the practices that 
organizations use to successfully produce those qualities. 
With that background, a specific IPT implementation by 
Coast Guard Headquarters Support Command at Coast Guard 
Headquarters was studied with respect to security and 
deployment practices. A description of CGHQ’s background 
and telephony requirements were given, as well as portrayal 
of the process that HSC used to implement a test bed and 
initial rollout of the IPT technology. Finally, HSC’s 
implementation processes and use of security measures were 
analyzed to help understand how the rest of the Coast Guard 
could learn from those experiences. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
HSC took a cautious approach to implement an evolving 
information technology. The use of IPT promised to 
introduce increased capability through decreased costs and 
improved operations. However, a simple switch could not be 
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made without consideration of issues like security, 
reliability and call quality. These concerns were 
characteristics that were often taken for granted in the 
PSTN. Through careful planning and an incremental 
implementation process, HSC demonstrated that IPT-based 
networks can effectively replace many portions of the PSTN 
(However, in this case, IPT does depend on the PSTN for 
external calls, E911, fax, modem, and backup capability). 
That is, on the CGHQ LAN, the IPT-based network can provide 
acceptable levels of reliability, security, and call 
quality while providing extra features not available on the 
PSTN. 
Despite the success of the first stages of the 
implementation at CGHQ, the results cannot necessarily be 
extrapolated to all situations. This particular deployment 
occurred on a relatively small scale on a simple set of 
systems. It only extended across CGHQ’s LAN. It did not 
extend across the CG’s WAN (CGDN) nor move across the 
Internet. It did not provide E911 location service, secure 
communications, or service to analog equipment (e.g., fax, 
modem). The mention of a few of the potential differences 
between IPT systems demonstrates how widely different 
agency’s requirements and solutions may vary. Therefore, 
each IPT implementation must be carefully planned to meet 
the needs of an organization and to adjust to the changes 
in IPT technology. No two solutions are similar; however, a 
common set of approaches may be used to bring about 
successful IPT-based systems. 
The IPT deployment at CGHQ was successful to date 
because of a meticulous planning phase and an incremental 
process of expansion and improvement. HSC’s initial 
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deployment was simple precisely because it was designed to 
be that way. The project team understood the various risks 
associated with various deployment options and chose a 
conservative path based on the CG’s inexperience with this 
changing technology. CGHQ has a good start on introducing 
IPT technology to the Coast Guard through this initial 
implementation and must continue to vigilantly plan, make 
incremental improvements, and test. This approach will 
ensure that the Coast Guard implements the IPT solution 
that provides the most organizational value, but still 
provides good call quality, security, and reliability.  
C. FUTURE WORK 
Since HSC focused on a relatively limited IPT solution 
to introduce the Coast Guard to IPT, there are many other 
areas where the technology may be investigated to encourage 
further progress: 
• Are acceptable levels of call quality, 
reliability, and security viable across other networks, 
including: the CGDN, the Internet, and classified networks? 
• Are acceptable levels of call quality, 
reliability and security viable across different media, 
including: wireless connections, satellite communications, 
and shipboard radio communications? 
• Are converged networks actually the wave of the 
future, as most believe, or just a passing fad? Are 
government agencies jumping on the bandwagon too soon or 
are they falling behind?  
• What protocols will emerge as the dominant 
standards among IPT equipment and services? What type of 
equipment and services must government agencies acquire to 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
1. Internet Protocol Telephony (IPT) is a rapidly growing and evolving technology 
that promises to provide enhanced business processes through advanced 
telephony features and the convergence of voice and data networks.  The 
interaction of voice and data networks introduces security vulnerabilities that can 
potentially put information systems at risk.  The study and implementation of 
security mechanisms and risk analyses are required to ensure a secure information 
sharing environment. 
2. This document provides a basic overview of IPT and makes recommendations for 
information security policy guidance, procedures, and processes for 
implementation of IPT at units in the United States Coast Guard (CG).  It is a tool 
intended to promote the secure deployment and maintenance of IPT-based 
networks. 
B. AUDIENCE AND SCOPE 
1. The target audience for this document includes managers who intend to deploy 
IPT at their units, information technology personnel, and network and security 
administrators. 
2. It is assumed that the personnel reading this document have a basic understanding 
of traditional telephony, operating systems, network operation, and data network 
security.  This document addresses security issues that are unique to or 
particularly important for IPT-based networks and their components.  It applies to 
all IPT systems and devices within the CG’s information infrastructure and 
operating environment. 
3. These recommendations are intended to complement other CG Information 
Technology and Security Policy, including: 
a. Policy on Coast Guard use of Internet/Worldwide Web, COMDTINST 
5230.56. 
b. Coast Guard Limited Personal Use of Government Office Equipment, 
COMDTINST 5375.1A (series). 
c. Coast Guard Physical Security and Force Protection Program, COMDTINST 
M5530.1 (series). 





e. Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Information Technology (C4&IT) Information Assurance (IA) Policy, 
COMDTINST 5230.67. 
f. Coast Guard Telecommunications Manual, COMDTINST M2000.3 (series). 
4. The following documents also provide useful recommendations to understand and 
deploy secure IPT-based networks: 
a. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VOIP) Security Technical Implementation Guide 
b. Security Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems: Recommendations of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 
800-58 
5. The rapidly evolving nature of the IPT environment requires that security policies 
and practices be reviewed frequently to adequately adjust to changes. IPT policy 
should be updated at least annually until the technology settles. 
C. INTERNET PROTOCOL TELEPHONY (IPT) DEFINITION  
1. A variety of terminology has been coined to describe the process of replicating 
the function of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) by moving voice 
on data networks, including: Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP or VOIP), 
Internet telephony, internet telephony, Voice on the Net (VON), next-generation 
telephony, computer telephony, packet telephony, intranet telephony, extranet 
telephony, etc. For the purpose of this document, Internet Protocol Telephony 
encompasses these terms and refers to the components and technology required to 
place telephone calls over any IP-based network; that is, transferring voice data 
over a packet-switched network. 
D. DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION 
1. Chapter 1 provides the background and definition of IPT and the purpose, 
audience, scope, and organization of the document. 
2. Chapter 2 briefly discusses an overview of the operation of and the equipment 
used for IPT-based networks, to include: Components, Protocols, Voice Quality, 
and Architectures. 
3. Chapter 3 outlines potential threats to and vulnerabilities of IPT and presents 
various consequences of a successful attack. 
4. Chapter 4 presents the mechanisms used to secure an IPT-based network, 
mitigating the risks mentioned in Chapter 3.  Security measures discussed include: 
policy, physical security, logical separation, traffic management, hardening IPT 
equipment, encryption, authentication, and redundancy. 
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CHAPTER 2  INTERNET PROTOCOL TELEPHONY (IPT) OVERVIEW 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. To understand how voice data moves across packet-switched networks to make 
IPT phone calls, this chapter provides a description of equipment and protocols 
that make up an IPT-based network and allow it to communicate with other 
networks like the PSTN.  The system elements described are useful points to 
identify potential vulnerabilities. 
2. Applying security mechanisms to IPT-based networks often comes at a cost of 
reduced call quality.  To understand how security affects quality, this section 
describes how voice quality is measured and influenced. 
B. COMPONENTS 
1. Telephones: IPT phones can take many forms. They sometimes use a traditional 
handset that is connected to an adapter that utilizes bandwidth provided by an 
internet service provider (ISP). They may exist in the form of Softphones, where a 
PC with a microphone and software are used to create a virtual phone. The most 
common IPT telephone, called an IP Phone, consists of a handset and a processor 
that provides varying degrees of IPT functionality depending on the model.  
2. IP network: The network that IPT packets traverse is made up of similar 
components as the standard data network.  Hubs and Switches logically connect 
many nodes together, Routers connect networks, and Servers provide most of the 
intelligence.  These components are linked with a variety of media, like, copper 
wire, fiber optic cable, wireless, satellite, etc.  
3. Call Processors/Controllers: These devices set up, monitor, and tear-down calls.  
They can coordinate signaling, address translation, access control, bandwidth use, 
and call features.  They are sometimes called gatekeepers, call agents, call 
managers, or softswitches depending on how they are used. 
4. Gateways: Gateways connect dissimilar networks, protocols, or formats.  For 
instance, they may be used to connect an IPT-based network to the PSTN or to 
convert analog voice signals to digital data packets.  There are three basic types of 
gateways: 
a. Media Gateway (MG): The media gateway coordinates the transfer of data 
between different networks by, for example, providing an interface between a 
packet switched network (e.g., IPT) and a circuit switched network (e.g., 
PSTN). 
b. Signaling Gateway (SG): The signaling gateway coordinates the signaling 
functions between two networks by, for example, connecting the IP network 




c. Media Gateway Controllers (MGC): The media gateway controller 
coordinates the roles of the MG and the SG so that signaling and data 
transport functions can work together to complete a call. 
C. PROTOCOLS                   
1. Many standards and protocols are used to exchange voice information between 
different systems and devices.  Some of the most commonly used IPT protocols 
will be briefly discussed.  They can be split up into two general groups: transport 
protocols that move the data of interest (i.e., voice) and signaling protocols that 
set up the connection. 
2. Transport protocols consist of well known protocols like the Transmission 
Control Protocol (TCP), the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), and Real-Time 
Transport Protocol (RTP).  
a. TCP is a connection orientated protocol ensures reliable information 
exchange by acknowledging receipt of packets and resending unaccounted for 
packets.  This process works well for transferring data like email, but for real-
time applications like voice conversations. However, TCP is often used to 
carry higher-layer protocols that setup and tear down IPT calls.  
b. UDP is a connectionless orientated protocol, is simpler than TCP and is used 
where reliable transmission of every packet is not critical. UDP has much less 
overhead and does nothing to acknowledge or resend packets. Though packets 
may be lost, it is usually acceptable since a single lost packet does not 
significantly effect the transmission of information 
c. RTP is a higher-layer protocol that is encapsulated in UDP and is specifically 
used to support streaming real-time multimedia applications like IPT. RTP 
carries the bulk of the voice conversation between two IPT endpoints once a 
connection is established.  
3. Signaling protocols set up and manage telephone calls in the IPT-based network. 
The two most widely accepted standards today are H.323 and Session Initiation 
Protocol (SIP), while a variety of other proprietary protocols are also in use.  The 
MEdia GAteway COntrol(MEGACO)/H.248 standard that allows communications 
between diverse networks will also be discussed. 
a. H.323: The H.323 standard, developed by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU), encompasses a set of standards designed to 
enable real-time multimedia (voice, video, and data) communications over a 
packet-switched network. H.323 is described by four primary components: 
terminals (telephone), gateways, gatekeepers, and Multipoint Control Units 
(which provides conferencing). This is one of the first protocols developed for 
IPT and is currently the most widely supported. The high level of detail of the 
standard provides for excellent interoperability but has high overhead and is 
slow to change.   
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b. SIP: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) was standardized by the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) in 1999 as Request for Comment (RFC) 2543. 
SIP-based networks consist of two main components, User Agents and 
Servers. User Agents (UA) are endpoints (e.g., IP telephones) that contain a 
Client (UAC) and a Server (UAS). The UAC initiates requests and the UAS 
responds to requests. There are several SIP servers that provide services on 
the IPT-based network. Proxy servers make requests in behalf of other clients, 
Redirect servers provide address translation, Register servers register clients 
on the network, and Location servers provide the call recipient’s possible 
location to other servers. SIP components are identified with Uniform 
Resource Locators (URL) to simplify addressing. The protocol was designed 
with simplicity in mind, focusing on session initiation and termination, while 
relying on other Internet Protocols (such as TCP, UDP, and RTP) to complete 
the process. SIP is much like HTTP, using text-based messages to setup call 
connections. This “lightweight” protocol is expected to dominate the industry 
because it facilitates quick, scalable IPT solutions and creates the potential for 
a variety of features that the PSTN or H.323 are too slow to provide. 
c. Proprietary Protocols: These are standards that have been created by 
commercial organizations to support IPT (e.g., Cisco’s Skinny Client Control 
Protocol).  Proprietary protocols generally do not interoperate with other 
standards and should be avoided to provide the most flexible network. 
d. MEGACO/H.248: This standard was developed jointly by the ITU and IETF 
and complements SIP and H.323 in order to connect dissimilar networks.  It 
refers to MGCs as Call Agents and has different gateways that provide 
interfaces between IP networks and a variety of other networks. For instance, 
“trunking gateways” manage many digital circuits to connect the PSTN to an 
IPT-based network, “business gateways” connect PBXs to IPT-based 
networks, and “residential gateways” provide an analog connection to the IP 
network via cable modems and other devices.  
D. VOICE QUALITY 
1. Measuring Quality: The most widely accepted method of evaluating voice quality 
is a subjective assessment called the mean opinion score or MOS. MOS is 
calculated by having several human listeners rate the quality of a call on a scale of 
1 to 5 and taking the average. Several algorithms have been created to estimate 
voice quality and map their scores to the MOS model. A MOS of 4 or higher is 
considered toll quality, while a value less than 3.6 usually causes dissatisfaction. 
2. Reductions in voice quality are most commonly caused by latency, jitter, and lost 
packets.  Latency or delay is the amount of time it takes for voice to travel from 
the speaker’s mouth to the receiver’s ear.  Jitter refers to variations in the arrival 
time and order of packets. Jitter can potentially cause packets to be assembled out 
of sequence or to be dropped. Lost packets are those packets that are dropped in 
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the network, whether from improper routing, corrupted data, overflowing queues, 
or late arrivals.   
3. Other factors that affect quality are echo, available bandwidth, voice activity 
detection (VAD), and codec selection.  Echo is created when the receiver’s 
telephony equipment amplifies and returns parts of the original signal back to the 
sender.  Bandwidth is the amount of information that can pass through a medium 
at one time.  The larger the “pipe”, the more data that flows through it.  When 
bandwidth is low, information flow slows down and reduces quality.  VAD sends 
smaller data packets during breaks in conversation to conserve bandwidth, but 
sometimes cuts off the beginning of phrases. Codecs convert between analog and 
digital signals, and compress and decompress signals.  These processes add delay 
and sometimes lose information to conserve bandwidth. 
4. Quality of service (QoS): QoS refers to services that give priority to certain 
packets, such as time-sensitive IPT packets over web browser traffic, to improve 
the affects of packet loss, jitter and delay. A variety of protocols are in use or 
being planned to help prioritize real-time data flows. They give priority to packets 
from time sensitive applications like IPT, subsequently slowing the processing of 
other information flows where time is less critical (like email). The use of QoS 
mechanisms is considered a must to successfully attain good call quality on data 
networks. 
E. ARCHITECTURES 
1. There are several IPT-based network designs that provide varying levels of IPT 
capability and network control to an organization. The following four are 
considered: 
a. Broadband services: These are services that are typically used by residential 
customers to save on long distance phone calls. They rely on a users existing 
broadband connection to provide service over the Internet. Services vary. For 
instance, among other services Vonage supplies its users with Analog 
Telephony Adapters that allow them to connect their traditional phones to 
their home routers. Other services, like Skype, are peer-to-peer services that 
require common (free) software between two users. 
b. IP-PBX: The Internet Protocol Private Branch Exchange (IP-PBX) is used by 
agencies to enable many features of an IPT-based network.  It is usually 
located within and owned by an organization. It provides services for many 
users with fewer resources by sharing lines (but not phone numbers). Further 
savings and functionality are achieved by connecting IP-PBXs at different 
offices. It is connected to the PSTN through a dedicated trunk. 
c. IP-enabled PBX: This is a hybrid solution, where a circuit-switched PBX is 
provided with interfaces for IPT equipment. It allows an incremental 
introduction of IPT without losing the features of the current PBX. 
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d. IP Centrex: A local service provider supplies the core IPT services for those 
organizations that wish to save costs on equipment and space. The 
disadvantage to this approach is that fewer features are available and 
businesses have less control of the network, making it more difficult to make 
changes or protect information. 
2-5 
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CHAPTER 3  IPT SECURITY RISKS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. Common IPT-based network threats, vulnerabilities, and attacks must be 
recognized to understand and implement appropriate security countermeasures.  
B. THREATS 
1. Security threats are those actors that attack or interact with data networks to 
degrade system security.   
2. IPT-based networks are exposed to the same information threats (internal, 
criminal, and foreign) that are described in section 2.G of the CG’s Information 
Assurance Manual (IAM).   
3. Network administrators should also be familiar with “Phreakers,” criminal 
hackers who attempt to make free phone calls (Toll-fraud) at the CG’s expense. 
C. VULNERABILITIES 
1. Vulnerabilities are weaknesses in IPT-based networks that potentially enable 
system exploits.  This section enumerates several elements of IPT-based networks 
that make them vulnerable. 
2. Network Convergence: When combining the data and voice networks, the 
telephony elements may become affected by the known (and unknown) 
vulnerabilities of the data network, and vice versa. This convergence also brings 
the signaling and data transport components of telephony together onto a common 
system, which are distinct on the PSTN. The generally isolated PSTN, with its 
separation of signaling and voice transport networks, is generally thought to 
provide a more secure environment.  
3. IPT Protocols: IPT relies on internet protocols (e.g., TCP/IP, UDP, RTP, etc.) to 
perform signaling and transport data. The security risks inherent in these 
supporting protocols transfer into the IPT domain. Furthermore, many have 
observed that internet protocols are often designed with functionality first and 
security mechanisms later; including IPT protocols like SIP.  Also, security 
mechanisms like firewalls and network address translation (NAT) are more 
difficult to implement with IPT protocols. 
4. Placement of Intelligence: More processing and configuration occurs at the 
endpoints (i.e., telephones) on IPT networks than on traditional telephone 
systems.  This requires increased protection of simple telephony devices. 
5. IPT Components: Any piece of equipment in the IPT-based network can become 




network. IPT Servers, gateways, network interfaces, and endpoints require special 
attention to ensure appropriate security mechanisms are in place.  
6. Availability: Network congestion and outages are common on data networks and 
are tolerated to a certain degree; however, an IPT-based network must be more 
reliable. An attack directed at shutting down or slowing the data network will 
disrupt telephone service and slow accomplishment of unit objectives. 
D. ATTACKS AND CONSEQUENCES 
1. This section lists common methods of exploiting vulnerabilities and the impact of 
successful attacks.  It will focus on attacks that are common to both the IPT-based 
network and data network, and on attacks that are unique to the IPT environment. 
2. IPT Phone Service Disruption: This is an attack on availability.  Degraded 
availability in this case can refer to poor voice quality, the inability to connect 
with or receive calls from a desired party, or complete loss of telephony service.  
a. Availability is compromised through Denial of Service (DoS) and Distributed 
DoS attacks that are enabled by viruses and worms.   
b. Attackers that gain access to equipment by using methods like Trojan horses, 
buffer overflow attacks and backdoors can affect availability by intercepting 
calls (call hijacking) or changing system configurations that reduce call 
quality.   
c. Even “spit” (spam over internet telephony) can affect availability by tying up 
phone lines or through blocked calls that are filtered out by anti-spam 
mechanisms.  
d. The damage of these attacks can vary from minor irritations and 
inconveniences to the interruption of mission critical operations and life 
threatening situations. 
3. Compromise of Confidentiality: Confidentiality describes the ability to keep 
private, confidential, or propriety information secret. IPT vulnerabilities provide 
opportunities for hackers to eavesdrop on conversations, to track signaling, to 
monitor billing records, and to see private information.  
a. Hackers can easily extract information from unencrypted packets that pass 
through sniffing devices under their control. Packets may pass through an 
attackers sniffer (1) as a necessary consequence of placing calls through 
untrusted networks like the Internet, (2) as a result of using hubs that 
broadcast packets to all devices they are connected to, (3) because an attacker 
physically attached the device to the network (e.g., insider attack), (4) because 
the attacker gained access to one of the network devices (e.g., buffer overflow 
or back door), or (5) because the attacker configured a network device to 
redirect (or send copies of) the packets (e.g., ARP Cache Poisoning).  
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b. When hackers are unable to determine the content of the messages on the 
network, they may still learn valuable information by sniffing the network 
through traffic flow analysis.  
c. Hackers are not the only enemies to confidentiality. Complacent employees, 
usually with no malicious intent, frequently fail to keep calls private. Whether 
it be speaking loudly amongst a group of cubicles, failing to close a door or 
window, or chatting on a wireless or cell phone, people often create 
vulnerabilities that no amount of network security mechanisms will overcome.  
d. Failure to maintain confidentiality can lead to such consequences as identity 
fraud and operational or National Security risks when sensitive information is 
compromised. 
4. Compromise of Integrity/Authentication: Integrity describes the ability to 
recognize if a packet has been altered (whether by mistake or intentionally). 
Strong integrity demonstrates that the message received is trustworthy and in its 
original form. Authentication is related, providing the means to reliably identify 
the source of a message. One step further is non-repudiation, a mechanism that 
prevents users from denying that they originated the message. When in place, 
these tools provide confidence in information from a known user on the other end.  
Hackers subvert these mechanisms in a variety of ways on the data network, but 
frequently work around them on an IPT-based network through spoofing.  
a. Hackers are able to gain control of endpoints by forcing them to restart (e.g., 
DoS) and then spoofing the address of the configuration server. 
b. Attackers may use a man-in-the-middle attack to intercept packets and 
retransmit packets without the sender or receiver’s knowledge. 
c. Caller ID is an example of a telephony feature that has been successfully 
spoofed on IPT-based networks. Hackers have found a way to display any 
number they want, and can bypass Caller ID blocking to discover the phone 
number of anonymous numbers. 
d. Complacent or naïve human behavior is often a target of these attacks.  
Personnel who use default passwords, simple passwords, or become victim to 
social engineering can expose their systems to unauthorized access and allow 
malicious parties to act in their behalf. 
e. The consequence of a loss of integrity is the potential to make decisions based 
on false information. 
5. Toll Fraud: Phreakers have been trying to get free phone calls from the PSTN for 
years and continue to pursue the same goal on IPT-based networks. Common 
methods of acquiring toll free calls consist of: intercepting and rerouting 
signaling, gaining access to network devices that record call billing, and gaining 
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access to another individuals IP phone. Simple employee abuse of telephone use, 
however, can be just as costly. 
6. IPT Components: The components of the IPT-based network are the focus of 
attacks, usually to disrupt service or to gain unauthorized access. Hackers will use 
a combination of many of the attacks already to meet their goals.  
a. Endpoints: The intelligence contained in IP Phones allows much more control 
of the network. Hackers can gain access to IP Phone configurations by forcing 
IP phone reboots, spoofing TFTP servers, and breaking passwords. 
Softphones are particularly vulnerable because they are susceptible to any of 
the worms, viruses, or operating system/application software bugs that the 
computer may encounter.  
b. The switches and routers on the network are targeted to disrupt or redirect the 
flow of traffic on an IPT-network. A hacker will attempt to eavesdrop or 
intercept phone calls at switches on the network. 
c. The servers in an IPT-based network hold most of the information of value 
(e.g., billing, address translation, configurations, etc.) and are thus a prime 
target. Hackers attempt to gain control of the servers or disrupt the network by 
bringing them down. A server that is compromised usually leads to a 
compromise of the entire IPT-based network. 
d. Gateways: The complexity of interfacing dissimilar networks provides great 
opportunity for hackers to identify bugs or to use known vulnerabilities of 
either network. They can subsequently exploit those bugs with the potential of 
gaining control over components of two networks, a vulnerability that was 




CHAPTER 4  IPT SECURITY MEASURES 
A. INTRODUCTION 
1. IPT-based networks inherit many of the same vulnerabilities that already exist on 
the data network; therefore, many of the same security mechanisms that are used 
for the data network can be applied.  However, the real-time nature of IPT often 
limits the use of certain safeguards because of their effect on voice quality.  This 
chapter presents recommended standards, guidelines, and procedures that should 
be followed to secure the IPT-based network.  These standards are intended to 
complement and be used alongside (not replace) the data network security 
guidance provided in the CG IAM.   
B. GENERAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
1. This policy shall be reviewed and updated at least annually to adapt to the rapidly 
evolving IPT environment. 
2. Policy is only effective when practiced.  The following steps shall be taken, along 
with measures outline in section 4.J of the CG IAM, to encourage compliance: 
a. Provide appropriate training (e.g., rules of behavior, security awareness, 
acceptable security practices, etc.) to personnel as required by section 3.J and 
chapter 5 of the CG IAM and make policy documentation readily available. 
b. Actively enforce policy by holding personnel accountable for ignoring 
mandated standards and procedures. 
c. When possible, automate policy in information technology systems and 
confirm its accuracy regularly. 
3. Prior to implementation, conduct an evaluation of the unit’s ability to manage and 
mitigate the risks to its information, system operations, and continuity of essential 
operations when deploying IPT systems.  The implementation guide presented 
with this document will facilitate this process. 
4. When designing, implementing, and maintaining IPT security models, the 
following general policy from section 2.H of the CG IAM must be considered: 
a. All IT that generates, stores, processes, transfers, or communicates 
information shall be protected at a level commensurate with the threat. 
b. System planners, organizational managers, and users (e.g., system 
administrators and end users) will have a common understanding of 
Information Assurance principles, concepts, and interrelationships. 
c. The threat to the CG’s information is measured by the capability and intention 
of an adversary. 
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d. All CG Information Systems shall be certified and accredited for officials 
appointed Designated Accrediting Authorities (DAA).  Certification and 
accreditation shall be performed before the system is placed into operation.  
Systems and applications shall be reaccredited whenever there is a major 
change, or every three years, whichever occurs first. 
e. The Information System shall meet or exceed minimum security 
countermeasures as required by federal and departmental security policies, 
standards, procedures and CG policies.  All CG information and information 
resources shall be appropriately safeguarded at all times in order to support a 
defense in depth, or layered, information assurance policy. 
5. IPT shall not be the primary voice communications system if the information it 
carries is considered to be Mission Critical, Category 1 as defined in section 2.J in 
the CG IAM. 
6. In accordance with COMDTINST 5375.1, Limited Personal Use of Government 
Office Equipment, the use of peer-to-peer broadband IPT services (e.g., Skype) 
shall not be used because they must circumvent or weaken security mechanisms 
to operate correctly. 
7. To reinforce the safety of human resources, Emergency 911 location services 
must be included in the unit’s telephony system, whether it be through the PSTN 
or via IPT. 
C. PHYSICAL SECURITY 
1. Due to the vulnerability and potential consequences of compromised IPT network 
equipment, physical access to all IPT equipment must be closely monitored and 
limited to authorized personnel only.  Ensure that physical countermeasures are in 
place to mitigate the risk of insertion of sniffers or other network monitoring 
devices. 
2. All unclassified IPT equipment, except for endpoints and cabling, shall be 
considered Sensitive/Critical Information Systems (SCIS) and protected in 
accordance with Chapter 2 of the CG Physical Security and Force Protection 
Program (PS & FPP).  Endpoints shall be considered Non-Critical Information 
Systems (NIS) and protected accordingly.  Cabling exposure to open areas must 
be limited as much as possible. 
3. Prepare controls for unexpected occurrences like fire, flooding, natural disasters 
and other acts of nature: 
a. Develop a disaster recovery plan and test it annually. 
b. Install a Heating, Ventilation, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) unit appropriate 
to the facility that houses network equipment.  This prevents overheating and 
the potential of damage caused by static electricity. 
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4. Support physical security by keeping configuration information and system 
documents (e.g., network diagrams) out of plain view, by using installed locks, 
and by physically disconnecting all unused ports and disk drives. 
5. Escort and log visitors in restricted areas in accordance with section 5.G.3 of the 
IAM and Chapter 2 of the CG PS & FPP. 
6. Monitor the use of portable electronic devices (PEDs) in restricted areas in 
accordance with Chapter 4 of the CG PS & FPP. 
D. LOGICAL SEPARATION 
1. To isolate the IPT network from the data network, logically separate the IPT 
network from the data network by putting them on different virtual local area 
networks (VLANs).  Wireless devices and Softphones should also be on separate 
VLANs.  Logical separation reduces the risk of IPT network exposure to data 
network attacks and improves performance.  However, if a device handles both 
voice and data networks, the IPT functionality will falter if the device shuts down 
due to a data network attack.   
2. If possible, replace all hubs on the IPT network with switches.  Hubs broadcast 
packets to all devices they are connected to and cannot logically separate data 
flows. 
3. Disable all VLAN ports that are not in use, including all data network ports on IP 
phones. 
4. Where possible, use Network Address Translation (NAT) and the Private IP 
Address space to mask internal addresses from external users and to separate IP 
telephony from the data network where interaction is required. Use caution when 
implementing NAT, since its use can conflict with other security mechanisms or 
prevent phone connections. 
5. IP phones must be VLAN capable and assigned to an IPT VLAN segment.  
Softphones must have a separate dedicated NIC for IPT VLAN access.   
6. If wireless IP phones are utilized, use products implementing WiFi Protected 
Access (WPA), rather than 802.11 Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP).  However, 
neither standard fulfills the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140-2 
standard for information that must be encrypted.  Other protocols such as secure 
shell (SSH), Transport Level Security (TLS) or Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) 
shall be used for encryption on wireless networks.  Adhere to the guidance 
provided in the CG IAM and CG PS & FPP for wireless applications. 
E. MANAGE NETWORK TRAFFIC 
1. Firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS), and NAT traversal mechanisms 
must be used at network boundaries to provide protection from external threats. 
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Careful planning is required to ensure these devices are deployed in the right 
places with functionality appropriate to the needs of the network.  
2. Firewalls are essential network security tools that are used to block undesirable 
traffic, both entering and leaving the network. However, they form bottlenecks 
that add delay to the system, significantly impacting the quality of IPT 
communications. Therefore, IPT firewalls must be stateful and specifically 
designed for IPT applications in order to process IPT packets that would 
otherwise be blocked or delayed.  
3. At a minimum, Stateful Firewall Filtering that supports required IPT protocols 
(e.g., SIP, H.323) shall be implemented between the IPT network and the data 
network at critical IPT servers. 
4. An IPT Firewall dedicated to IPT traffic shall be deployed at the security 
perimeter to support voice quality by reducing delay. 
5. A restrictive firewall policy shall be applied, where all packets are initially denied 
and only necessary ports are opened to allow traffic. 
6. Remote administration and configuration of firewalls may only occur through 
encryption or tunneling via a Virtual Private Network (VPN) (e.g., IPsec).  Other 
methods of remotely accessing Firewall configurations shall be blocked at the 
perimeter. 
7. Test firewall configurations, particularly IPT traffic filtering, at least quarterly. 
8. Adhere to other firewall guidelines in accordance with section 6.C.4 of the CG 
IAM. 
9. Place at least one Network-based Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) at the edge 
of the IPT network perimeter where it can observe traffic that flows in and out of 
the data network. Carefully determine a configuration that will promptly alert 
human resources to suspicious activity or that will block malicious traffic. NIDS 
must be carefully tuned to avoid either blocking legitimate traffic or allowing 
malicious packets into the network. 
F. HARDEN IPT EQUIPMENT 
1. IPT-based network equipment must be secured to prevent hackers from gaining 
control of critical network devices. Call servers, mail servers, and other IPT-based 
network servers hold sensitive data and perform critical functions that require 
special defenses. These servers must be dedicated to only applications required 
for IPT operations.  A suggested method to harden servers follows, use the CG 
IAM and other CG security policy to assure servers are adequately protected: 
a. Install the operating system on a clean hard drive. 
155 
4-5 
b. Apply the latest patches. Subscribe to a service that will provide continuous 
updates on new patches. 
c. Run a vulnerability assessment tool and take steps to mitigate identified 
vulnerabilities.  
d. Install a firewall on the server computer. Start with a restrictive policy (don’t 
allow any traffic) and then open only those ports required to serve its function. 
e. Consider Installing a Host-based IDS. 
f. Install antivirus software and ensure it is up to date. Utilize automatic update 
functionality that will automatically check for updates and download them. 
g. Create an Image after following the steps above and use it to create other IPT 
servers. 
h. Change default configurations to match security policy. This can be done 
using software. Adjust the boot sequence to prevent hackers from gaining 
access by forcing a system crash and reboot. Be sure default passwords are 
changed. 
i. Turn off or disable all unnecessary services and applications that are not in 
use. This may include disk drives and physical ports. Each service is a 
potential avenue of attack for a hacker. 
j. Avoid the use of shared drives. 
2. Voice Mail Servers require special security when they provide unified mail, 
because it introduces a point where the data network and IPT network must be 
logically connected. 
a. A stateful firewall shall be installed between the voice VLAN and the data 
network to deny all traffic that is not necessary for voice calls or voice 
messages to be transferred between the voice VLAN and the data network if 
the voice mail platform is connected to the data network. 
b. The Voice Mail Server and Applications shall be hardened as described 
above. 
c. Personal voice mail settings may only be changed via a Secure Socket Layer 
(SSL) connection to ensure authentication. HTTP and Telnet services shall be 
disabled.  
3. Harden IP Phones by updating passwords, by requiring authentication, by 
disabling unnecessary ports and services, by updating reboot sequences, and by 
disabling automatic registration mechanisms.  Treat public IP Phones differently 
by limiting available features and services. 
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4. Prefer IP Phones to Softphones.  Softphones are located on data network devices 
(PCs) and are vulnerable to the worms, viruses, and other attacks prevalent among 
personal computers.  Do not count on privacy or security when using Softphones. 
5. The installation and use of personal Softphone agent software is prohibited.  Only 
IP Softphone agent software approved by the DAA may be used.  This policy 
must be closely monitored and constantly enforced to protect the security of the 
IPT network. 
G. ENCRYPT AND AUTHENTICATE IPT TRAFFIC 
1. Encryption of IPT packets requires special consideration because of the negative 
effect it can have on call quality.  Careful selection of IPT equipment and 
encryption standards are required to facilitate both confidentiality and good call 
quality.  End-to-end encryption protects a voice conversation from the caller’s 
telephone to the callee’s telephone; however, its use is not required for all calls 
because IP Phones on both ends frequently do not have encryption mechanisms or 
adequate processing speed to assure quality.  Link-level encryption may be used 
via VPN technology or more efficient gateway devices to protect the 
confidentiality of voice conversations. 
2. All IPT traffic that traverses the public Internet shall be encrypted according to 
the standards specified in section 6.D of the CG IAM. 
3. The use of IP Security (IPsec) shall be considered to provide for security 
functions, authentication, and encryption of IPT-related traffic. 
4. All remote administrative connections to critical IPT servers and other IPT 
equipment shall be encrypted using IPsec, SSH, or other encryption or tunneling 
mechanisms. When possible, avoid remote administration and access IPT 
components from a physically secure location. 
5. Identify and Authenticate users in accordance with section 6.B of the CG IAM. 
H. REDUNDANCY 
1. To approach the level of reliability usually provided by the traditional telephone 
network, an IPT-based network must have several redundant systems in place to 
overcome downtimes that are relatively common among data networks.  
Redundancy and planning also ensures telephone operations when disaster strikes.  
2. Data must be protected by making regular backups of critical systems. They 
should be created in reliable memory systems and stored in a secured, offsite 
location. 
3. The network must be protected using a layered strategy or “Defense in Depth.”  
This describes the use of several security mechanisms that complement each other 
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and overlap, rather than a reliance on a single defense. Compliance with the CG 
IAM will facilitate a layered strategy. 
4. Use configuration management tools to proactively track changes to the IPT 
system.  Be prepared to fall back on previous versions when newly installed 
software, equipment, or configurations weaken security mechanisms. 
5. The operation of critical equipment is assured by providing redundant systems 
that are ready to go online when the current systems fail. All equipment must be 
protected from power fluctuations and power loss with surge protectors and 
Universal Power Sources to allow controlled shutdowns. Critical systems shall be 
backed up with generator power.  
6. The IPT-based network shall be supported by out-of-band communications, 
usually the PSTN. Secondary communications provide an improved likelihood of 
successful communications when confronted with high call volumes, 
emergencies, attacks on the data network, or failure of the IPT network. 
7. Disaster Recovery Planning (and practice), as mandated in section 5.O of the CG 
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CHAPTER 1  INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE 
1. Internet Protocol Telephony (IPT) is a rapidly growing and evolving technology 
that promises to provide enhanced business processes through advanced 
telephony features and the convergence of voice and data networks.  These 
benefits come at a risk to security, quality, and reliability of the telephone 
network.  Careful planning is required to implement a telephony solution that 
supplies improved service, but also effectively mitigates the risks introduced by 
the new technology. 
2. Despite continuous change occurring in the area of IPT, the technology has been 
in use long enough to develop practices that yield successful IPT deployments. 
However, there is not a “one size fits all” approach that is appropriate for all 
organizational entities. The purpose of this document is to outline the important 
quality attributes of an IPT-based network and provide recommended, adaptable 
processes that facilitate the achievement of those characteristics in harmony with 
Coast Guard Policy. 
B. INTERNET PROTOCOL TELEPHONY (IPT) DEFINITION  
3. A variety of terminology has been coined to describe the process of replicating 
the function of the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) by moving voice 
on data networks, including: Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP or VOIP), 
Internet telephony, internet telephony, Voice on the Net (VON), next-generation 
telephony, computer telephony, packet telephony, intranet telephony, extranet 
telephony, etc. For the purpose of this document, Internet Protocol Telephony 
encompasses these terms and refers to the components and technology required to 
place telephone calls over any IP-based network; that is, transferring voice data 
over a packet-switched network. 
C. SUGGESTED REFERENCES 
1. IPT implementation requires study and research beyond the scope of this 
document, particularly because the technology continues to evolve.  Managers 
must also have an understanding of relevant Coast Guard Policy.  This document 
is a guide to facilitate the consideration of significant requirements, challenges, 
and solutions that are involved in deploying IPT.  The following resources, among 
others, may be used to help understand and deploy successful and secure IPT-
based networks in the Coast Guard environment. 
a. Walker, John Q. and Jeffrey T. Hicks. Taking Charge of Your VoIP Project. 
Indianapolis: Cisco Press, 2004. 
b. Miller, Mark A. Voice over IP Technologies: Building the Converged 
Network. New York: M&T Books, 2002. 
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c. Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Information Technology (C4&IT) Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) 
Policy, COMDTINST 5230.66. 
d. Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Information Technology (C4&IT) Information Assurance (IA) Policy, 
COMDTINST 5230.67. 
e. Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Information Technology (C4&IT) Configuration Management (CM) Policy, 
COMDTINST 5230.69. 
f. Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Information Technology (C4&IT) Investment Management Policy, 
COMDTINST 5230.71. 
g. Security Policy Recommendations in Appendix A that is supported by the 
Coast Guard Information Assurance Manual, COMDTINST M5500.13 
(series) and the Coast Guard Physical Security and Force Protection 
Program, COMDTINST M5530.1 (series). 
h. Security Considerations for Voice Over IP Systems: Recommendations of the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Special Publication 
800-58. 
i. Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Voice Over Internet Protocol 
(VOIP) Security Technical Implementation Guide. 
D. DOCUMENT ORGANIZATION 
1. Chapter 1 provides the background and definition of IPT, suggested reference 
material, and the purpose and organization of this document. 
2. Chapter 2 briefly discusses an overview of the important requirements and quality 
attributes that must be addressed to effectively implement an IPT-based network.  
The issues discussed include: Cost, Security, Sound Quality, Resilience, Power 
and Reach, Network Management, Platform Independence, Support of Legacy 
Services, Scalability, Features, User Mobility, and Emergency Services. 
3. Chapter 3 provides some of the processes, methods, and practices used by 
successful organizations to support the requirements and quality attributes 
described in Chapter 2. The overall implementation process described addresses 
the following steps: Form an Implementation Team, Understand Current 
Telephony Requirements, Understand Current Data Network Infrastructure, 
Update the Data Network, Develop the Business Case & Acquire, Create an 




CHAPTER 2  IPT NETWORK KEY ATTRIBUTES 
A. PURPOSE 
1. Several areas of focus that must be considered to realize viable communications 
using packet-switched networks. Proactively addressing each of these technical 
and operational issues is a common success factor among organizations that have 
already attained the benefits of IPT.  This chapter enumerates several 
requirements and quality attributes, of viable IPT-based networks, which must be 
taken into consideration when designing an IPT solution. 
B. COST 
1. The initial push towards IPT was based on the desire to achieve cost savings 
through free long distance and international calls.  Residential users, for instance, 
still realize savings through IPT services.  However, bypassing toll charges is 
usually not reason enough to switch to IPT services because government agencies 
are charged very little for services through government wide telecommunications 
contracts. 
2. The total cost of an IPT-based network will depend on the size and scope of the 
implementation and the equipment required.  Large start up costs can hinder IPT 
development, especially when completely replacing large portions of the 
telephony infrastructure.  However, incremental conversions from aging PSTN 
equipment to newer IPT technologies are manageable and provide increased value 
over time. 
3. The most convincing argument for cost savings is attributed to the convergence of 
the voice and data networks.  By putting voice and data on the same network, 
organizations can save on the costs (after initial implementation) of supporting 
and maintaining one physical network with one support team (vice separate 
telephony personnel and data network personnel). 
4. The cost benefits of IPT discussed present a solid argument for a transition away 
from the PSTN; however, an IPT-based network may not be the best solution in 
all cases. It is unwise to invest in technology just for technology’s sake. Each unit 
must carefully consider its options and make an unbiased business case for a 
particular telephony implementation. 
C. SECURITY 
1. An information system must be able to ensure appropriate levels of 
confidentiality, integrity, availability, authenticity and non-repudiation in 
accordance with the Coast Guard Information Assurance Manual. 




3. The telephone system must provide a level of availability that allows for reliable 
operation, especially when there are emergencies or high call volumes. 
4. The personal information (e.g. Names, phone numbers, billing information) that 
resides in the IPT-based network must be protected from access (confidentiality) 
or unauthorized modification (integrity). 
5. The IPT network has many vulnerabilities that make voice information 
susceptible to compromise.  Network security must be an integral part of any IPT 
deployment. 
6. Implementing security mechanisms frequently comes at a cost of increased 
bandwidth, equipment upgrades, or degradation in voice quality. 
7. It is impossible to eliminate all security risks without rendering the network 
ineffective or too costly.  Therefore, each Coast Guard organization must balance 
between risk mitigation techniques, cost, and capability of the IPT-based network. 
D. SOUND QUALITY 
1. Sound quality and security are often at odds with each other in an IPT-based 
network. It is very difficult (i.e., expensive) to realize high levels of both quality 
and security equal to that provided by the PSTN.  
2. Quality can be monitored and measured by observing the mean opinion score 
(MOS), latency, jitter, and lost packets in the IPT-network.  These metrics should 
be understood for varying network conditions (e.g., peak and average call 
volumes) in different portions of the network. 
a. The MOS is a subjective score of voice quality that is determined by having 
people listen to conversation over a voice network.  A score of 4.0 or greater 
is considered “toll quality,” while a scores less than 3.6 are considered to have 
poor (irritating or unacceptable) call quality.  The MOS is often estimated by 
using computer algorithms that use objective measures from the network. 
b. Latency is the time it takes for a voice packet to traverse the network. 
c. Jitter is caused by variable arrival times of voice packets.  A buffer, or delay, 
is created to wait for packets that arrive out of sequence. 
d. Lost packets are voice packets that do not reach the endpoints to be processed 
for the voice conversation.  A single lost packet is usually not noticeable, but 
packet loss frequently occurs in bursts where many packets are lost in a group. 
e. It is commonly accepted that it must take no more than 150 milliseconds for a 
voice signal to pass from the caller’s mouth to the callee’s ear to realize 
acceptable voice quality. 
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3. Increasing bandwidth can help to improve voice quality in some regards, but is 
usually not the best method to address poor quality. 
4. Echo is frequently encountered when implementing IPT.  It iscreated when the 
receiver’s telephony equipment amplifies and returns parts of the original signal 
back to the sender. It negatively impacts the conversation when the delay is 
greater than 25 milliseconds. It can be reduced by properly configuring echo 
cancellers that are equipped with most IPT devices 
5. Quality of Service (QoS) mechanisms must be used to maintain good call quality 
on a converged network.  QoS mechanisms give time-sensitive packets like IPT 
traffic priority over other traffic, like email, to increase the probability that voice 
packets will arrive quickly enough to achieve good call quality. 
E. RESILIENCE 
1. The PSTN provides “five nines” of availability (99.999%), meaning that the 
telephone network is done less than six minutes a year.  IPT-based networks 
require a variety of backups to approach this level of service, including redundant: 
power, memory, systems, applications, network components, and out-of-band 
communications (e.g., PSTN line). 
2. PSTN lines provide power to telephone components, even in times where local 
power is down.  IPT-based networks require extra consideration for providing 
local power to equipment during power outages. 
F. POWER AND REACH 
1. Many phones are located in places where there is no need for computers, so there 
is not any power or network wiring in place. Sometimes these points are extended 
using wireless devices. Units must be prepared to provide for these areas when 
deploying IPT, and understand the potential reductions in voice quality to create 
solutions. 
G. NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
1. IPT-based networks are not managed in the same manner as the data network. 
Data network personnel and telephony personnel must work together and learn 
new skills to properly manage the IPT network. The network will require constant 
attention and tuning to assure quality and availability. The support of the network 
should be facilitated by network management tools that are specifically attuned to 
the needs of IPT. 
H. PLATFORM INDEPENDENCE/SUPPORT OF LEGACY SERVICES 
1. A successful IPT implementation will facilitate interoperability among telephony 
components and be flexible to adapt to changes in the technology.  
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2. Few telephony networks are solely devoted to IPT technology, but rather integrate 
a variety of networks to provide a competitive telephony solution. It requires 
careful planning to connect the IPT network to other networks, like the PSTN or 
an ISDN, and to connect a variety of equipment from multiple vendors.  
3. Successful implementations avoid propriety equipment and protocols, and strive 
for standards that bring a diverse set of elements together to form a reliable 
telephone system. 
I. SCALABILITY 
1. An IPT-based network, its equipment and protocols, must be flexible enough to 
grow and change with the organization. 
2. Most IPT implementations do not completely replace existing telephony 
solutions; rather, they are incrementally deployed to achieve better value. 
J. FEATURES 
1. The primary business advantage that is beginning to emerge from IPT is the 
diverse set of features that it promises to provide. To maximize the benefit of an 
IPT implementation, Coast Guard organizations must create IPT solutions that 
enable feature sets that optimize current operational practices and understand how 
those features differ from current PSTN offerings. 
K. USER MOBILITY 
1. One of the advantages of IPT is the mobility that it provides to employees. This 
mobility can be manifest in a user’s ability to quickly change desks, change 
phones, or even work out of the office at home or on the road. These benefits 
require additional security and QoS measures to appropriately implement. 
L. EMERGENCY SERVICES  
1. Emergency 911 location services are a standard part of the PSTN that many 
people take for granted. These services require special measures (especially due to 
increased mobility) to ensure the same level of reliability that the PSTN already 
provides. Coast Guard units must ensure appropriate systems are in place to 
protect human resources. 
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CHAPTER 3  IPT IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICES 
A. PURPOSE 
1. The following section enumerates and explains a variety of practices that 
organizations are using to successfully implement IPT and address the issues 
discussed in the previous section. The methods described below are not 
necessarily conducted in the order listed. Some may be performed simultaneously, 
while other groups of processes may require multiple iterations to design the right 
IPT solution. The practices discussed should be adapted to meet the needs of a 
Coast Guard organization within the context of its environment.  
2. The implementation practice considerations are separated into nine elements: (1) 
Form an Implementation Team, (2) Understand Current Telephony Requirements, 
(3) Understand the Data Network Infrastructure, (4) Upgrade the Data Network, 
(5) Develop the Business Case & Acquire, (6) Create an Implementation Plan, (7) 
Deployment, (8) Network Management & Maintenance, and (9) Manage Change. 
B. SECURITY 
1. Security must be considered throughout the implementation process, but will not 
be addressed in detail in this Appendix.  IPT-based network security issues are 
addressed in Appendix A and other Coast Guard Security Policy. 
C. COAST GUARD POLICY 
1. COMDTINST 5230.66, The Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, 
Computers, and Information Technology (C4&IT) Systems Development Life 
Cycle (SDLC) Policy has a sequence of seven phases that are used to produce, 
operate, and support C4&IT.  They include: (1) Conceptual Planning, (2) 
Planning and Requirements Definition, (3) Design, (4) Development and Testing, 
(5) Implementation, (6) Operations and Maintenance, and (7) Disposition (or 
System Retirement).  The recommendations provided in this document differ in 
the following aspects: 
a. The recommendations that follow are specific to IPT-based networks and 
components. 
b. The SDLC policy addresses similar issues, but appears to do so with a 
waterfall approach.  That is, each step of the life cycle is almost fully 
completed before moving on to the next step.  The recommendations that 
follow recognize that successful IPT implementations are often incremental, 
and the phases of development often overlap or require several iterations to 
produce the right solution. 




d. The recommendations that follow specifically addresses change management, 
in regards to managing personnel and business processes as the organizational 
element transitions from traditional telephony and data networks to a 
converged network. 
D. FORM AN IMPLEMENTATION TEAM 
1. Since IPT brings together the data network and the telephone network, personnel 
with training and experience from both backgrounds are required to understand 
the new system. Form a team that taps the resources of employees with varying 
specialties (e.g., telephony specialist, network manager, security professional, 
finance, legal, educational, etc.) so that all issues may be addressed.  
2. Team members must receive the training and develop the experience necessary to 
interface ideas and processes.  Collaboration must be encouraged to exchange and 
fuse information. 
3. The project team must be given adequate sources of power (e.g., budget, 
resources, management support, etc.) to plan and implement the new IPT system.  
4. The IPT implementation team may be supported by outside personnel, called 
system integrators, who are brought in to help design an IPT solution. 
Outsourcing pieces of the implementation has the advantage of providing in-depth 
knowledge and experience about IPT. This know-how usually comes more 
quickly and at a lower cost than training internal IPT experts.  
5. When selecting system integrators, review and weigh the integrators’ level of 
quality, expertise, capability, integrity and cost.  The contract with the system 
integrator should include service-level agreements, training and support so that 
the system is properly maintained when the system integrator leaves. 
E. UNDERSTAND CURRENT TELEPHONY REQUIREMENTS 
1. Use Call Detail Records (e.g., monthly itemized bill) to track statistics of interest 
that will help to understand current telephony usage.  These statistics include: 
number of calls, number of users with distinct phone numbers, duration of calls, 
number of concurrent calls, source and destination of calls (within site, within 
business, external, international versus domestic), and call volumes.  
a. Call volume profiles are especially important for determining network 
capacity. Call volume peaks and averages should be discovered with an 
understanding of when peaks occur, for how long, and if they cause (a 
percentage of) blocked calls.  
2. Review telephony costs and carrier contracts. Identifying these costs helps to 
justify the IPT implementation, but may also point out potential areas of increased 
costs. For instance, a unit that deploys IPT may reduce the number of calls on the 
PSTN, but actually cause an increase in telephony costs. This can happen when 
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the reduced PSTN call volume falls below a threshold where “bulk” rates are 
applied. Even though there are fewer calls, those calls become more expensive 
and may actually drive up costs. 
3. Review telephony system maintenance costs, including equipment and personnel.   
4. Determine the costs of Moves, Adds, and Changes (MACs).  An example of a 
MAC happens when a person moves to a new office with his/her phone and 
number.  The administrative process is often expensive and slow due to 
limitations of PSTN design.  
5. Determine what level of availability your current telephone system actually 
provides.  Is it 99.999% or actually something less than that? 
6. Determine what functions and features the current system provides to users.  Find 
out which ones they actually use, and prioritize them.  Solicit ideas for new 
features.  Manage user expectations. 
a. Examples of telephony requirements include: voice mail, conferencing, 
customer relationship management tools (a.k.a. phone trees), simple phone 
interfaces, simple dialing plans (how many extra numbers does the user need 
to dial to get an outside line balanced with how few to dial internal 
extensions), Caller ID, Call waiting, number of lines, voice quality, reliability, 
E911, accessibility, mobility, fax, modem, etc. 
F. UNDERSTAND THE DATA NETWORK INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. IPT cannot be placed on top of the data network like any other application. Data 
network adjustments and more stringent monitoring are required to ensure 
acceptable security and call quality.  Implementation failures and difficulties are 
often attributed to insufficient network preparation. 
2. Conduct a data network audit to identify the current characteristics of the data 
network so that adjustments can be made to support IPT. This type of evaluation 
must be performed at three levels as appropriate to the implementation: (1) over 
the local area network, (2) over the enterprise wide area network, and (3) over the 
Internet (although the ability to make changes will be limited). The audit may be 
conducted by focusing on the four areas provided: Configuration Assessment, 
Utilization Assessment, Call-Quality Assessment, and Bandwidth Modeling. 
a. Configuration Assessment: The purpose of this assessment is to examine 
network equipment to determine what must be upgraded to handle IPT. First, 
all network equipment must be identified and inventoried. The equipment 
characteristics that should be checked include:  
(1) Operating system version,  
(2) Memory,  
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(3) QoS mechanisms,  
(4) VLANs (data, voice, and wireless should be separate & hubs should be 
removed),  
(5) Interface speeds, and 
(6) Power supplied to the phone.  
Then each piece of equipment must be compared to a set of criteria to 
determine if it will support IPT: traffic, functionality, capacity, reliability and 
call-quality. For example, a configuration assessment might reveal that a 
network router has an interface speed of 100 megabits per second (Mbps). 
Based on peak call volumes, the speed will not be able to handle all calls 
without degraded call quality or dropped calls. The router must be upgraded 
(e.g., 1000 Mbps) to support the new IPT-based network. 
b. Utilization Assessment: The purpose of this assessment is to identify to what 
degree network devices and links are being utilized. Average values, peak 
values, and times of high utilization are important metrics to observe. 
Utilization rates that approach 100% suggest problem areas for IPT 
implementation, which must be managed or corrected via equipment 
upgrades. The following dimensions should be measured to ensure the support 
of IPT: traffic, functionality, capacity, reliability and call-quality:  
(1) CPU utilization (device’s workload),  
(2) Memory utilization (e.g., size of jitter buffer),  
(3) Backplane utilization (amount of traffic moving through switches),  
(4) Dropped packets (occur at bottlenecks),  
(5) Buffer errors (usually indicates inadequate memory),  
(6) Interface errors (usually indicate problems with physical transport 
medium), and  
(7) Bandwidth utilization (the percentage of bandwidth being used). 
Bandwidth utilization is a good indicator of network capacity and should 
always be closely monitored, particularly on wide area network links 
where delays are more likely. 
c. Call-Quality Assessment: The purpose of this assessment is to determine 
how well the network would support good call quality by simulating IPT 
traffic and measuring the flow of information for delay, jitter and packet loss. 
These measurements are used to estimate a mean opinion score to determine 
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call quality. The following characteristics of IPT equipment and packets will 
affect the flow of information:  
(1) The type of codec used (the compression algorithms and data rates it uses, 
and the packet size it produces). 
(2) Voice packet sizes (smaller packets move more quickly but have more 
overhead). 
(3) The use of Voice Activity Detection (VAD) (smaller packets of 
information are sent when there is silence on the line between phrases). 
(4) The size of jitter buffers. 
(5) QoS mechanisms. 
The simulation allows experimentation among changes in network 
characteristics and is usually conducted on selected portions of the network 
that mostly represent the entire IPT network. From this assessment, 
predictions can be made about the feasibility of good call quality in an IPT 
implementation. It is also useful for identifying potential risks and weak 
points in the network prior to deployment, allowing for equipment upgrades or 
network configurations that will enhance call quality. 
d. Bandwidth Modeling: The purpose of this assessment is to make predictions 
about the actual performance (not necessarily call quality) of the current 
network with the load of IPT traffic. This process is very similar to the call 
quality assessment described above, but is more complex and requires many 
mathematical calculations to complete.  If possible, conduct bandwidth 
modeling on critical network links first and expand as resources permit. 
Bandwidth modeling allows the IPT design team to determine how well the 
capacity of the network handles the additional traffic introduced by IPT, based 
on changes in call volumes, codecs, bandwidth, packet sizes, QoS, and voice 
suppression mechanisms. 
G. UPDATE THE DATA NETWORK 
1. After successfully auditing the data network, many changes are required to 
adequately support IPT.  Network changes usually focus on call quality 
improvements or replacing equipment to meet other requirements like security or 
redundancy.  
2. Increased call quality can be achieved by cleaning up network traffic, increasing 
bandwidth, upgrading equipment, changing the network design, and 
implementing or tuning QoS mechanisms. 
a. Network Traffic: Approximately 20%-50% of network traffic is considered 
unnecessary, supporting unneeded services that are operating by default, 
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usually without anyone’s knowledge. Use a network protocol analyzer (e.g., 
Ethereal, EtherPeek) to identify these. Turning them off will increase 
bandwidth, and reduce the load on processors and memory. 
b. Bandwidth: There are several methods available that help to conserve 
bandwidth, some of which include:  
(1) RTP header compression (cRTP): cRTP compresses RTP headers to 
reduce bandwidth consumption, but comes at the expense of increased 
handling delay.  
(2) VAD: VAD reduces bandwidth consumption by sending smaller packets 
during silence, but can reduce voice quality.  
(3) RTP multiplexing: RTP multiplexing sends several voice conversations in 
the same packet to cut out bandwidth that is consumed by headers, but can 
add to delay and cause greater impact when packets are lost.  
(4) Call admission control. Call admission control is used to limit the number 
of concurrent IPT calls on the network, routing extra calls to the PSTN.  
The benefits and disadvantages of each of these methods must be balanced to 
meet the requirements of the network configuration. If these mechanisms 
aren’t sufficient to free up adequate bandwidth it may be appropriate to pay 
for more; however, it is important to understand the network in order to 
increase the bandwidth in the bottlenecks where it is needed the most. 
c. Equipment: Common equipment upgrades to improve voice quality include:  
(1) Replacing hubs with switches,  
(2) Upgrading to more modern switches and routers that process information 
more quickly,  
(3) Increasing Router memory, and  
(4) Preferring hardware-based firewalls to software-based equipment.  
These equipment upgrades help increase the processing speed of the network, 
enabling better call quality. 
d. Network Design: Re-engineer the network to improve call quality: 
(1) Examine traffic flow to determine what kinds of routes are used and how 
many hops are required to get from one endpoint to another. Direct, 
shorter routes and fewer hops will help to reduce propagation and 
handling delays.  
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(2) Locate bottlenecks and points of congestion.  Work to eliminate them, 
route around them, or give precedence to IPT traffic.  
(3) Push processing work out to the endpoints to facilitate the movement of 
packets through the core of the network. This, however, requires more 
processing power at the edges of the network.  
e. QoS Mechanisms: QoS mechanisms give priority to time-sensitive 
applications like IPT. They help to maintain good call quality during 
occasional periods of congestion. 
3. When updating network equipment, make changes methodically.  
a. Prioritize: determine which changes are the most cost effective and most 
important.  
b. Incremental adjustments: start with the highest priorities and make small 
changes. Those that try to make too many modifications at once find that it is 
too difficult to identify new problems created by the change. 
c. Test: conduct assessments to ensure that changes have the desired effect. 
d. Repeat:  The incremental, iterative approach makes it easy to adjust priorities 
and determine when network improvements have reached an acceptable level 
to meet IPT network performance criteria. 
H. DEVELOP THE BUSINESS CASE & ACQUIRE 
1. Justifying the installation of an IPT-based network occurs prior to and throughout 
the implementation process. The planning and preparation phases discussed to 
this point help to strengthen a case to deploy IPT (or not to deploy it) by 
determining requirements and by assessing the condition of the data network. 
These considerations must be weighed with an analysis of the costs required to go 
forward with a large scale implementation. A project team that is able to 
demonstrate measurable benefits and the viability of IPT early and continuously 
will get internal commitment and budgetary support that will sustain the duration 
of the implementation. 
2. IPT-based networks are rarely deployed by completely replacing old PSTN 
equipment with new IPT gear. The benefits of IPT are usually realized through 
incremental upgrades that take advantage of the features of both IPT and the 
PSTN. The following scenarios are examples of upgrades that promise large 
returns from minor investments for most organizations. 
a. New Sites: Expanding to a new site allows a unit to build new telephony 
service from the ground up without having to worry about upgrading an old 
network. With proper planning, the new office can provide dependable IPT 
service with room for future growth. 
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b. Data Network Upgrades: If the data network is already in need of an 
improvement, it is appropriate to piggy-back IPT requirements in the planning 
process. 
c. Excess Capacity: Bandwidth and processing power have become very 
inexpensive. Consider IPT if you have recently upgraded the data network 
with increased speed and capacity. 
d. Expiring Service Contracts: The possibility of shifting some telephony 
expenses to the data network may be convenient when leases expire, but also 
adds leverage to bargaining power when renegotiating. 
e. Voice Network Upgrades: If the current voice network is not meeting 
operational requirements it is a good opportunity to incrementally add and test 
new IPT services that will eventually lead to larger deployments. 
f. Remote Users: IPT can provide telephone support to telecommuters with high 
speed connections. 
3. Equipment: To avoid additional costs and network difficulties, all IPT equipment 
should be non-proprietary and interoperable. The use of proprietary equipment 
often prevents equipment (from different vendors) from communicating correctly 
and can lock you into a position where you must continue to rely on one vendor 
for service. This lack of flexibility puts you at the mercy of the vendor, creating 
the potential for inflated costs or system failure should the vendor company 
collapse or fail to keep up with operational needs. Support vendors that produce 
interoperable, open architecture systems. This facilitates the development of 
equipment that easily communicates between different types of networks, 
protocols, and vendor equipment. Until common IPT standards are realized, 
prefer equipment that provides the most interoperability (e.g., IPT equipment that 
supports both SIP and H.323). 
4. Services: A Service Level Agreement (SLA) is an agreement between the user 
and a vendor that defines what services will be provided, at what cost, how they 
will be measured, and how deficiencies will be addressed. When working with 
service vendors, agree on measurable SLAs that are easy to enforce (because they 
include specific actions when guarantees aren’t fulfilled).  
5. Outsourcing: All of the practices discussed in this document could potentially be 
outsourced to another company. Outsourcing is the practice of hiring another 
company to handle an internal business function, usually because we believe that 
someone else can do it better at a lower cost. Outsourcing options can range from 
an entire IPT deployment to portions of it, like the data network assessment or 
network upgrades.  Hiring a system integrator is also a form of outsourcing. 
Almost anything can be outsourced; however, as the level of outsourcing and 




a. When outsourcing any of the IPT implementation or IPT services, work to 
create a relationship with the provider that will lead to long term success of 
the IPT deployment. This can be done by avoiding the following six mistakes: 
(1) Not clearly defining the desired results and how they’ll be measured,  
(2) Not talking to a provider’s current and former clients,  
(3) Failing to consider the long-term relationship dynamics,  
(4) Signing a standardized, multiyear contract,  
(5) Not planning up front for how the relationships might end, and  
(6) Treating the provider as an outsider. 
6. Acquire all IPT equipment in accordance with appropriate Coast Guard Policy: 
a. Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Information Technology (C4&IT) Investment Management Policy, 
COMDTINST 5230.71. 
b. Coast Guard Acquisition Procedures (CGAP), COMDTINST M4200.19 
(series). 
c. U.S. Coast Guard Logistics Handbook, COMDTINST M4000.2. 
I. CREATE AN IMPLEMENTATION PLAN 
1. An effective method of implementing IPT is to make incremental adjustments. An 
IPT implementation plan is designed with this in mind and identifies distinct 
breaks in the process where effectiveness can be measured. A proven method to 
start the process is to conduct a pilot deployment. This gives the IPT project team 
the opportunity to gain experience with the technology before diving into a full 
deployment. The pilot program helps the project team to truly understand how the 
IPT-based network will function in the organization and enables them to create an 
implementation plan that addresses the highest priorities first. 
2. Pilot Deployment (Test Bed): A pilot program is a small implementation of IPT 
intended to be a learning opportunity that prepares for a larger implementation; 
however, it also helps to define a business case for IPT and helps to select the best 
equipment and services for a full deployment.  
a. The best places to perform the pilot is in a situation where: 
(1) Return on investment is high (see section H.2 of this chapter),  
(2) Potential for disruption is minimal, 
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(3) User cooperation and feedback is high.  
b. To get the most out of the test bed, the project team should learn as much as 
they can about the behavior of the system: 
(1) Experiment with different equipment, configurations, traffic volumes, 
protocols, QoS mechanisms, and security mechanisms.  
(2) Understand how equipment from different vendors interoperates.  
(3) Understand how to recognize, isolate, and repair network problems.   
(4) Supported experimentation with training and with strong working 
relationships with potential vendors.  
(5) Become familiar with the maintenance and long term management of the 
system to ensure success when vendor support fades.  
c. The more thorough the pilot program, the more prepared the project team will 
be for a large scale deployment of IPT. 
J. DEPLOYMENT 
1. Once a pilot program has been conducted and an implementation plan is 
developed, the project team will be prepared to move into full deployment. The 
project team should begin to make adjustments to the network incrementally and 
be prepared for adjustments. Changes in the plan will effectively be recognized by 
building feedback loops into the process and by monitoring measurements that 
demonstrate system effectiveness.  Examples of tests that might be used to check 
each phase of the implementation is provided below. A systematic and continuous 
assessment of the implementation creates a smooth transition to a valuable IPT-
based network.  
a. Operation and Function Test: Does all the end-user equipment work properly 
and provide all promised features? 
b. Ease of Use Test: Is the system easy for all users to use?  Is the system easy 
for the IT staff to maintain? 
c. Network Application Performance Test: Is there good call quality? 
d. Transaction-oriented Application Performance Test: Are critical applications 
on the network still operating normally after the change?  This requires the 
project team to take measurements prior to the change. 
e. Settings Test: Do equipment and applications still perform as expected after 
changing IPT configurations? 
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f. Stress Test: Does the network provide good call quality to the predicted level 
of call volume?  Does it transfer calls to the PSTN when the limit is reached? 
g. Extraneous Traffic Test: Is the system doing anything you don’t expect or 
understand? A network protocol analyzer may help to determine this. 
h. Problem Reporting Test: Does the IPT management system operate correctly? 
Create faults in the system and see if the management system responds 
accordingly. 
K. NETWORK MANAGEMENT & MAINTENANCE 
1. Once the IPT-based network has been deployed, it requires constant attention to 
maintain high levels of reliability, call quality, and system security. An effective 
IPT management system will meet the future needs of a growing network while 
addressing four areas of concern: Operations, Availability, Call Quality, and 
Accounting. Security is an important piece of each area and must be consistently 
addressed to assure the well-being of the network. 
2. Managing Operations: Use configuration management, event management, and 
fault management to identify and address problems proactively to prevent 
significant system failures. 
a. Configuration Management: A configuration is the hardware and software 
arrangements that define a computer or telecommunications system and thus 
determine what the system will do and how well it will do it. To manage the 
IPT system configuration, the IT staff must:  
(1) Understand the current configuration, 
(2) Test and monitor all changes to the system configuration,  
(3) Closely track all changes, and 
(4) Limit and control who is authorized to make changes. 
An awareness of the current system configuration is achieved through the use 
of readable and understandable files, reports, and diagrams. The network 
management team must understand what physical components make up the 
network, they should know equipment specifics, and recognize how the 
components are linked together. This can be accomplished through the use of 
network topology diagrams and up-to-date inventories. Topology diagrams 
provide a good high-level understanding of how the network is connected. 
Inventories provide more specific information (e.g., Name, location, IP and 
MAC addresses, function of the device, vendor, model, serial number, 
operating system version, available memory, processing speed, etc.) to better 
understand each components function in the network. There are also software 
tools available to help identify and track this information. Configuration files 
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should be protected to ensure the current configuration is accurate. This is 
accomplished by limited access to authorized individuals, by backing up 
configuration files frequently, installing security mechanisms, and by closely 
monitoring access to the files in order to recognize potential damage. 
b. Perform configuration management in accordance with appropriate Coast 
Guard Policy: 
(1) Coast Guard Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Information Technology (C4&IT) Configuration Management (CM) 
Policy, COMDTINST 5230.69. 
(2) Standard Workstation III Configuration Management Policy, 
COMDTINST 5200.16. 
c. Event Management: Operating systems have the ability to track and log a 
variety of system events (e.g., opening, reading, modifying, and closing 
documents; when an application starts and stops; system errors). When system 
performance suffers, failures occur, or when the network has been attacked it 
is usually possible to recognize signs of the cause through system logs.  
(1) Prioritize system events.  It is infeasible to keep track of them all, so track 
and log only those events that can effectively acted on. 
(2) Determine what kind of system response is required to address suspicious 
activity, which might include alerting the IT staff or executing corrective 
action without immediate human intervention.  
(3) Use software applications that help to track system events, consolidate 
logs, and help to recognize irregular activity. 
d. Fault Management: The IPT system management team must be able to 
locate and correct system problems quickly as a part of day-to-day operations 
to prevent significant downtime.  
(1) The complexity of the network often makes it difficult to isolate problems. 
A team can do several things to locate problems more quickly: 
(1) Look in places where recent changes were made,  
(2) Look in places where previous failures occurred, and  
(3) Look in places where monitoring indicates a trend of increasing 
trouble.  




(2) Track all problems, whether solved or still unidentified, with an 
explanation of symptoms, expected time and cost to repair, solutions, and 
a priority. This will help the management team to address the most 
important problems first and create a repository of information that will 
enable faster resolution in later cases.  
(3) Create a plan to handle significant events, like a network failure or severe 
attack on security (e.g., DDoS), so that the problem can be addressed 
efficiently (i.e., decreasing the likelihood of long hours that can cause 
more failures due to human fatigue and limitations) before significantly 
impacting operations. 
3. Maintaining High Availability: Reduce network downtime through prevention, 
detection, and reaction.  Focus efforts on IPT servers and managing applications. 
a. Prevention: The best approach is to prevent failures by actively responding to 
small indications of problems before they get out of control.  
b. Detection: When prevention is not successful, the IT team must be able to 
quickly isolate the problem so that it can be repaired.  
c. Reaction: Once detected, the team must act quickly to provide a short term 
solution and follow up with a permanent fix and preventions for similar 
failures. 
d. IPT servers: IPT servers provide the most critical portions of the network.  
Harden servers to maintain a strong security posture and monitor them 
continously with a focus on the hardware, applications, and traffic.  
e. Manage Applications: System software is complex and often acts 
unexpectedly, especially when interacting with other applications. 
Applications can often consume resources quickly or waste processing 
capability on unnecessary operations. Setting limits and closely monitoring 
these systems assists in achieving better levels of availability. 
4. Maintaining Consistent Call Quality: On initial deployment, the IPT-based 
network should provide satisfactory call quality. However, as the network grows 
and changes, call quality is likely to become an issue.  
a. Measure and track current call quality: Toll quality is measured at an MOS of 
4.0 or greater, while quality becomes unacceptable at levels lower than 3.6. 
Software is available to continuously monitor network traffic and determine 
an estimate of the MOS. Monitoring should occur throughout the network and 
trigger a response (e.g. alert staff or divert calls) when quality falls below 
established standards.  
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b. Monitor network performance: The network metrics for IPT that should be 
examined most closely are delay, jitter, and lost packets. Responding to 
fluctuations in these measurements help to maintain call quality. 
c. Enforce SLAs: Delay, jitter, and lost packet measurements are typically used 
to establish service level agreements with service providers. Track them and 
hold vendors accountable to encourage consistent quality. 
d. Tune QoS mechanisms: QoS mechanisms must be managed to ensure that they 
are configured correctly and work correctly. The mechanisms can be complex, 
but can be managed with policy-based network management. A policy server 
monitors how traffic is handled and automatically generates and distributes 
configuration instructions that help components to apply QoS settings in 
accordance with policy. 
e. Plan for future growth: Prepare for future growth by tracking how the network 
responds when new users are added. Understanding these trends assists in 
determining how to incrementally install or upgrade components in response 
to increasing call demands.  
5. Accounting: Call detail records (CDRs) are used to keep track of the details of 
completed calls, containing information like the call source, destination, time, 
duration, delay, and jitter.  
a. Use the information in CDRs to monitor and troubleshoot the network. 
b. Use the information in CDRs to determine who pays for what IPT service.  
c. Closely track and monitor CDRS to ensure accurate billing and to help 
identify potential problems in the network.  
d. Protect CDRs, they usually contain personal or private information that is 
protected by law.  
6. Failure to successfully monitor and upkeep the network can create substantial 
losses due to the costs of replacing damaged equipment, time lost by the IT staff, 
lowered employee productivity, and the loss of customer or public trust. Good 
IPT network management will come at an increased cost of human and physical 
resources, but is necessary to balance the risks of network failures that hamper 
operations.  
L. MANAGE CHANGE  
1. The final capabilities that are used in successful deployments are: the ability to 
manage the expectations of the people who will use the new system and the 
ability to adjust operational processes to utilize new technology.  
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2. Employees can be a great hindrance to any significant change in an organization, 
including the introduction of an IPT-based network.  They have a variety of 
reasons, whether it is because they are comfortable with the old way of doing 
business or because they believe they will lose power or because of any other 
reason. Harness the drive of those who are excited to implement the change and 
manage those who are likely to resist. 
3. The introduction of IPT will not only change the equipment in the business, but is 
likely to have an effect on how business is done in order to take full advantage of 
the opportunity. An implementation of IPT must include a reevaluation of 
operational processes that utilize telephony resources.  
4. There are many methodologies that have been created to manage this type of 
change in the organization, and many of them could be applied to an IPT 
implementation. An example of a change management methodology is discussed 
below to demonstrate the use of techniques that might smooth out the transition to 
IPT.  A framework for business transformation, which may be applied to IPT 
implementations, is explained by Joseph Kotter in the article, “Leading Change: 
Why Transformation Efforts Fail.” It consists of eight steps that are discussed 
below. 
a. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: The urgency that must be conveyed for an 
IPT implementation is the opportunity to realize great benefits from a 
converged network.  That urgency may soon be created by the need to keep up 
with other governments or agencies that have already taken advantages of 
IPT-based networks. The level of urgency is established by the effectiveness 
of the business case made to stakeholders of an IPT system. 
b. Forming a Powerful Guiding Coalition: The IPT implementation project 
team will lead the development, but can only do it effectively with the support 
(in the form of budget and authority) of upper management. They can also 
drive positive change with the support of enthusiastic employees that have an 
interest in the end product. 
c. Creating a Vision: The vision is supported by a strong business case and a 
well-planned implementation plan, which includes plans for development 
beyond the initial deployment and changes in operational and administrative 
processes. 
d. Communicating a Vision: All stakeholders, down to individual users, must 
have an understanding of the changes that will take place to convert to IPT 
technology and resultant business practices. This is accomplished through 
training and continuous communication that includes feedback between both 
implementers, stakeholders, and users. 
e. Empowering Others to Act on the Vision: This is accomplished by getting 
full support from individuals who have the authority and budget to make 
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changes. Enthusiast stakeholders will lose faith if not given the power to 
implement the IPT system the right way.  
f. Planning for and Creating Short-Term Wins: Small deployments and pilot 
projects, which take advantage of great returns from small changes, will help 
to achieve buy-in from stakeholders. It is also an early indication of problems 
or resistance if a project team is unable to get user acceptance or realize 
business improvements on small changes. Successes, however, should be 
recognized to encourage further growth, acceptance, and positive business 
change. 
g. Consolidating Improvements and Producing Still More Change: The 
incremental approach to implementing IPT-based networks provides an 
excellent method to encourage positive change. The process produces gradual 
change in stages and confirms success through effective measures of 
performance. Not only must the technical aspects of the change be measured 
as described, but the project team must also monitor the effect those changes 
have on business processes. Incremental successes build upon each other to 
create more positive change and acceptance in the future. 
h. Institutionalizing New Approaches: Finally, the implementation will be a 
success when stakeholders adjust to and accept new business processes 
created by the change in technology. Be wary of those who continue to 
reminisce about the way things used to be, and reward those who embrace the 














THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
183 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. Professor Dan C. Boger 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
4. R. Scott Coté 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
5. CDR Kip Whiteman 
USCG Headquarters Support Command 
Washington, D.C. 
 
6. Tom Estes 
USCG Headquarters Support Command 
Washington, D.C. 
 
7. CWO Lewis Darley 
USCG Headquarters Support Command 
Washington, D.C. 
 




9. Tom Clark 
Telecommunications and Information Systems Command 
Alexandria, Virginia 
 
10. LT Mark Patton 
Cottage Grove, Oregon 
 
 
